



JPRS-NEA-89-068
23 OCTOBER 1989



**FOREIGN
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JPRS Report

Near East & South Asia



Near East & South Asia

JPRS-NEA-89-068

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NKAO Declared 'Independent Soviet Territory'

46050039b Paris HARATCH in Armenian
29 Aug 89 p 1

[Text] As we reported in our 24 August edition, a congress of the authorized [liaison] representatives of the people of Karabakh convened in Stepanakert on August 16. The congress has argued that the Special Administrative Committee assigned to the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast [NKAO] is not in a position to resolve the existing crisis in the oblast. The congress elected a 78-member National Council and a 17-member presidium. The congress stated that its main concern is the reunification of NKAO with Armenia, the stabilization of the tumultuous state of daily life and the prevention of interethnic clashes.

The 19 August edition of the daily, KHORHRTAYIN KARABAKH, reported elaborately about the work of the congress. The paper also carried the text of the congress declaration which, after explaining the factors that made the convening of the congress essential, says:

- All local party and Soviet institutions played an active role in the preparations for and the convening of the congress, considering it as the sole authority which has been elected by the people in the oblast and whose purpose is to serve the people.
- The National Council is independent in its activities; it is accountable only to the congress. Its decisions are binding across the entire territory of Nagorno-Karabakh.
- The congress declares the NKAO as an independent Soviet territory. The Azerbaijani constitution, Azerbaijani laws for NKAO and other laws of the Azerbaijani SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] are no longer applicable within the borders of the oblast. Any interference by Azerbaijan will be considered as an act of aggression and will receive the appropriate response. The congress appeals to the USSR Supreme Soviet and the supreme soviets of all Union republics to recognize the National Council of Nagorno-Karabakh as the only legitimate authority in NKAO. It also asks them to contribute to the restoration of constitutional means that are independent of Azerbaijan for the administration of the autonomous oblast.
- The congress requests from the democratic governments of the world and the UN Secretary General to help the people of Nagorno Karabakh in its aspirations for self-determination and independence.
- The congress urges the people of the oblast to consolidate their unity and not to fall prey to provocations.

The congress of the authorized representatives of the people of NKAO ended its meeting with the statement: "The success of our sacred mission depends on our unity and organization."

Karabakh Committee Members Elected to Supreme Soviet

Candidates' Background, Motives

46050039a Paris HARATCH in Armenian
29 Aug 89 p 1

[Excerpt] Special elections were held for Supreme Soviet seats in five electoral districts in Armenia on 27 August. The candidates were:

Arkadi Manucharov in the Charentzavan electoral district: His candidacy was forced by the people of the region despite the fact that the former head of the "Krunk" organization of Karabakh remains in prison. Another motivation for his candidacy is to have a representative from Karabakh in the Armenian Supreme Soviet.

Rober Kocharyan in the Kirovakan electoral district: He is also from Karabakh.

The presence of representatives from Nagorno-Karabakh in the Armenian Supreme Soviet has special political significance and is considered very important by the Karabakh Committee.

Levon Ter Petrosyan [Karabakh Committee] in the Lenin electoral district of Yerevan.

Rafayel Khazaryan in the Ashtarak electoral district: Vartges Petrosyan, currently the president of the Cultural Foundation and formerly the president of the Armenian Writers' Union, announced his candidacy against this well-known member of the Karabakh Committee, but withdrew 3 days before the election day.

Arshak Sadoyan [Karabakh Committee] is running in Stepanavan. [passage omitted]

Imprisoned Activist Elected

46050039a Paris HARATCH in Armenian
30 Aug 89 p 1

[Text] Yesterday we reported initial results from the special elections for the Armenian Supreme Soviet. Below are the names of the winners and the percentages of the electoral vote they won.

Levon Ter Petrosyan: Lenin electoral district of Yerevan (71.7 percent).

Rober Kocharyan: Kirovakan electoral district (58.6 percent).

Rafayel Khazaryan: Ashtarak electoral district (68 percent).

Arkadi Manucharov: Charentzavan electoral district (63.6 percent).

The percentages are based on the number of votes cast.

As for Stepanavan, the results are confusing and have led to protests. Indeed, special efforts were made to prevent the election of Arshak Sadoyan who is a member of the Karabakh Committee. As a result of tactics such as distributing soap and coffee to the electorate, the "desired" result was achieved: Mr. Cheshmarityan, the first secretary of the Stepanavan raykom was elected by 63 percent of the vote, while Sadoyan won only 22 percent of the vote.

These results are questionable, and petitions have been filed to nullify them.

To clarify the situation of Arkadi Manucharov, who is in prison, KHORHRTAYIN HAYASTAN reported the following on 16 August: "A. M. Manucharov, who currently remains in a place of detention, was registered as a candidate for a deputyship in the Armenian Supreme Soviet in addition to several other candidates by the 11 August 1989 decision of the Electoral Commission of Electoral Okrug No. 194 of the Armenian Supreme Soviet elections in Charentzavan. According to Article 96 of the USSR Constitution, persons who are held in places of detention cannot participate in elections. According to Article 74 of the USSR Constitution, 'the laws of the USSR are uniformly valid in the territories of all Union republics. In the event of inconsistencies between any law of a Union republic and an all-Union law, the law of the USSR prevails.' In the light of these articles of the USSR Constitution, the Presidium of the Armenian Supreme Soviet examined the decision of the Electoral Commission with regard to the candidacy of A. M. Manucharov and, finding that that decision contravenes existing legislation, and decided to declare as void the 11 August 1989 decision of the Electoral Commission of Electoral Okrug 194 of the Armenian Supreme Soviet elections in Charentzavan to register A. M. Manucharov as a candidate for a deputyship in the Armenian Supreme Soviet."

Despite this decision, Manucharov ran as a candidate and won because the Electoral Commission did not implement the said decision. The commission decided that Manucharov is eligible run as a candidate because he is not charged with any offense and he is under preventive detention. This decision is, however, subject to the approval of the "Mandate" Commission.

Turkish Decree on Sabotage Deplored

46050039c Istanbul MARMARA in Armenian
8 Aug 89 p 3

[Article by Dr Garabed Arman, private counselor to the Armenian Patriarch of Turkey: "We Are not Saboteurs"]

[Excerpts] We heard with anguish the publication in the Official Gazette of a decree signed by several ministers and the Honorable Prime Minister with regard to measures to be taken in the event of a conspiracy.

The decree describes in great detail all persons who may be considered dangerous elements in this country and who may engage in acts of sabotage. Up to this point it is

quite understandable, and we have no objections. Like all countries, this country must report to its security forces and pertinent authorities the names of suspicious groups so that the necessary measures can be taken against possible conspiracies.

But the reason for our anguish becomes clear when we read Section (r) of the said decree and see that the groups which are considered potential saboteurs include:

"Local foreigners and people of other races with Turkish citizenship who live in this country."

In other words, according to this article, we, the Armenians, as well as the Jews and the Greeks can be considered as potential saboteurs.

Firstly, that phrase is incomprehensible in a syntactic sense because several contradictory terms are used together.

How can someone live in this country, be a citizen of this country and be described as a foreigner?

How can a country which has a republican form of government and where democracy prevails make racial distinctions among its citizens—that is, find differences in the shapes of their skulls? [passage omitted]

I ask all the ministers who signed this decree:

1) Every day when we read the papers we hear about the dangerous elements operating in the country, bombings of banks and people arrested for committing various political offenses. Is there a single Armenian among them?

2) Today there are numerous terrorists and political prisoners in the country's prisons for trying to disseminate their ideas across the nation by creating discord in the country. Some of them have even killed officers and policemen. Can a few Armenians be found among all these thousands of convicts?

The Armenians will not betray the country they live in. [passage omitted]

The Armenians of Turkey have never worked against the interests of this country or contemplated to harm the country in which they were born and raised. We are law-abiding and loyal citizens, and we only wish to live in peace and tranquillity in this country without being subjected to discrimination. It is a great joy for us to hear praise for Turkish-Armenians from the Honorable President of the Republic or the Prime Minister. But we are deeply tormented and feel morally devastated when we see that Armenians are labeled with derisive and defamatory names in the papers.

Honorable ministers: Be assured that we, the Armenians of Turkey, are good and dedicated citizens, that we mean no harm to you and that we can do nothing but good to you.

We are not "potential" saboteurs.

REGIONAL AFFAIRS

Iraqi Missiles May Have Been Intended for Israel

44000015 Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST
in English 7 Sep 89 p 2

[Text] The Iraqi missile plant struck by a massive explosion in mid-August may have been engaged in making chemical warheads for advanced long-range missiles powerful enough to reach Israel, observers here say. But the August explosion is unlikely to deter the Iraqis from their ambitious and highly successful missile program that already has been credited with helping Iraq win the Gulf War, noted Aharon Levran, a private military analyst. He says that in the summer of 1987 a similar explosion had wrecked an Iraqi military complex engaged in extending the range of the Soviet Scud missile from 300 to 600 kms. Despite the setback the newly-adapted Iraqi missile, dubbed the "al-Husayn," was unleashed by the dozens against Tehran in February 1988. The missile barrage helped bring Iran to its knees and led to the Gulf War ceasefire a few months later. Iraqi sources said the explosion at the plant touched off a big fire that destroyed at least 30 percent of the complex, which includes laboratories, missile factories, and workers' living quarters. The sources also said that the missiles facility included a chemical weapons factory and that some of the casualties had wounds consistent with contact with chemical agents. The Badr 2000's [latest Iraqi missile] range and potential for carrying chemical warheads has proven particularly worrisome to Israel. Iraq reportedly has several other plants developing and producing chemical weapons, said 'Ofra Banjio of Tel Aviv University's Dayan Center. Those sites are located in 'Akashat near the Syrian border, al-Basrah, and al-Mawsil in northern Iraq.

Iraqi Ba'th, Egyptian Liberal Parties Make Statements

Liberal Leader on Arab Intervention

45040516a Cairo AL-AHRAR in Arabic 28 Aug 89 p 8

[Article: "Arab Force Must Be Sent To End War in Lebanon"]

[Text] Mustafa Kamil Murad, head of the Liberal Party, stressed the importance of sending an Arab force, called the "Peace Force," to end the war in Lebanon, so that it does not become feasible for any foreign force to intervene in Lebanon.

He said this during his meeting with Mr Shabib al-Maliki, representative of the Foreign Relations Committee of the Iraqi Ba'th Party, and Mr Sufyan al-Wazir, commissioner at the Iraqi embassy in Cairo.

Muhammad Farid Zakariyya, assistant general secretary of the [Liberal] Party, attended the meeting.

The party chairman called for coordination between Arab defense ministers in order to form an Arab force that would frighten the Zionist enemy.

He called for the unification of Arab currency, and the creation of what would be called the "Arab dinar" (or whatever name is agreed upon). It would be a symbol of currency unification.

Muhammad Farid Zakariyya spoke about the need to coordinate between the Ba'th and the Liberal parties, and to lay the overall outlines for increasing and strengthening relations.

Mr Shabib al-Maliki, representative of the Foreign Relations Committee of the Ba'th Party, affirmed that the aim of the visit was to strengthen relations between the Arab peoples, and to become acquainted with different ideas about the issues of Lebanon and Palestine.

Youth Committees Support Tripartite Committee

45040516b Cairo AL-AHRAR in Arabic 28 Aug 89 p 8

[Article by Khalid al-Qushayri: "Permanent Committee of Arab Youth"]

[Text] Members of the Liberal Party's Youth Committee met with a youth delegation from the National Union of Students and Young People of Iraq last Thursday evening in the Liberal Party's headquarters in 'Abidin.

The two sides reviewed all of the problems facing the Arab nation and the problems of the young people in the Arab countries. They discussed serious steps and coordination between the young people's unions and institutions in all of the countries.

Mr Naji Fayyad Bilal, a member of the Executive Committee of the National Union of Students and Young People of Iraq, headed the delegation of Iraqi youth. Muhammad Farid Zakariyya, the party's assistant general secretary, headed the committee of Liberal Party youth.

The two sides emphasized that the youth must assume its role and bear full responsibility, because young people are tomorrow's leaders and the objects of this nation's brightest hopes. The following statement was issued at the end of the meeting:

- The two sides affirm that all non-Lebanese forces must withdraw from Lebanon immediately to provide the proper climate for the Lebanese people to choose a leadership and government from among the Lebanese themselves.
- The Syrian forces bear the principal responsibility for the massacres and crimes that happen on Lebanese territory, if the Syrians insist on not responding to the tripartite committee.
- The task of the Arab tripartite committee must continue, and it must move to restore Lebanon's unity, independent sovereignty, and Arab character. The two sides believe that the Arab solution to this

problem is the only way to preserve the unity of Lebanon.

- The Arab nation must assume its role. Interference by any foreign forces must not be allowed. An Arab force must be formed to restore unity to Lebanon.
- The two sides send greetings and esteem to the Palestinian people on their brave intifadah [uprising]. The two sides affirm that they stand supporting them and offering them aid in all areas, since they believe that the revolution of stones is the effective tool for realizing Palestinian hopes.
- The two sides call for discussion between all Arab youth and student organizations in order to stand beside the Lebanese people in their striving to realize their unity and territorial integrity and to oppose the Zionist-imperialist attack.

It should be mentioned that the head of the Liberal Party attended part of this meeting, and delivered a speech in which he greeted the Iraqi youth. He stated that the Arab youth everywhere must draw together, because they are tomorrow's leaders.

The Iraqi consul in Cairo also attended the meeting.

Egypt Building Fence on Border With Israel

TA2009170989 Tel Aviv MA'ARIV
in Hebrew 20 Sep 89 p 2

[Summary] Yehudit Zilberstein reports that Egypt has begun to build a fence along its border with Israel. Egypt is apparently planning to erect a fence along the entire border from Taba to Rafiah. Egyptian soldiers have recently arrived in Taba and have begun to plant stakes from the Parker Point near the Taba road to border pillar 91, and have placed barbed wire between the stakes. Egypt informed Israel in advance of its intention to build a fence along the border. Border fences were built in the Ra's al-Naqab and Ma'ale Netafim area several months ago.

AFESD Officer Discusses Goals, Relations With Egypt

45040533a Cairo AL-NIQAABI AL-'ARABI
in Arabic Jul 89 p 10

[Article: "Philosophy of the Arab Fund for Economic Development in Supporting and Funding Arab Projects"]

[Excerpts] Dr Mirfat Badawi, deputy director of the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development [AFESD], affirmed that Egypt had paid its full share in the fund following its return to fund membership in April of the past year. She explained that the remaining share owed by Egypt had been about 18,750,000 Kuwaiti dinars and that it was paid last January.

In a press conference she gave during her recent visit to Cairo, Dr Mirfat Badawi said that the fund welcomes

funding any projects that Egypt submits to it, as long as they contribute economically to development. [passage omitted]

The fund's deputy director indicated that Egypt can be considered the country receiving the largest proportion of loans from the fund, after the Sudan. This is due to the high level of the indicators upon which the fund bases its policy of distributing loans to the Arab states. She said that the loans Egypt had obtained from the fund to finance projects totaled about 54,300,000 Kuwaiti dinars.

Replying to a question about facilities the fund could provide to support Arab projects, Dr Mirfat Badawi said that the fund could provide about 130 million Kuwaiti dinars a year to finance projects in the Arab states. She explained that the fund's current resources amounted to about 1.077 billion Kuwaiti dinars. In addition, the fund can borrow from other financial markets for twice its subscribed capital of 674,800,000 Kuwaiti dinars. She went on to say that the fund had not to date turned to the method of borrowing from financial markets, because it could cover the loans advanced to it.

Replying to another question about the fields of the projects to which the fund gives priority in granting loans, the deputy director of AFESD said that the fund's most important objective was to develop the economies of the Arab states. Thus, the largest loans were directed in the past stage toward projects related to the infrastructure of the Arab states because of its major importance in the growth of these countries. She added that in the coming phase loans will concentrate on the development of food security projects, the development of the human element technologically, and projects for development of the environment—especially water, which is considered one of the most crucial subjects that will affect the economies of the Arab states in the future.

Dr Mirfat Badawi answered another question about rumors that the fund intervenes in projects to which it lends. She stated that no intervention by the fund had ever occurred in any project for which the fund had approved a loan. Such projects are, however, followed by the fund's projects committee, which monitors projects every 6 months to learn of difficulties confronting implementation and to overcome them as far as possible, so that project implementation can be completed.

Regarding possible fund financing of private sector projects in the Arab states, Dr Mirfat Badawi made it clear that the fund welcomes the financing of serious private sector projects in the Arab states, provided that the respective countries guarantee the project. She said that the fund had indeed financed a number of private sector projects in Morocco, Tunisia, Jordan, and Iraq by opening credits for them in a number of banks. The amount that these projects had obtained in loans from the fund totaled about 30 million Kuwaiti dinars.

At the end of her talk, Dr Mirfat Badawi indicated that there was constant coordination between the fund and

other Arab financing institutions, in order to coordinate between funding projects and give confidence to Arab projects that need other funding from international financial institutions.

GCC Phthalic Anhydride Industry Underway

90OL0023c Doha AL-'ARAB in Arabic 17 Aug 89 p 5

[Article: "Study by Gulf Industrial Consultations Organization Underlines Importance of Setting up Local Industry To Produce Phthalic Anhydride"]

[Text] The Gulf Industrial Consultations Organization has conducted a preliminary study on setting up a joint project to produce phthalic anhydride and its main derivatives to meet the Gulf market's needs of these products.

These derivatives—softeners, unsaturated polyester resins [ratinjat], and alkyde resins—are used on a large scale in the Arab Gulf states to produce pliable plastics, oil paints, water tanks, and fiberglass boats. Because there are no existing plants or plants currently under construction to produce phthalic anhydride, the Gulf states rely totally on imports to meet their needs, which are expected to increase in the future with the growth of the Gulf's petrochemical industries which turn out final products.

This study dealt with the actual production and consumption of the phthalic anhydride industry in the region, pointing out that there is a single plant in Iraq scheduled to produce phthalic anhydride at a capacity of 40,000 tons annually and that there are five plants to produce the main derivatives of this substance in each of Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Kuwait, in addition to two plants under construction in Iraq.

The study also shows that Saudi Arabia and Iraq are the biggest consumers of phthalic anhydride, and that their consumption amounts to more than 75 percent the total consumption of the region's states. The region's current consumption of phthalic anhydride amounts to 18,000 tons [annually].

As for the main derivatives, the consumption is as follows: 21,000 tons of softeners, 12,000 tons of unsaturated polyester resins, and 22,000 tons of alkyde resins. The existing capacities to produce these derivatives amount to: 12,000 tons of softeners (Iraq), 12,000 tons of unsaturated polyester resins (6,000 tons by each of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait), and 20,000 tons of alkyde resins (14,500 tons by Saudi Arabia and 5,500 tons by Kuwait). As for the capacities under construction, Iraq has two projects to produce 9,500 tons of unsaturated polyester resins and 9,500 tons of alkyde resins.

The study estimates the expected Gulf states production and consumption of phthalic anhydride and its derivatives to be as follows by the year 2002: For phthalic

anhydride, there is no production, and the consumption amounts to 34,000 tons, with the gap thus amounting to 34,000 tons.

Regarding derivatives, softener production will amount to 12,000 tons and consumption to 39,000 tons, with the gap amounting to 27,000 tons. Unsaturated polyester resin production will amount to 12,000 tons and consumption to 24,000 tons, with the gap amounting to 12,000 tons. Alkyde resin production will amount to 20,000 tons and consumption to 43,000 tons, with the gap amounting to 23,000 tons.

The study conducted by the organization points out that there is need to set up a local industry to produce phthalic anhydride to replace imports, to meet the Gulf market's need, and to export the surplus to the outside world in the presence of encouraging likely markets in Southeast Asia, a number of West European countries, and other Mideastern countries, in addition to the Gulf markets.

As for derivatives, it has become obvious that despite the proliferation of plants producing them in the region, there is need to establish new production capacities to make up for the existing and expected deficit. The study also points out in this regard that a project is under construction to produce softeners at a capacity of 20,000 tons annually and another project to produce alkyde resins at a capacity of 10,000 tons annually.

Phthalic anhydride is a chemical produced by oxidizing orthozylene which is produced in turn by refineries as part of a group of oil aromatics used for the production of final petrochemicals utilized in the industry. The most significant are the softeners used in the production of pliable polyphenyl chloride, cellulose nitrate paints, and rubber. As for unsaturated polyester resins, they are used, after reinforcement with fiberglass, to produce various products. Alkyde resins are used to produce oil paints, printing ink, and moldings.

GCC Industrial Coordination Emphasized

90OL0023d Doha AL-'ARAB in Arabic 19 Aug 89 p 7

[Article: "Study Underlines Importance of Coordination in Gulf Industrial Projects"]

[Text] A study conducted by the Gulf Industrial Consultations Organization underlines the importance of coordination in the Gulf industrial projects. The study says that this coordination gains special importance if industrial development is to achieve its desired role of providing the growth alternative in the post-oil era.

The study, published in edition 37 of the Arab Gulf AL-TA'AWUN AL-SINA'I [Industrial Cooperation], issued by the organization, points out the importance of industrial coordination and economic integration in the industrialization process, and of eliminating duality in numerous projects, whether already existing projects or

projects to be built in the future, because of the similar production structures of the region's economies.

The study stresses that Gulf industrial coordination through joint projects is the best formula that can be adopted at present, considering that it is a practical and effective inlet to marching on the long path of economic integration.

The study further notes that the Arab Gulf joint industrial projects are embodied in creating and expanding the fundamental industrial development base and in building agreed industrial projects remotely from duality and similarity. The study also refers to joint food industry projects as projects that will provide these countries with an effective instrument to achieve their national food security.

The study points out that investments in Gulf joint projects in the area of chemicals, fertilizer, and plastics top investments in the various branches, amounted to 26 percent of the [total] investments, followed by 21.1 percent in projects turning out processed iron products, 12 percent in the basic metals industry, and 3.3 percent in the food industries.

As for the qualities of the joint industrial projects, the study emphasizes that these projects make it easier for the Gulf countries to utilize the Arab dimension, which is essential for confronting the basic challenges facing industrial development in these countries by incorporating the givens of the other Arab countries, which offer varied natural resources, abundant labor, a big market, a capable agricultural dimension, and a relatively long industrial experience in some Arab countries.

The study notes that joint industrial Gulf-international projects constitute the main part of the region's industrial projects.

Joint international industrial projects amounted in the early 1980's to 31 projects with a total capital of \$7,261,000,000, whereas the joint Gulf industrial projects amounted to 18 projects with a total capital of \$2,805,000,000 for the same period, meaning that the joint Gulf industrial projects amount to one-third of all joint Gulf-international projects.

Kuwaiti Real Estate Investment in Egypt Detailed

45040500 Cairo AL-MUSAWWAR
in Arabic 1 Sep 89 p 55

[Article by Fawzi 'Abd-al-Latif and Sayyid Zakariyyah: "Spotlight on Kuwaiti Real Estate Investment Group's Activities in Egypt; Group Chairman Rashid al-Mujrin Al-Rumi: 'Our Housing Projects Provided 2,800 Jobs in Various Sectors As Well As 2,750 Housing Units'"]

[Excerpt] [Passage omitted] We interviewed Mr. Rashid al-Mujrin Al-Rumi, board chairman of the Kuwaiti Real Estate Investment Group, who shed light on the major activities in Egypt of the group and its companies in the fields of housing, industry, economy, and tourism. He

said: The group, through all of its projects and investments in Egypt, was able to create some 2800 jobs in various sectors. Its housing projects provided 2,750 housing units.

It is common knowledge that the Kuwaiti Real Estate Investment Group began investing in the Arab Republic of Egypt, since its creation under foreign and Arab capital investment laws, by participating in projects that are economically viable to both parties. The Kuwaiti Real Estate Investment Group has invested in many sectors including:

Housing and Real Estate Development

- The "Tibah 2000" project at Nasr City—the Egyptian Kuwaiti Company for Real Estate Development, a joint venture, was created in 1978 under terms of the 26 January 1975 Egyptian Kuwaiti Cooperation Agreement for Rehabilitation and Development. The company undertook several real estate projects in cooperation with the Cairo governorate and the Nasr City Company for Housing and Rehabilitation. Among them are the "Tibah 2000" commercial and business project that comprises six office rental floors, 59 shops, two movie theaters, a multistoried department store, and a supermarket. The "Tibah 2000" housing project comprises 100 luxury apartments. Another housing project for those with above average income comprises 360 housing units at the eastern site and 180 housing units at the western site for a total of 640 units [as published].
- The economical housing project at al-Basatine—it is a major project undertaken by the Kuwaiti Real Estate Investment Group in cooperation with the Egyptian-Kuwaiti Company for Real Estate Development. It comprises 2,019 Kuwaiti-financed housing units under the company's supervision. The project is being implemented by two of the largest contractors in the Egyptian public sector. It will play a major role in solving the housing crisis which is receiving considerable state attention.
- The al-Khalij Towers Complex—another real estate project of the Kuwaiti Real Estate Investment Group is the Al-Khalij Towers complex in the borough of al-'Ajuzah. It is a self-contained housing complex of eight adjoining towers on a 2,600 square meter plot. It includes 89 apartments and a number of shops.

The Tourism Sector

Among the group's projects in the important tourism sector are:

- The Zamalik Ambassador Hotel Suites which lies along the Nile on an area of 2,400 square meters. It is classified as a five-star hotel and comprises 104 suites on 27 floors in addition to other hotel facilities such as restaurants, shops, etc.
- The Cairo Ambassador Hotel comprises 280 rooms, including 24 suites, in addition to other hotel facilities. Plans are underway to expand the hotel on an adjacent site.

The Industrial Sector

Mr Rashid al-Mujrin Al-Rumi added that the groups major contributions to the industrial sector include:

- The Egypt Kuwait Sali Company for Wood Industries—the group has contributed 53.63 percent of the company's 4.3-million-pound capital. The enterprise produces wooden household and office furniture as well as doors and windows.
- The Arab Stone Company—the group plays a role in the construction industries and it helped create this company and contributed 50 percent of its 6-million-pound capital; the company produces sand stones of various kinds and colors.
- The Arab Ceramics Company (ARACEMCO)—the group is a 24.4 percent partner in this company capitalized at 12 million pounds; it produces ceramics and ceramic tiles as well as sanitary equipment.
- The Egyptian French Industrial Company—the group contributed 8.6 percent of its 3.5-million-pound capital; it produces mixers and other bathroom fixtures of chromed copper.
- The International Textile Company—the group contributed 15 percent to the capitalization of this company created in cooperation with Arab entities; it is expected to help develop the Egyptian textile industry.

Mr. Rashid Muhammad Al-Khalidi, general manager of the Cairo offices of the Kuwaiti Real Estate Investment Group, discussed more of the group's activities in Egypt. He said that its other major economic ventures include:

The Banking Sector

- The Egyptian-Khaliji Bank—the group, in cooperation with Arab and Kuwaiti businessmen, contributed 49 percent to the capitalization of this bank which is growing and gaining a market share to a remarkable degree.
- The group, through one of its companies, is also a partner in the Alexandria-Kuwait International Bank.

Several other projects are also under study.

The Tourism Sector

- Al-Jazirah Ambassador Hotel—to be constructed on a Nile front site at al-Nile street in the borough of al-Jazirah, it is planned as a five-star hotel and a contribution to meeting the growing needs of tourism in Egypt.
- Al-Ghardakah Project—is a world-class tourist complex that comprises a five-star hotel, a tourist village, tourist villas, a yacht marina, a children's garden, and an amusement park. It would have an area totaling 312,000 square meters.

The Real Estate Sector

- The Abu-al-'Ilah Luxury Housing Project is contemplated for an area of more than 1,700 square meters in al-Zamalik.

Moreover, the Group has recently created the Investment and Financial Papers Group and contributed 49 percent of its capitalization. It is an institution that buys, sells, and evaluates financial papers, acts as broker with stock exchanges, markets domestic and foreign projects, and conducts evaluations and feasibility studies of existing and new ventures.

PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS

PFLP Leader Discusses Regional Relations, Dialogue With U.S.

44040527a Dubayy AL-BAYAN
in Arabic 28 Jul 89 p 14

[Interview with George Habash, secretary general of the PFLP, by Fathi al-Barqawi: "Israel's Policy Toward the Intifadah Takes Shape in Shamir's Plan, While America's Policy Is To Reject Palestinian State; 'We Assured Fellow Palestinians in Fatah That We Remain Committed to Program of Returning Palestinians to Palestine, Establishing a Palestinian State, Having the Right To Determine Our Own Destiny, and Striving To Convene International Conference—Points on Which PFLP and Fatah Agree Outnumber Those on Which They Disagree';" in Tunisia; first eight paragraphs are AL-BAYAN introduction; date not specified]

[Text] A significant and an intelligent remark pertaining to the Middle East appeared in a recently published American report whose authors observed that any plan which either one of the two parties or another outside party proposes has supporters as well as opponents, even within the same camp. In Israel, there are differences between the Likud and Ma'arakh [Labor] parties, and there are also differences within each party. The same is true with the PLO: what is accepted by Fatah may be unacceptable to the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine [PFLP] or the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine [DFLP]. We are also aware that there are other parties outside the PLO that get involved in this matter.

Opportunities to discover something new in an interview with the secretary general of the PFLP remain rare. Because journalists are always thinking about headlines, they will find those headlines with George Habash, even though pinpointing what is being described as an unexpected situation remains difficult.

Although the PFLP has been known for its invariable positions, its positions have been somewhat flexible in recent months. This flexibility manifested itself when the PFLP halfheartedly voted for the resolutions adopted by the 19th session of the PNC [Palestine National Council]. At that time the PFLP's reservations about

some of these resolutions were explained by saying that the PFLP was accepting the democratic method for a modern government.

Differences, not contradictions, between what the PFLP is saying and what other factions, especially Fatah, are saying are quite obvious. The open letters between Mahmud 'Abbas, member of Fatah's Central Committee, and the PFLP are unforgettable.

Naturally, these differences, which surface every now and then, do not lead to the situations which they did in past years. Palestinian political action, which has become more reasonable and more balanced in recent years, is responsible for bringing the Middle East question to the place it is today. The Middle East is one of the world's foremost issues, an issue that is of concern to the two superpowers. It appears on the agenda for all meetings on all levels between the two superpowers.

George Habash was in Tunisia a few days ago. Unlike other Palestinian leaders who are not stationed in Tunisia, he rarely visits that country.

Habash came to Tunisia to attend meetings between Fatah and the PFLP. Although this might at first appear to be an opportunity for the two factions to coordinate their activities and positions in the face of tensions which make more mutual support necessary, it does not mean that the two factions will come out with identical points of view on all pending issues. Habash made that quite clear. Should something like that happen, the PFLP would lose the distinguishing character of its positions which can be described here only by saying that PFLP positions are to the left of Fatah's.

This was an opportunity for AL-BAYAN to meet with the secretary general of the PFLP, but, because many meetings were being held for Palestinian leaders on more than one level, he asked us politely that the interview last no more than 30 minutes. We promised him it would not, and we kept our promise. The interview was short, but it still revealed many positions.

Exchanging Opinions

[AL-BAYAN] What were the issues that were discussed during the meetings which took place between Fatah and the PFLP?

[Habash] We in the PFLP have come to feel, especially in recent months, that Israeli as well as American policy toward the intifadah [uprising] has been quite clearly defined and formed.

While, on the one hand, Israel is turning toward a policy of more repression to strike at the intifadah, its policy, on the other hand, has taken shape in Shamir's plan whose aim is to find an alternative to the PLO and abort the intifadah.

We have also sensed that America's policy has taken form and that it has been defined: America is rejecting the Palestinian state.

In light of this fact, we thought it would be appropriate at this time to meet with our fellow Palestinians in Fatah and face these facts in an attempt to answer the following question together: What is to be done about these developing facts?

We in the PFLP proposed that forceful action be taken to give the intifadah a firm, unshakable foothold. We proposed that all methods to step up the intifadah be considered to ensure that we inflict upon the enemy economic, human, and military losses. We made these proposals after it became clear that the only language the Zionist enemy understands is the language of force, and after it became evident that a Palestinian state cannot be realized until a radical change in the balance of powers on the land can be guaranteed. Such a change would force the enemy to recognize the PLO and recognize our rights.

Forging Close and Strong Relations

In addition, it became clear during that period that the only way to change the American position was to impress upon the American administration that none of its ploys will ever deceive the PLO, and that its interests in the area will actually be threatened unless the United States complies with our request for national rights as a people as well as with our request for political rights. We assured our fellow Palestinians in Fatah that we remain committed to the program which calls for the return of Palestinians to Palestine, the establishment of a state, and the right to determine our own destiny. We told them we remain committed to the effort to convene an international conference as a mechanism to achieve our goals. We told them that we were ~~reaching~~ extending our hands to them, and that created closer and stronger relations. In other words, the political course which was taken after the PNC meeting produced conditions which are forcing Palestinian leaders to adopt a new and serious posture so they can safeguard the achievement of the intifadah's goals of freedom and independence.

[AL-BAYAN] Were any other subjects discussed?

[Habash] Of course these were not all the subjects that we talked about. We talked about our duties as Palestinians living abroad, and we talked about the need to mobilize all the energies and resources of the masses living in exile to ensure all kinds of financial, political, moral, and media support for the intifadah.

This led us automatically to the subject of democratic reform and its importance in the PLO's institutions, which are effective tools in the process of mobilizing people.

Naturally, we also talked about the Arab situation and our function in that regard. We also talked about the PLO's role in getting the movement of the Arab masses to take such action as would apply pressure on Arab countries to make them do their duty to the Palestinian cause.

In the past Arab countries fought in wars for the Palestinian cause. In 1973 they fought the battle of oil for the Palestinian cause. If these countries cannot fight a second battle for oil now, the least they can do is tell the United States that it cannot continue using its veto in the UN Security Council. The United States has already used its veto five times against the intifadah. The least these countries can do is tell the American administration that they will break relations with it, and that our relations with the United States as countries depend on its acceptance of the rights of the Palestinian people and its recognition of a Palestinian state.

Our talks also dealt with our international functions and with the things we have to do to push for an international conference, on the one hand, while ensuring the greatest support for the intifadah, on the other. We are to prod world opinion to apply all kinds of pressure on the Zionist entity so it would find itself compelled to recognize Palestinian rights.

The intifadah which proclaimed freedom as a slogan has made the establishment of a Palestinian state a realistic possibility, but this freedom will not be achieved unless we prescribe a new balance of power locally, in the Arab world, and internationally. It is this new balance of power that will make the establishment of this Palestinian state possible.

Imperfect Harmony

[AL-BAYAN] Was the harmony obvious in all the subjects that were discussed between the PFLP and Fatah?

[Habash] Naturally, it is not easy to say that there was total and perfect agreement, but I did feel that the points we agreed on outnumbered those that we disagreed about. We in the PFLP sincerely wish that Fatah succeed in its fifth general national conference for which it is making preparations. We wish Fatah success based on the continued pursuit of all subjects until the Palestinian state is established.

The Palestinian position is manifested in rejecting Shamir's plan in principle. The American administration, which is the author of the election plan for the occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip, wants to use this election plan to soften support for an international conference so that it can continue to be in the driver's seat, holding all the controls. Accordingly, the idea of holding elections must be rejected in principle. Were we to ask ourselves what are the goals of Shamir's plan, we would find that, without going into details which could distract us or obscure our vision, the aim of the plan was to break the international isolation of the Zionist entity, to abort the intifadah gradually, and to find local Palestinian leaders who would become the alternative to the PLO. Another aim of the Shamir plan is one it shares with the United States which wants to soften support for the idea of an international conference. The United States wants the idea of an international conference ruled out altogether as a mechanism which can achieve

the goals of the Palestinian people to return to their country, determine their own destiny, and establish a Palestinian state.

I personally understand that the Palestinian position rejects Shamir's plan in principle. There can be no democracy under occupation. Anyone who is sincere about achieving democracy must also be sincere about achieving freedom, which precedes democracy. This means Israel's occupation troops must depart first; elections can be conducted afterwards. The departure of Israel's troops does not mean sending these troops out of the principal cities only, but it means their departure from all the areas they occupied in 1967 and establishing UN protection. We would be willing after that to give our Palestinian masses their full right to conduct elections. Anything else would be ridiculous.

[AL-BAYAN] It is being said that the PLO has set conditions for accepting the election plan. What is your position on that?

[Habash] I know about the Palestinian paper which was presented to the emergency Arab Summit meeting in Casablanca, and I know about the decision that was made by the summit meeting. I also know about the PLO's Palestinian decisions. I will answer your question in light of all this.

Statements made by Hasan 'Abd-al-Rahman in Washington and statements made by anyone else anywhere do not concern me. What concerns me are the decisions which are made by the PLO in that regard. The paper which was presented by the PLO to the Arab Summit and the decision that was made about the Shamir plan concern me. These are matters that should be of concern. They are more important than a statement made by one person or another.

Communications Inside

[AL-BAYAN] Did the PLO give people inside the country the green light so they can communicate with Israeli officials?

[Habash] The PLO gave no one the green light. What it said was this: If Israeli occupation authorities force anyone to meet with Yitzhaq Shamir, Shim'on Peres, or Yitzhaq Rabin and if that person has no other recourse but to comply, that person's answer in that case must be that the PLO is the sole and legitimate representative of the Palestinian people and that its address is known to the whole world.

Communications Between Palestinian and Israeli Officials

[AL-BAYAN] It is being said that there are communications between PLO officials and Israeli officials. What do you have to say about that?

[Habash] We in the PFLP think that the pact calls upon us to be bound by PNC resolutions. What do these

resolutions say in this regard? Or rather, what do the resolutions of the 19th PNC meeting say?

The national councils changed their positions on this matter. The most recent PNC meeting decided that communications were permissible. We in the PFLP had reservations about that decision. But despite our reservations, the PNC decided to permit such communications with Jewish forces who support our national Palestinian rights. In no way, however, does that decision permit meetings with Israeli delegations which do not support our rights. We determine our positions on such meetings in light of that fact.

[AL-BAYAN] The talks between Palestinians and Americans have gone nowhere. How would you evaluate the outcome of these talks?

[Habash] We in the PFLP welcomed these talks. We considered them a significant accomplishment of the intifadah. Our analysis of the situation was that it was the intifadah more than any other factor which forced the U.S. administration to conduct talks with the PLO.

Now, at this stage of the dialogue with the PLO, the American administration is trying to turn us away from our national goals. It is trying to turn us away from what we as Palestinians have in common. National unity was built on what we have in common. And that is why these talks are in a crisis.

I do not think it would be proper for the Palestinians to take the initiative of breaking the talks. While, on the one hand, Palestinians must not be deceived by American ploys, they must not, on the other hand, deviate from the common national goals. As the intifadah continues, as it gains a strong foothold and spreads, and as it gets the time and space to affect Palestinians and Arabs abroad, we will force the American government, just as we forced the American administration, to recognize our rights. I swear I can see this happening just as clearly as I can see the sun: we can force the U.S. administration to recognize our rights because it cannot remain isolated. We can force it to recognize our rights just as we forced it to start talking with us. We will also force the American administration to get the election idea and the Shamir plan out of its mind and to start looking seriously into convening an international conference.

[AL-BAYAN] Because there isn't enough time, we will ask one question which has to do with normalizing relations between Palestinians and Syrians. Despite Algerian efforts which were made last month, no progress was made in these relations after the Harare meeting and then after Casablanca.

[Habash] I believe that Palestinians have an obligation to take the initiative over and over again until serious dialogue begins and relations with Syria are corrected. Palestinians must continue taking the initiative in that regard at least until it becomes clear who is responsible for dragging his feet or impeding the process.

At any rate, the most recent information I have in that regard is that fellow Algerians will put this subject on the table once again and that they will do so forcefully. Followup on this matter is a must. This will be done after Fatah's fifth general conference is held, and that conference will be held soon.

Hawatimah Discusses DFLP Policy Directions, Relations

44040548 Dubayy AL-BAYAN in Arabic 11 Aug 89 p 14

[Interview with Nayif Hawatimah, Secretary General of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine in Damascus: "In an Exhaustive Interview with AL-BAYAN Nayif Hawatimah Says, 'Regaining Palestinian National Unity Would Provide Strong Buttress of Support for Stepping Up Intifadah'; Normalizing Relations between the PLO and Syria Based on Casablanca Resolutions Would Be Step Toward Agreement of Five Arab Leaders;" date not specified]

[Excerpts] [Passage omitted]

[AL-BAYAN] How do you view the relationship between the DFLP [Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine] and the PLO? Can we say today that all differences between the front's positions and those of the PLO's leaders have been resolved?

[Hawatimah] The PLO is a broad, national, political coalition. It combines various ideological, political, and organizational tendencies, which can be found in the ranks of our Palestinian people. It also has Palestinian factions. They are all part of the organization.

Today, it is no coincidence that the Unified National Command of the intifadah [uprising] in occupied Palestine is made up of the main factions in the PLO. It is an extension of what is happening within the ranks of the Palestinian people.

Each Palestinian faction has its own view of what has to be done politically, what has to be done in the struggle, and what has to be done in the organization to achieve national liberation. Each faction has its own view of what political tactics are necessary, and what methods of action are to be employed by the leaders. But the PLO factions agree on the common national program which defines the parameters of the agreement between them without signifying that contradictions have been brought to an end or have been frozen.

We in the DFLP have worked for 20 years, within common institutions, to solve these contradictions. By applying constant pressure to keep all Palestinian factions in line, and ensuring their adherence to the common national program, we stifled all attempts that were made to deviate to the right or to the left of this program. Such deviation would weaken Palestinian national unity and sap the strength out of our people's struggle. Our people would have to go through a new stage of the struggle against the occupation to seize their

freedom and independence and bolster their national unity. The Palestinian people's national unity can only be strengthened in proportion to the growth, in respect for the common program and for the spirit of collective leadership, which manifests itself in dealing democratically with everything that is common. It is on this basis that in past years we persisted and persevered in our efforts to regain Palestinian national unity. Our efforts paid off, and we scored a victory for national unity. First, the dialogue between us and Fatah was resumed. Then, the PFLP [Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine] joined the dialogue. Later, the Palestinian Liberation Front [PLF], and the vast majority of Palestinian national figures joined the dialogue also.

All of this led to the restoration of national unity in the National Council of Unification which met in Algeria. This step provided the strong impetus to expedite the onset of the intifadah which took off a few months later.

National unity has been and still is the large umbrella under which our people have conducted their struggle. Today, the intifadah continues on that basis. However, let us say, quite unequivocally, that differences within the organization's ranks continue; they cannot be removed by bureaucratic administrative decree or by having one group on the Palestinian scene dominate another. These differences stem, first of all, from disparate views of the common national program and from the tactics, political steps, and methods of action which may be derived from those different views. These differences emerged, for example, when we opposed an announcement in which a willingness to visit occupied Jerusalem was declared; when we opposed an ongoing economic relationship between the Zionist entity and Lebanon, for example; and when we opposed appeals for negotiations in the area to be held before the international conference. Our position was one that expressed our determination to defend the organization's common program. We are a principal partner in the leadership of this organization, and no one is allowed to take away from us this partnership to which we are entitled.

The differences have always been the result of our demands that the resolutions of the National Council of Unification be applied. The council, which was held in Algeria in 1987, adopted resolutions which have to do with the democratic reform of the PLO's institutions and with building up a collective leadership for daily actions. The glorious intifadah established a formula for national and democratic relations with the Unified National Command of the Popular Committees as its frame of reference. Thus, it revealed once again the importance of employing a spirit of unity and democracy to reform the organization's institutions. Demands for developing the forms of struggle are being made daily by the intifadah, which is also demanding support for itself and for the Palestinian people wherever they are. The national command for the intifadah is aware that many of the political and diplomatic agencies of the PLO's institutions are not able to provide this support. That is why broad political and democratic reform in the organization's institutions

is being forcefully proposed. Palestinian popular organizations should also be rebuilt so they can renew their relationship with the broad masses in the community.

These issues, which make up the hitherto unresolved conflicts between us and the PLO, are primarily political. A resolution of these issues requires tenacity. It requires the implementation of collective resolutions and the application of the principle of proportional representation in all of the PLO's institutions and in all Palestinian popular organizations.

Palestinian Taboos

[AL-BAYAN] There is one group which thinks that concessions have been made in the Palestinian political program for 2 and 1/2 years. This group thinks that you in the DFLP are partly responsible for making those concessions, even though you are one of the organization's principal leaders. What do you think about that? What are the proscribed actions which the DFLP will not take on the Palestinian scene?

[Hawatimah] Ever since the PLO's national program was completed in 1974, we have always had proscriptions which could not be overlooked. Since then, several events and developments have occurred, and new elements have been introduced onto the scene. There are fixed principles which may not be circumvented, chief among which is the Palestinians' right to return to Palestine. Palestinians have the right to determine their destiny, and they have the right to set up the institutions of a Palestinian state on Palestinian territory. Pressure has been applied continuously since the interim program was introduced to force us to back away from the Palestinians' right to return to Palestine, and their right to determine their own destiny. Continuous pressure has been applied so that the Palestinian question can be limited to the question of the destiny of part of the Palestinian people, and I mean the residents of the occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip. Therefore, we have to become aware of this danger and to resist it. We have to develop our struggle so that all of our people will have the right to return to Palestine in accordance with UN resolutions. We have to develop our struggle to avoid having one right of one segment of the population approved and not that of the other. We want to avoid having most of the Palestinian people absorbed by and blended into Arab and foreign countries through the so-called settlement process. Besides, we do not want to give up the Palestinians' sacred and inalienable right to build an independent state. This right has been infringed upon more than once for the purpose of destroying it.

In addition, the Palestinian people are entitled to independent representation with the cooperation of all the Arab countries. Such representation and cooperation are based on Arab summit resolutions and UN resolutions guaranteeing our people their right to be independent; to determine their own destiny; to insist on a comprehensive and a balanced solution to the Middle East crisis and its central issue, that of Palestine; and to reject all

deals in any form as well as bilateral and unilateral solutions of any color. Today, such solutions, contrived by Washington and Tel Aviv, are looming ahead. Both Washington and Tel Aviv are attempting to destroy the Palestinian people's right to return to Palestine, to determine their destiny, and to become independent. Washington and Tel Aviv want to go back to something that is less than this national program: they want to go back to something that is between autonomy under occupation and a territorial compromise, which is based on dividing the territory of the West Bank, Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip. Therefore, an effort must be made to bring about a comprehensive and a just settlement in the context of an effective, UN sponsored international conference. The five permanent members of the UN Security Council would participate in that conference, and the PLO, which is the sole, legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, would also participate in the conference. In accordance with UN resolutions, there would be guarantees to ensure the Palestinian people's right to return to Palestine, and their right to build an independent state in Palestine. There would also be guarantees to ensure the Arab countries' right to regain all the territory which was occupied in the June 1967 aggression. Security provisions for the state of Palestine and for all the countries in the area are to be devised by the international conference.

The major political operation which was unleashed by the intifadah, and the decisions which were made and approved last November by the PNC [Palestine National Council] and adopted by the recent Casablanca Summit require that safeguards be provided to protect the rights of the Palestinian people. An effort must also be made to strengthen Arab solidarity and to normalize the PLO's relations with each Arab country on the basis of the Casablanca Summit resolutions. Efforts made by the United States and Israel to exploit the differences between Palestine, Jordan, Syria, Egypt, and Lebanon, the countries which make up the front line, must be blocked. In other words, an effort must be made to achieve agreement between the five Arab countries so that Washington's schemes to toy with these countries and apply pressure on each one of them separately can be thwarted. Besides, pressure must be applied on western Europe so that it would recognize the state of Palestine and the representative function of the PLO. Pressure must also be applied to the American administration so it would stop supporting the Israeli election plan, whose aim is to split and undermine the PLO. The most prominent example of U.S. support for Israel's election plan was the recent visit to the area made by John Kelly, the U.S. assistant secretary of state. Mr. Kelly visited Egypt, Jordan, and the Zionist entity, and he ignored the PLO.

It is in the context of this operation that we think it is essential that the PLO's relations with Syria be normalized on the basis of the Casablanca Summit resolutions. It would thus become possible to ensure agreement between the five Arab countries and bring new life into

the Palestinian people's role in Lebanon and in Syria for the purpose of serving the Palestinian struggle by bringing energies and resources together against the Zionist enemy.

The Democratic People's Party

[AL-BAYAN] As far as the DFLP is concerned, the event of the hour was the DFLP's announcement in Jordan, a few days ago, that it was being disbanded, and that the Jordanian Democratic People's Party was being formed. What are the reasons behind this announcement? Does this mean that the new party will participate in the parliamentary elections which Jordan intends to call for soon?

[Hawatimah] The decision which Jordan made on 31 July 1988 announcing that its legal and administrative ties with the occupied Palestinian West Bank would be broken was the culmination of protracted arguments between Jordanians and Palestinians. This step helped to solidify the Palestinian national character and to establish the Palestinian people's right to express themselves to safeguard their right to determine their own destiny and build the institutions of the Palestinian state on the national soil of Palestine. That step also expressed Jordan's respect for the Palestinian people's right to determine their own destiny and to represent themselves. It created an opportunity for reformulating Palestinian-Jordanian relations from this position, and for determining Jordan's national role in defending the Palestinian cause alongside the people of Palestine and the other Arab countries.

Jordan's decision to break its ties with the occupied West Bank set forth a new situation for Palestinians and Jordanians, each of whom had to come up with a proper response for that situation. All of the PLO factions had to come up with a response to the intifadah's appeal. That response, which came after 4 months of talks between Palestinians, was embodied in a series of three points made by the PNC's November 1988 resolutions: a Palestinian state was declared; the political and organizational principles which are to be employed when forming the broad, national coalition which will make up the temporary government of the state of Palestine were announced; and a Palestinian political initiative was announced with a view toward a comprehensive and balanced present-day settlement of the Middle East crisis and its central question, the Palestinian question.

One thing remained on the agenda of Jordanian and Palestinian forces in Jordan: they had to come up with a response to Jordan's decision to break its ties with the occupied West Bank. Similarly, when the PLO reformulated the relationship between the state of Palestine and the Arab countries at the PNC meeting on the basis of independence and Arab summit resolutions, it was incumbent upon Jordanian forces to respond. Therefore, talks on different levels were started in Jordan to look into this matter. It was the DFLP in Jordan and a number of associations and personalities that took the

initiative in responding to Jordan's decision to break its ties with the occupied territories. They took the initiative of reformulating Jordanian-Palestinian relations on a proper foundation which complies with PNC resolutions and with Arab summit resolutions, especially those of the two recent meetings that were held in Algiers and Casablanca.

Accordingly, the DFLP in Jordan took steps to develop its national and pan-Arab program as well as its bylaws. In cooperation with a number of associations and personalities who worked together to reformulate these programs, the DFLP's programs were reformulated on the basis of an independent, Jordanian national character. These programs would be responsive to the intifadah's appeal, to Jordan's decision to break its ties with the occupied territories, and to Arab summit resolutions. With these things in mind, an announcement was made about the establishment of the Jordanian Democratic People's Party.

It is our opinion that reinforcing Jordan's decision to break its ties with the occupied territories, and the Palestinian people's right to determine their destiny and to build the institutions of a state on their Palestinian land, clearly means that the fraternal relationship between the Palestinian people and the Jordanian people is being reformulated on a proper foundation that is responsive to the Palestinian people's right to return to Palestine, and their right to determine their own destiny, become independent, and have their own independent representatives. This is according to Palestinian resolutions made since June 1974, and according to Arab summit resolutions issued between the Rabat Summit and the Casablanca Summit. It is also according to the intifadah's appeal and Jordan's decision to break its ties with the occupied territories. The Jordanian Democratic People's Party thus becomes immersed in the actual tasks it has to carry out in Jordan, defending the economic, social, and national interests of the Palestinian people and the Jordanian people.

We expect all Palestinian and Jordanian forces in Jordan to follow the bold lead of the Jordanian Democratic People's Party which forged ahead fearlessly, acting on the basis of its independent policy, a policy which is consistent with the national and social interests of the Jordanian and Palestinian peoples. We expect all Palestinian and Jordanian forces to do that and to defend the Palestinian question, the Arabs' fundamental issue.

[AL-BAYAN] It was reported recently that an official representative of the DFLP in Cairo was appointed. How true is that news report, and what are its political implications?

[Hawatimah] From its principal position within the ranks of the Palestinian people and the PLO, the DFLP's contribution to the resolutions which were made last November was outstanding. All these resolutions call for normalizing relations between the PLO and all PLO factions, on one side, and the Arab countries on the

other. In that regard, the Egyptian government announced that it would recognize the PLO as the sole, legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. The Egyptian government gave full legal recognition to the state of Palestine, and announced that it would adhere to the spirit and the letter of the Casablanca Summit resolutions. All these factors together call upon us to normalize relations between the PLO and all its factions and the Arab countries, including Egypt, because that would serve the national and the pan-Arab struggle.

"Al-Quds" Uprising Radio Examined

44000019 Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT
in Hebrew 18 Sep 89

[Text] People in the territories do not accept the defense establishment's claim that the latest escalation in intifadah-related incidents is a consequence of the political deadlock and of the opening of schools. According to figures in East Jerusalem, the real reason lies in the fact that the broadcasts of the 'Voice of Jerusalem'—the radio station of Ahmad Jibril's organization—are not being jammed, thus making the station the official mouthpiece of the intifadah, as well as a source of incitement and of the intensification of violence. The broadcasts of 'AL-QUDS' can now be picked up in almost every home: in Hebron, Nabulus, the Jabalya refugee camp, and Jerusalem. Ten hours a day, on short wave radio and on FM, the station broadcasts nationalistic songs, slogans, special 'educational programs'—including lessons in the preparation of Molotov cocktails and explosive charges, and instruction in the throwing of stones and in the organizing of demonstrations—and a lot of news regarding events in the territories. Residents in the territories are correct in stating that even though the 'Voice of Jerusalem' is operated by the pro-Syrian Ahmad Jibril organization, it is the official radio station of the intifadah. About half an hour after the police closed Salah-al-Din street in Jerusalem last week, it was reported on the 'Voice of Jerusalem,' and the report included the names of those who were arrested and of the store owners who were taken for interrogation. Another news bulletin reported on disturbances in Qalqilyah, and provided the names of the casualties in that incident. The report was broadcast even before the ambulance carrying one of the casualties arrived at the hospital in Nabulus. Another report dealt with a raid by income tax personnel in Tulkarm, and even specified the names of the merchants and the amounts collected from them. And before the Nabulus military court completed its daily deliberations, some of the sentences meted out in the morning were broadcast. Jibril's radio station, transmitting from Syria, started operating about 2 months after the beginning of the intifadah. Israel immediately understood that in question were inflammatory broadcasts that were liable to cause an escalation in events. At that time, the press abroad reported that Israel was jamming the broadcasts, and that they cannot be picked up in most parts of the territories. About 6 weeks ago, the foreign press reported that the jamming had been stopped. The broadcasts were enthusiastically welcomed

in the territories. Suddenly people from Nabulus could hear about incidents in Hebron, including the names of people involved in intifadah-related activity. In Gaza, reports about activity in Ramallah could be heard, and in Jericho, reports by the 'Voice of Jerusalem' on incidents in Tulkarm could be heard. Defense establishment personnel now openly admit that the broadcasts certainly affect the intifadah and its intensity. Many in the civil Administration are of the opinion that it acts as a catalyst of incidents. Residents in the territories who oppose the violence have appealed to the Civil Administration a number of times, proposing that the stations's broadcasts be jammed. And with all these, the violence continues.

Press Association Head Discusses Intifadah Media Coverage

45040483 Nicosia AL-HURRIYAH
in Arabic 13 Aug 89 pp 42-44

[Interview With Kamil al-Zuhayri, Egyptian Journalists Union Chairman, by A. 'Ubayd in Damascus: "Kamil al-Zuhayri: 'Egyptian Media Still Lagging Behind Developments'"; first two paragraphs are AL-HURRIYAH introduction; date not given]

[Excerpts] My acquaintance with Kamil al-Zuhayri, a professional acquaintance made possible by the Arab Journalists Federation, dates back to 1974. [passage omitted]

During the 1974 meeting, al-Zuhayri held the position of the Arab Journalists Federation secretary general, as we have already noted. During the 1989 meeting, al-Zuhayri held the positions of the Egyptian Journalists Union chairman and member of the anti-Zionism Committee, the Human Rights and Support for the Intifadah [uprising] Committee.

[AL-HURRIYAH] How do you view the current condition of the Arab media and are they performing their national and pan-Arab tasks?

[Zuhayri] [Passage omitted] We find that the Arab media are facing a serious accusation that they are either rich media relying on foreign and external resources, or stupid media that do not comprehend their message of enlightenment, education, and development. The Arab media are incapable of assuming their position and role in technological progress. The international news agencies are in full control. There are the so-called big five international agencies, all of which are non-Arab, that monopolize nearly 90 percent of the news and that play the role of wholesaler supplying news reports to the receiving news consumers or contractors. The Arabs, despite their vast material resources, do not yet have a united Arab news agency capable of marching or competing with the five big agencies.

UNESCO [United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization] tried to set up a Arab visual-media agency, but the plan came to a halt. Because of the

predominantly regional character of Arab media—considering that all the news agencies are government-owned agencies—the Arab television stations, for example, are compelled to fill their hours with foreign, mostly French, and U.S. programs. We now find that the danger emanating from the Arab media's deficiency is increasing with the use of artificial satellites and the possibility of beaming transmissions to the areas determined and desired by those who own these satellites, especially by the western countries that export their media industry technology to the Arab countries.

[AL-HURRIYAH] The Arab media often suffer from incompatibility between form and content, which causes them at the very least to fall into professional problems. What, in your opinion, is the means to overcome this?

[Zuhayri] It is my opinion that the Arab media lack modernism, meaning that they rely on eloquent words. In Arabic, the eloquent word is beautiful and enjoyable. But modern media rely on the image because we are in the cinema and television age. The image is important as a news report and as a document which sums up and embodies the reality better than any article, long or short. The image conveys the reality, both in form and content. The ugliness of breaking the bones of Palestinians and of beating children has been highlighted by the image. Because Israel is aware of the significance of modern media, the marine cable was one of its main objectives in the October 1973 war. Israel hit the cable which linked Beirut with the Arab and international cities and capitals to prevent the flow of news reports, especially news of the massacres it perpetrated against the Lebanese and Palestinian people in 1982 when it tried to hit the marine cable anew.

I will tell you what ex-U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger has said about the significance of the image conveyed by the media. Kissinger met with the leaders of the U.S. Jewish community who asked him for advice after becoming aware of the impact of the television image on the U.S. public opinion regarding the occupied Arab territories. Kissinger's advice was to tell them: "Prevent television photographers from entering the confrontation areas in the camps." Thus, the occupation authorities began to declare from time to time this or that area a military zone so that they could commit more forms of oppression and escalate this oppression without any watch or control. The problem is that the images have been provided by western photographers. Bulgarian television has produced a documentary on the brutal acts committed by Israel against the Palestinian people. Hungary has done the same. Greece has dispatched seven photographers to record the developments. Arab television cannot, of course, enter the occupied territories. But the issue is comparative. The Arab media repeat, for example, the same news report in several broadcasts. Thus, the Arab citizen gets 5 to 10 news items repeated in the same form and with the same content, whereas both news item and news message can be provided indirectly, and whereas news and information can be delivered to the listener and the viewer in various

literary and social forms, coupled with an analysis of the background of the news item and of its ramifications.

[AL-HURRIYAH] It seems that most of the Arab media continue to live at the peripheries, and not in the midst, of the event. This is why there is more talk about the past than about the future. Who is to blame for this?

[Zuhayri] A significant problem of the Arab media is that Arab journalists sit behind their desks, whereas the advanced media rely on correspondents on the spot, or on temporary reporters through whom the media people catch up with the development quickly. They do this regardless of the dangers and risks involved, so that they may cover the development successfully, may get to the heart of the matter, may analyze it, and may make future projections with utter democracy [as published]. [passage omitted]

In our case, we find that the receiver is always subjected to official, mostly annoying, instructions. This is why the viewer, the listener, and the reader seek foreign transmission that gives them the information they want.

Intifadah and Media

[AL-HURRIYAH] What, in your view, is the best means to counter the Zionist media and what has the intifadah done in this regard?

[Zuhayri] I don't believe that the Zionist media are as strong and influential as some believe, especially in this phase. These media are now on the defensive and they cannot justify Israel's crimes. The picture has changed since the intifadah. I have met with prominent French, Italian, Norwegian, and Greek media people in the past few months, and it has become obvious to me that the Zionist media have failed to defend Israel's crimes because the intifadah has added an influential fundamental element: It has touched the European citizen's values. Ordinarily, the European's response to media accounts of natural catastrophes is a sympathetic response. When the European sees images of the starvation in Africa, he responds with humane sympathy. Yet, he experiences a sense of European superiority, considering that he is not starved and that he is remote from want and poverty. But the response takes a more serious and rational character when he sees an Arab child attacking a Zionist tank or armored vehicle with a stone, or sees a woman yelling in the face of the military. In this case, something stirs the values the European has gained, and preserved deep in his heart, from the legacy of his national revolutions, such as the French revolution. The image of the Palestinian's rejection of oppression and occupation, which are also rejected by the European, is what is reflected in the European's mind. A new image of the Palestinian is developed. It is no longer the image of the powerless Palestinian begging a solution but that of the Palestinian fighting oppression.

Prior to the intifadah, the world viewed the Palestinian from the perspective of pity. But now the world views the Palestinian with admiration, considering that he has

wrested appreciation and respect. He has wrested the European's political support, not just his sentiments.

A Zionist writer has said verbatim: "The Palestinians are fighting us with a primitive means, namely stones, along with a modern means, namely the television image which they make."

On my visit to Greece as part of the International Committee for Supporting the Intifadah, I realized how profound the intifadah's impact is on the scene. The Popular International Committee, which consists of the All Greece Education Movement, the various Greek parties, and prominent writers and artists, brought Israel to trial in the streets of Athens. In Italy, a deputy in the Italian parliament who is a member of the committee, told me: "The intifadah's influence on the Italian public opinion spurred Italian citizens to collect drugs and aid from their villages even before the Italian parties supporting the Palestinian cause asked their masses to do so. The sympathy for the intifadah has been spontaneous. Some Italian cities have halted their twinning with Israeli cities. The intifadah has performed outstanding struggle and information roles."

This is why I say that the Arab media are supposed to provide information through several channels, such as popular information. What I mean is information through the professional unions and federations, considering that such invitations play the role of an information bridge with Europe. It is also necessary to invite the European unions to attend Arab conferences. For example, 30 Arab professional organizations and 38 international organizations, including Amnesty International, represented by its secretary general, have been invited to attend the current Arab lawyers conference. This foreign presence will produce enormously positive results for Arab causes, especially the Palestinian cause. The official Arab media are supposed to speak the language of the age.

[AL-HURRIYAH] You are attending the conference in your capacity as a member of the International Anti-Zionism Committee, as a member of the Committee Supporting the Intifadah, and as the Egyptian Journalists Union chairman. What is your opinion of the proposals made by the conference and of the propaganda impact of its resolutions on the Arab and world public opinion?

[Zuhayri] The significance of the Arab Lawyers Federation is that it is nongovernmental. The Arab media are supposed to encourage the nongovernmental organizations to exchange information and ideas, so as to serve the pan-Arab causes. Regardless of how different our political beliefs are, there are pan-Arab tasks that we must accomplish, no matter how divergent the viewpoints on these tasks. There are common problems, and solutions have to be developed for them. The meeting of the lawyer from the Arab Maghreb with the lawyer from the Arab East and from Africa and Asia is a magnificent

phenomenon of pan-Arab interaction. We now have large-scale popular pan-Arab organizations. This is important.

The professional problems that arise between the popular federations are less critical than the sensitivity existing between the regimes. Recently, there have been serious Arab disagreements which allowed the regional viewpoint to prevail and which almost caused the pan-Arab security perspective to be lost. Issues have been greatly muddled. The 17th conference is playing a positive role in clearing the air. A popular Arab and international meeting such as the one in Damascus, which has included nearly 2,500 members and observers, is called upon to perform its propaganda and practical role, whether at the level of the homeland, or of the citizen and his freedom. Therefore, the ideas expressed may be a sincere reflection of the masses' feelings and may familiarize the people with their most important problems. The resolutions adopted will contribute positively on the level of Arab and world public opinion. The proof of this is that the Damascus conference has revealed new eagerness on the part of the Syrian and Egyptian delegations to cling to the pan-Arab dimension and to put pan-Arab security in its right place. The studies presented to the conference were not confined to the "old-fashioned" theoretical speeches and appeals. The conference activities have included historical, scientific, and legal studies which offer numerous methods and the best means to serve the common Arab action. The conference has also made it evident that the Arab people's concerns revolve around two axes: The citizen's rights—his public liberties, human rights, and the press' rights—and the homeland's rights. The 10 committees formed by the conference have surveyed the Arab homeland economically, have raised the issues of the food and water crisis, of Israel's ambitions, of unionist liberties, of the judiciary's independence, and of protecting the Palestinians, and have debated the intifadah position and the fight against Zionism in its capacity as a racist movement. All these are issues that fall within the framework of the media's tasks.

[AL-HURRIYAH] What is the role of the anti-Racism Committee and what is its information role?

[Zuhayri] The committee is concerned with underlining UN General Assembly resolution 3379 of 1975 which brands Israel as racist. The significance of this resolution is that it challenges "Israel's legitimacy." AL HAMISHMAR characterizes it as a resolution which "has assassinated Israel." When this resolution was being debated at the General Assembly, the Israeli delegate took hold of it and tore it to pieces. This resolution is based on two other resolutions: a resolution by the OAU [Organization of African Unity] and one by the nonaligned countries. The conference will play a role in strengthening common Arab action and bolstering the peoples of the world's friendship for the Arabs and their sympathy for the Palestinian cause through what is written about the intifadah. The information aspect of

the conference has been overwhelming. The mass of western journalists attending the conference will produce a high yield.

Al-Nusayrat Refugee Camp Profiled

44040527b Jerusalem AL-FAJR in Arabic 28 Jul 89 p 6

[Article by 'Abd-al-Salam Musa: "Al-Nusayrat Camp: a Bitter Reality and Unlimited Contributions"]

[Text] The men and women of the future are growing in the midst of suffering. Their experiences will generate ideas that will shape the future. It is said that the journey of 1,000 miles begins with one step. And that was how the journey and the suffering of al-Nusayrat Camp began. That was how thousands of people, who had been forcibly evacuated, began the journey of 1,000 miles.

They started out in tents. Then they had tin huts. They even had dwellings made of brick and tile, and they ended up in a situation which might have been better than the situation they were in before. They ended up in dwellings with asbestos roofs. It is a struggle for survival.

The Origins of the Camp

Al-Nusayrat Camp, like the remaining eight camps of suffering, was established in the Gaza Strip in 1952 under the supervision of UNRWA, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency. UNRWA started the camp with tents which were pitched to house thousands who had been evacuated from their homes, villages, and cities inside the country. The camp was established on a piece of land that was made up of hills and woods. UNRWA cut down the trees in those woods and distributed the land to the refugees who were provided with basic and simple construction materials to build residential units which amounted to tin huts. The situation developed after that, and homes were built with tile. When the Gaza Strip was opened to the outside world and citizens were able to travel to work abroad, a number of refugees sent their sons to work in the Gulf countries. They managed to accumulate some money which they sent to their parents to build homes suitable for the requirements of life. The situation then developed further, and homes were built with brick and asbestos sheets. The camp is divided into six blocks. These blocks are referred to as blocks A, B, C, S, G, and H, or blocks 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6.

Why the Camp Is Called al-Nusayrat

A number of citizens with expertise whom I met while I was writing this report agreed that the camp got its name from the al-Nusayrat tribe which used to live on the land where the camp stands before it was established. The al-Nusayrat tribe was originally from Bi'r al-Sab' [Beer-sheba].

The Location of the Camp

Al-Nusayrat Camp is one of three camps in central Gaza; the other two are al-Burayj and al-Maghazi. It is located

in the middle of the Gaza Strip with al-Burayj Camp to the east, the Mediterranean Sea to the west, al-Zuwaydah Village and the city of Dayr al-Balah to the south, and Gaza Valley and the city of Gaza to the north. Like the remaining camps in the Gaza Strip, homes in al-Nusayrat Camp were torn down and razed in the early seventies to widen the streets. Citrus trees nearby were uprooted for the same reason.

The Origins of the Camp's Dwellers

The number of people living in al-Nusayrat Camp and registered with UNRWA is approximately 29,681 persons. They come from villages and cities which existed before 1948 and which they had to leave. These are villages and cities like al-Majdal, Ashdod, Hamamah, Kawkabah, Simsim, Birbirah, Barir, Harbiya, al-Kunkhah, Lod, al-Ramlah, Yafo, Bishit, al-Sawafir, and Yavne.

The camp is also inhabited by people of Bedouin origin who came from the city of Bi'r al-Sab' [Beersheba]. The area of the camp is approximately 13.2 square kilometers, and that is equal to 130,000 donums.

Sources of Income for Residents of al-Nusayrat Camp

Most camp residents who are of working age rely on employment in Israel where they work for a small daily wage under poor working conditions.

A number of camp residents are also employed in trade. Trade is an active business in the camp, where many simple craft industries are also practiced. These are represented in the manufacturing of plastic bags and rubber spare parts for automobiles. There are also factories for manufacturing bricks.

Some camp residents are employed in agriculture: they grow grain, vegetables, and citrus fruits. The camp has land which is located nearby and on its borders. That land, which is approximately 3,967 donums, is cultivated with citrus trees. A small number of residents are employed in fishing.

Health Conditions in the Camp

There has been no change in health standards for 5 years even though camp residents pay what amounts to 200 dinars a year for health insurance. The camp has a hospital which is affiliated with the Health Department. Camp residents say that the hospital runs out of medicine before the middle of the month, and no one knows why.

The camp has a clinic which is affiliated with UNRWA. A number of physicians and nurses work at that clinic which offers medical services to people with chronic diseases. The clinic also offers maternity services, pediatric services, and care for pregnant women. An emergency room was recently opened. Simple medical services are offered there to people who are injured in minor accidents.

Camp residents suffer from the lack of a sewage system in the camp. UNRWA built small ducts that carry sewage water to nearby septic tanks or to the sea. A number of camp residents said that this situation spreads disease and causes mosquitoes and other insects to multiply. In addition, garbage is piled up in the streets.

Education in the Camp

UNRWA's Education Department oversees education in al-Nusayrat Camp, which has four elementary schools. These schools are located in two buildings, and they operate two shifts: a morning shift and an evening shift. Approximately 2,860 male students are enrolled in these elementary schools. The camp has four schools for female students, and they operate two shifts also: one in the morning and another in the evening. Approximately 2,688 female students are enrolled in these schools.

The camp has two preparatory schools for boys and two for girls. Approximately 1,200 male students and approximately 1,050 female students are enrolled in these schools.

The camp has one secondary school for secondary school students from al-Burayj and al-Nusayrat camps. The Education Department oversees that school.

The camp has two kindergartens which are run by Quakers. It has one kindergarten, which is run by the Islamic Society, and a fourth one run by the Education Department. There are many university graduates and many individuals with a sense of purpose in the camp, but many of them are unemployed.

Athletic Activity in the Camp

The camp has a youth center which is affiliated with UNRWA. It has many athletic teams. In addition, there is the National Club. But these two centers for athletic activities have been closed for about 2 years because of current conditions. There is also one soccer field in the camp which belongs to Khalid Ibn-al-Walid Secondary School.

Social Conditions

Social conditions in al-Nusayrat Camp, like social conditions in the other camps, were affected by economic conditions. Economic conditions in the camp had a direct effect on people who were preoccupied with their work and with the effort to earn a living for themselves and their children. And yet in one visit to the camp we saw the close ties that camp residents have with each other and we saw how they complement each other socially on joyful, sorrowful, and other occasions. Social customs in the camp have been affected, just as they have been affected in the remaining cities and camps in the occupied territories. All social behavior observed by people in connection with weddings was no longer being observed, and sums which used to be paid for bridal money were reduced. Thus, with no financial obstacles

standing in the way, young people became interested in marriage, and the divorce rate among citizens declined.

Because of current conditions, many bad social habits were also eliminated. The fight against drug dealers and drug users continued until the camp became free of drugs. Now, there are no drugs and no drug dealers in the camp.

The Camp's Establishments

Al-Nusayrat Camp has no cultural and social facilities, but the camp has establishments which are affiliated with UNRWA. These include:

- Al-Nusayrat Services Center—this is an athletic club,
- The National Club,
- A supply center,
- A children's nutrition center,
- A medical hospital and a medical clinic,
- Private kindergartens.

Problems and Worries

Residents of al-Nusayrat Camp, like residents of the other camps in the Gaza Strip, suffer from many problems in their lives. These are represented by:

- Sand barricades blocking the entrances to the camp,
- Narrow streets that are not suitable for walking,
- Lack of attention to environmental health,
- Interruptions in telephone communications services and an insufficient number of telephones,
- No recreational and cultural facilities.

EGYPT

Interior Minister Addresses 'Ayn Shams Worshippers

45040509a Cairo AKHBAR AL-YAWM
in Arabic 26 Aug 89 p 9

[Article by Majdi 'Abd-al-Ghani: "Interior Minister Addresses Friday Worshippers in 'Ayn Shams"]

[Text] Minister of Interior Major General Zaki Badr performed his Friday prayers at the Khalid Bin-Walid Mosque in 'Ayn Shams, where he addressed the worshippers after the prayers. He said that "extremist groups are trying to disturb the peace in Egypt and to publicize their opinions by force, and that they overstate their size when in fact they are small extremist groups that are under constant surveillance."

The minister said that "the opposition press assures the citizens that Zaki Badr loves to arrest and I ask you: Will I arrest any of your children without reason? The answer is no, because arrest has been established under the emergency law to protect society from criminals and terrorists. The opposition is trying to tarnish my reputation with the people. I am an ordinary person just like

you and there are people who are better than me. I have dedicated my life to the protection of this citizen."

He emphasized that "the opposition parties have exploited the iron and steel workers incident, claiming that I have arrested 600 workers, which is not true. All we did was to protect the people and their properties from extremists who tried to ruin them."

Zaki Badr added that he was not against the Islamic groups but rather against the extremist groups that claim to carry the name of Islam and to speak in the name of Islam when they are far removed from its tolerance and its teachings.

After the speech, Zaki Badr surprised the security officers and residents of 'Ayn Shams by changing his return route so he could mingle with the crowds.

The interior minister told AKHBAR AL-YAWM that his primary duty is to maintain law and order, that he is now touring the streets of 'Ayn Shams to assure the opposition that they are now free of extremist groups, and that no one will disturb the peace so long as every attempt to threaten the Egyptian people's safety is deterred.

Agriculture Minister Discusses Unemployment Solutions

45040470 Cairo UKTUBAR in Arabic
6 Aug 89 pp 18-19

[Interview with Dr Yusuf Wali by Mahmud Fawzi; first six paragraphs are UKTUBAR introduction; date and place not given]

[Excerpts] "There aren't any jobs...no jobs, no jobs." This is a well-known statement from a motion picture, made by an official to the hero of the film "al-'Azimah" produced by Kamal Salim even before he gave a hint that he was looking for work! This statement is irrefutable proof that the problem of unemployment in Egypt has been around for more than 50 years.

Following its fifth conference, will the National Democratic Party [NDP] be successful in solving this chronic problem, which successive eras and governments have been unable to solve over more than half a century?

If the most important recommendation of the conference is to give desert lands to those young people who will reclaim and cultivate them, who will guarantee that that army of officials from irrigation, antiquities, the local authorities, and others who would impede any project or attempt at success will stay away from them? Who will keep away the specter of bureaucracy, which nips every project in the bud?

What will the party do regarding "masked" unemployment—those who sit behind their desks without doing any work or actual production?

Then, what is the party's reaction to women, who are very angry these days because of the state of "deliberate"

unemployment, whereby many ministers, including the minister of industry, refuse to employ them in their ministries, while signs saying "Males Only" have multiplied in many government offices and public sector companies? Women are still very angry with the NDP because it did not have a female candidate in the state council elections. What with their deeprooted history, they do not believe they should be excluded, rather that they must participate in the electoral experience with all its negative and positive aspects.

Dr Yusuf Wali, secretary general of the NDP, deputy prime minister and minister of agriculture, who now works 16 hours a day, has in him a flame of vitality and of earnest, tireless work aimed at expediting the implementation of the party's recommendations so as to establish a decisive solution to the oldest problem Egypt has known.

[UKTUBAR] Was the NDP's fifth conference on solving the unemployment problem intentionally held at the same time as the 37th anniversary of the July revolution, which has been unable to solve this chronic problem, despite its prominent role as a comprehensive social revolution? Indeed it has helped, unintentionally, to aggravate the problem by issuing its July '61 decree, whereby all graduates of universities and institutes would be hired regardless of their specialties, and the result has been that we have surplus workers in some areas, and a shortage of workers in others.

Will the party solve what the revolution has been unable to?

[Wali] The conference was held at the same time as the celebration of the July anniversary only within the context of the party's appreciation of the prominent and pivotal role played by the July revolution in the social, economic, and political life of our country, a role that has even extended beyond our borders to many African and Asian states. The occurrence of a surplus in graduates as a result of the expansion in the educational process, which is one of the notable characteristics of the July revolution, does not detract from the great positive effects that this policy has had at the social level, and the economic and cultural ones as well.

What we must do now is to correct the course so as to make a connection between the numbers and specialties of the graduates of universities, institutes, schools, the needs of the development plan and the labor market in general, and the availability of new job opportunities for graduates in service and production fields far from government offices and public sector units. This is to the extent that that is consistent with the actual labor needs of these units [passage omitted].

[UKTUBAR] The recommendations concentrated on giving lands to those who will reclaim and cultivate them, and cooperate with the local authorities in cultivating desert lands. However, who will guarantee that that army of officials from irrigation, antiquities, the local authorities and others who would impede any

project or attempt at success will stay away from those young men? Do not forget that the Egyptian bureaucracy nips any project in the bud.

[Wali] This important issue was dealt with by his excellency President Husni Mubarak in his comprehensive speech on the occasion of our celebration of the July Revolution anniversary, in which he confirmed the need to remove all routine and bureaucratic obstacles from all production projects, and decisive steps have already been taken in this respect. He also spoke about export activity, for example, and he said that the land reclamation projects of the young men receive every attention from state agencies, and that the young men now deal with only one agency, the Ministry of Land Reclamation [passage omitted].

[UKTUBAR] To what extent has the NDP succeeded in implementing the recommendations of the previous conference on dealing with the problem of development and the future, which was discussed by the fourth conference of the NDP? Are they still being carried out now, in view of the fact that they are essential to solving the unemployment problem that was raised in the fifth conference?

[Wali] As I said before, continuing with the recommendations that we issue is a set policy of the party. By way of example, amending the investment law was one of the important recommendations of the fourth conference, so as to give labor a boost and attract more investments, and standardize transactions between the foreign investor and the Egyptian one. The amendments that were introduced to this law were a reflection of the opinions and directives that were raised in the meetings of the party, both within the conference and in regular meetings, and of the participation of his excellency the president in many of the meetings held by the committees and secretariats of the party. Thus the recommendations are still being carried out at the highest level. At the same time, what his excellency and the executive officials bring up in the way of facts on issues of national labor give a large degree of objectivity and realism to the recommendations that the party's committees issue. They are the primary mainstay to their being implemented.

[UKTUBAR] Dr Yusuf Wali, as minister of agriculture, the greatest burden of solving the unemployment problem falls upon your shoulders, and for a while we have been hearing that the ministry has been studying allotting 40,000 feddans to set up a national project for youth that would include small model projects which would be funded through banks, and which would be carried out in cooperation with the Ministries of Construction and of Defense over a period of months. However, the project has not yet seen the light of day nor has it been actually implemented so far.

[Wali] The subject was brought up during meetings of the youth committee in the fifth conference, and it is still being studied in the course of attaining the maximum

guarantee of success, by the grace of God. This is in view of its being one of the good ways of solving the unemployment problem among graduates through important productive activity, along with other projects, such as distributing lands to young people, from which 5,500 young people benefited last year. It is expected that this number will double this year to reach 11,000 [passage omitted].

[UKTUBAR] A thinker once said: "Stop the human flood to the universities—for they represent 90 percent of the unemployment problem—so that there will not be 6 million unemployed in Egypt in the nineties." What do you think?

[Wali] Reducing the numbers of those accepted at the universities, especially the theoretical colleges, is a course that has already begun to emerge. It will develop without interruption within the framework of support for the people, who will reap the benefits thereof in future generations, as will the development plans.

[Uktubar] What will the party do regarding the "masked" unemployed, who sit behind their desks doing nothing and having no actual production?

[Wali] Even though the problem of obvious unemployment is more urgent at the present time, the party committees have discussed this problem as a separate issue, or within the framework of their discussion of the unemployment problem in general. Retraining programs, giving them a strong push, and linking incentives to workers' actual production, as well as other elements of administrative reform, all come at the forefront of the methods of countering this problem.

[UKTUBAR] The International Labor Organization has estimated that the size of the labor force in the Arab states will exceed 80 million in the year 2000, which will create an Arab unemployment crisis. Following the recent coup in the Sudan, everyone has perceived the beginnings of joint cooperation in the agricultural field between the two countries. Will that help to solve the unemployment problem? And following the resumption of relations with Libya, what new projects will there be between the two countries, especially since you were once the chairman of the projects committee and the head of planning in Libya?

[Wali] Arab cooperation at the economic level would guarantee an end to what these states suffer in the way of economic problems, no matter how much they differ in outward appearance in each Arab country, and not the unemployment problem alone. I believe that if the activity of development in the Arab nation turned at a speed in keeping with the resources that our Arab nation possesses, it would absorb the entire labor force, and there would be absolutely no unemployment problem in the year 2000, or in any year.

Agricultural cooperation with the Sudan has always gone on, and we in the two countries intend to give it more support, especially at the funding level. We expect that

we will reach a point where we will have joint projects with our brother Libya. My task at one time was to be a consultant to planning and projects, but I never had an executive function in them.

[UKTUBAR] Will the Arab Cooperation Council help to solve the unemployment problem, especially since there will be seven meetings this week of agricultural experts in the cooperation council states on land reclamation projects and combating desertification in the council states?

[Wali] Absolutely. The economic framework of the activity of the council in the future will provide much opportunity for work in the large agricultural projects, and that certainly helps in dealing with the problem.

[UKTUBAR] Egyptian women are very angry at the NDP because it did not have a woman candidate in the state council elections, and they do not believe, what with their deeprooted history in having the first female deputy in the Middle East, that they must be excluded. Rather they believe that they must involve themselves in the electoral experience with all its negative and positive aspects.

[Wali] The decree on appointing a third of the members of the council issued by his excellency the president has guaranteed the necessary representation for Egyptian women in the state council, who have agreed with you that it is proper for them to run in any elections, and that is what the upcoming elections will see.

[UKTUBAR] But Egyptian women are still angry, because they believe that they suffer from "deliberate" unemployment, whereby many of the ministers, including the minister of industry, have refused to hire them in their ministries. The sign "Males only" has multiplied these days in many government offices and public sector companies. Did the conference take that into consideration? And what is the solution, in your opinion?

[Wali] Women are half of society by right. This is what prompted us in the Ministry of Land Reclamation to give female graduates the same opportunity to own new land as their male colleagues, because the goal in the end is to establish a new society. Perhaps the sign about "Males Only" refers to types of arduous jobs, or those that require travelling to remote locations, that still are not compatible with a woman's nature and the Egyptian family.

[UKTUBAR] Is it true what is being said that the NDP supports and encourages those who split with Ahmad al-Sabahi, head of the Ummah Party, to punish him for his latest attempt at coordination with opposition parties following the rejection of the list which he submitted for appointment to the state council, while the decision did not exclude anyone except him, which aroused the indignation of the party leaders?

[Wali] The NDP does not interfere in the internal affairs of the Ummah Party or any other Egyptian party, for which we always wish unity of rank so as to enrich the democratic life our country experiences.

[UKTUBAR] In his latest speech, President Mubarak paid attention to the issue of population increase, indicating that it is awakening the national conscience. In this a sign that this will be the subject of the NDP's next conference, its sixth?

[Wali] The population problem is already at the forefront of our problems because of its negative impact on all aspects of life in our country. It has already been discussed in many of our meetings, and these studies and discussions will continue. As for designating what subjects and issues will be discussed at the sixth conference, that will come in due time in the course of what the political office sees.

Iran Reportedly Establishes Subversive Organization

45040499a London AL-DUSTUR
in Arabic 22 Aug 89 pp 12-14

[Article by Salim Ibrahim: "Plot Against Egypt Under Khomeyni's Turban"]

[Text] It seems Iran will not stop its attempt to infiltrate Egypt's domestic front with the aim of establishing a loyal organizational cell that enables it to influence the public opinion tendencies in preparation for pouncing on power and proclaiming an Islamic state in Egypt.

For the second time, the Egyptian security agencies have exposed a large and extensive "Khomeynist" organization that uses various means to accomplish the desired Iranian dream.

In light of the facts produced by the investigations, whether in connection with the first Khomeynist organization which was apprehended 3 years ago or the second organization which was seized this week, it is noticed that Iran's material resources are backing this organization, regardless of how exorbitant the material cost.

As in the case of the first organization, the exposure, seizure, and investigation of the second organization have confirmed the identical nature of the means and methods of the organizational structure. This structure has taken the form of numerous and independent clusters of cells—a pattern that permits these cells to proliferate the various parts of Egypt's governorates at the broadest level and to spread among the various circles of the different cultural groups, classes, and levels.

Let us begin with the facts in order that we may understand the results the Iranian regime seeks to accomplish by establishing and proliferating the Khomeynist call in Egypt, and by enabling it to overwhelm the various religious sects, intellectual ideologies, schools, and political parties at the phased and strategic levels.

Perhaps the first fact on the minds of the Iranians scheming to seize power in Egypt in the long run is that the Egyptians have always opted for the Sunni doctrines in their religious rites and dealings, even under the rule of the Fatimids.

Even though the Fatimid rule of Egypt lasted years and years, the only religious impact it left behind was some ceremonial rites which appealed to the Egyptians and which were compatible with the Egyptians' folkloric heritage and their fondness for the prophet's kinsmen, may God's peace and prayers be upon the prophet.

Even before Islam's arrival and before Egypt was Islamized on the hands of 'Amr Ibn- al-'As, the Egyptians received Christ's apostles, embraced Christianity and ultimately developed their distinctive form of worship, rites and ceremonies which assumed a special Egyptian character. Monasticism, the building of monasteries and the rites developed by these monasteries were the outcome of special Egyptian circumstances resulting from the Romans' persecution of Christians, meaning that they were not an original mainstay of Christianity, except indirectly and implicitly.

This is why the leaders of Iran's Khomeynist regime have not concealed their solicitude for the various Egyptian Islamic tendencies and groups generally, at times under the guise of the call for bringing the sects closer to each other, and at others from the perspective of rejecting and opposing the regimes and governments on the pretext that these regimes and governments reject the Islamic system and are lax in Islamizing their positive constitution and laws.

The second fact lies behind the Khomeynist regime's intentions, both the intentions proclaimed in the Khomeynists' statements and literature and those concealed within the framework of their scheme and action to seize the venerable al-Azhar which embodies Egypt's elevated Islamic status and Egypt's historical and cultural leadership of the Islamic call. It is the Iranian leadership's assessment that despite Egypt's remoteness and despite the difficulty of controlling the venerable al-Azhar religiously and intellectually, it is impossible for them to proliferate the Khomeynist call and to proclaim their so-called Islamic state without Egypt.

The final fact is political and it concerns Egypt's position vis-a-vis the Iraq-Iran war and the Egyptian regime's and people's support for Iraq, considering that the issue is a principled pan-Arab issue that pertains to defending the Arab soil, the Arab people in their entirety, and all the common values, heritage, bonds, and history in which the Arabs believe, and an issue that represents an imminent danger threatening pan-Arab security at present and in the future.

On their part and from their political perspective, the Egyptian security agencies have, since the onset of the Khomeynist revolution and its assumption of power in Iran, focused on observing the large-scale Iranian intelligence activity inside and outside Egypt to recruit

agents, infiltrate the domestic front, and establish loyal organizations as a prelude to spreading the Khomeynist call.

Egyptian security sources assert that the Iranian security agencies have organized numerous Islamic conferences abroad and have participated in other conferences under various names and that all of these conferences have concerned themselves with the Islamic ideological, political, economic, social, and cultural issues as a means to probe the intentions of the Egyptian Islamic organizations and groups, to develop special relations with them, to establish phased or strategic alliances between them and the Khomeynist regime, to recruit agents, and to gain supporters primarily.

In light of the suspect roles and plots witnessed by Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Sudan, and the Arab Maghreb as a result and a consequence of the Iranian conspiratorial scheming, the Egyptian security agencies also believe in this regard that Iran's determination to keep its Iraqi, Egyptian, and Sudanese prisoners [of war] is due mainly to its premeditated intentions and its strategic schemes to disseminate the Khomeynist call in the Arab area. They believe that Iran seeks to "brainwash" these prisoners with the various means, so that they may return to their countries as trumpets that sing Khomeini's praises, that advocate the false "Islamic revolution," that disseminate its fanatic anti-Arabism and that prepare the intellectual, ideological, and popular ground to enable the Iranian regime to infiltrate the Arab domestic fronts easily through a so-called Khomeynist fifth column.

On the basis of reliable information revealed by responsible Egyptian security sources, AL-DUSTUR asserts that the process of observation and of picking up the first thread leading to the exposure of the latest Khomeynist organization moved along two axes:

First, the observation activity was launched in the wake of the interrogation conducted by the state security prosecution with the elements of the first Khomeynist organization 3 years ago. Some of the elements released for lack of evidence proving their organizational connections were kept under constant surveillance, and it was proven within a period of no more than one year that these elements continued to engage in their hostile activity and to participate in the cluster cells, formed in such a manner as to insure the independence of each cell from the others so that the exposure of one cell may not lead to exposing others.

The second axis was embodied in observing the elements that took part in foreign Islamic conferences and activities in which elements of the Iranian security agencies also participated, and in observing other elements proven to have visited Iran on various occasions on the pretext of private business and tasks.

Dr Fahmi al-Shinnawi, a former urology professor at Cairo University, is one of the organization's most

prominent elements to be snared by the Khomeynist regime through a third recruitment axis.

Dr al-Shinnawi has acknowledged that his relationship with the Khomeynist regime developed lately, when he received a cable and a plane ticket to go to London to take part in treating an Arab patient. In London, Dr al-Shinnawi called the telephone number he had been given only to discover that it was the Iranian Embassy number and that the patient was Iranian. Finally, it became obvious that the patient was Khomeyni and that he was needed to take part in treating his bladder cancer. So, Dr al-Shinnawi agreed to go to Tehran. He then returned from Tehran to take part in the organization.

The investigation has also exposed the names of Iranians who are closely connected with the Tehran security agencies and who played a direct role in recruiting elements of the Egyptian Khomeynist organization, both inside and outside Egypt. In the first Khomeynist organization, Abu-Iman, the nom de guerre of a pro-Iran Arab notable, played the fundamental and direct role in recruiting the organization members. But the Egyptian security agencies were not able to identify and apprehend him at the time. So he resumed his activity to establish the second organization, which was apprehended recently, by making the acquaintance of 4 of the organization elements at the 1986 Cairo Book Fair. These elements then undertook the task of forming the organization.

Abroad, numerous contacts between the Iranian security agencies, organization elements and Muhammad Hasan Ramadan al-'Awadi, the official in charge of drafting the organization's action program, were observed. In Damascus, another contact was made on behalf of the Iranian security agencies by the so-called official in charge of the "Shirazi Tendency" for the recruitment of youth throughout the world.

Other contacts were made with the Egyptian elements in the organization by each of Abu-Ayman [as published] and by "'Abdullah," the assistant to Ayman Al Khatit, the official in charge of exporting the Khomeynist program to the outside world, from Switzerland, Pakistan, and Iran. There were more important contacts connected with training and educating the cadres ideologically and militarily. The man who was in charge of these contacts is called Abu-Rashid, an Iranian citizen with close contacts with the Iranian regime's top leadership.

Prosecution sources and the security circles in charge of interrogating the accused organization elements have stressed that Abu-Rashid did actually succeed in conducting training and educational courses for these elements in Cyprus and India, and several other courses in Iran. The elements were paid a sum of nearly \$500 each as private expenditures. The security authorities of the Iranian embassies in Turkey and Syria forged the seals of the countries the elements visited. The rest of the story is well known.

But what remains to be discussed is the grave danger threatening Egypt's national security as a result of the Iranian regime's determination to infiltrate the domestic front, and the means and methods on which these elements have been trained so that they may carry out sabotage acts, stage explosions, and assassinate public figures. Numerous cassettes spelling out these tasks clearly and numerous books and films connected with training on clashes and on the use of weapons, grenades and explosives have been seized. Also seized also were a number of documents on forming the "consultative council" to assume the leadership responsibilities, issue the organizational instructions, and define the tasks that were supposed to be carried out to create the required unrest in Egypt.

The Egyptian security agencies had made sound and picture recordings of a number of meetings by the organization cells. When confronted with these recordings individually and collectively, the elements began to reveal the names of the other organization members and its cells in the Lower Egypt governorates in particular.

There was a total of 49 organized elements, and a number of others who were influenced by the Khomeynist thinking but who had no connection with the organization. These were expected to be included at a later phase.

Perhaps the phenomenon that requires a pause and that has been revealed by the investigation is that a number of organization leadership elements belonged in the past to the Atonement and Emigration Group which became defunct when its members were arrested and tried. It seems that these radical organizations are like a cancerous weed. The more it is uprooted, the more it grows and spreads. This undoubtedly requires intellectual, social, and political approaches that are not within the capacity or the tendencies of the security agencies.

[Box on Page 13] Observations on Peripheries of Issue

The issue of the latest Khomeynist organization can only be approached through two axes that are closely connected with this system which is intended to prevail in Egypt.

The first is not to take into account the statements and announcements that the security agencies make about their heroism and their extraordinary ability to snare these groups, because most of the officials in charge of these agencies don't know much about the thought and organizational structures of these groups.

The proof of this is that when members of the radical and nonradical Islamic groups are arrested, the state security men ordinarily ask them to write down whatever information they have on the Islamic groups, especially on their organizational structures, on Shi'ite jurisprudence, and on the concept of the awaited al-Mahdi.

The second axis is that there is an intricate and difficult to distinguish overlap between the Khomeynist thinking

and the endeavors to spread the "Bedouin's Islam", with its values and its customs in eating and dressing in Egypt. These endeavors are, regrettably, financed directly by some Arab countries. This financing covers broad areas of the activities of the political and nonpolitical Islamic organizations, including the Muslim Brotherhood, and is aimed at driving Egypt away from its Islamic role, striking its tolerant religiosity, and at pulling the rug from under the venerable al-Azhar's feet.

It is not surprising that the leaders and financiers of the latest Khomeynist organization are from the rich Arab countries. But this is not the subject of discussion now.

Moreover, and this is just for information, Iran wishes it had one quarter the control these countries have over the Islamic groups. In the case of the Egyptian fishermen, Iran even tried to elevate and strengthen the status of these groups when it refused to negotiate with the Egyptian Government and demanded that the leaders of the Islamic groups mediate on this issue. But Iran failed because of the long distance separating the denominational thinking embraced by the Egyptians, including the elements of these Islamic groups, and the denominational thinking embraced by the Iranians.

Therefore, the religious groups and Iran may agree on some raised slogans, such as "The Oppressed of the Earth, the Dispossessed, and the Poor to God." But any relationship between the two sides is doomed to failure, regardless of whatever superficial agreement may develop between them for the abovementioned reasons.

This is because the roots of the thinking affected by the Iranian denominational influences were eliminated in Egypt in the days of Saladin al-Ayyubi who shut down al-Azhar Mosque and abolished the studies offered at the time by the mosque on the sect of the Fatimid State which had ruled earlier. Thus, al-Azhar remained closed for more than 100 years until it was reopened as a university.

With the entrenchment of the radical and fanatic ideology at the hands of the late Sayyid Qutub in the 1970's, youth groups fully embraced Qutub's ideas and became known as the Qutubists. This group's slogans are close to the political ideas presented by Khomeyni prior to and after the revolution. Here is where the security men get confused.

This is on the one hand. But at another level, in the wake of the Iranian revolution's success, the Shi'ite sect, of which no part had survived in Egypt other than the love for the prophet's kinsmen, became popular among the radical youth groups, and came to be considered the practical model of the desired Islamic plan. Numerous cells emerged and most of their members had previously embraced the ideas of other groups, such as the Atonement and Emigration Group, which ended organizationally when its leader, Mustafa Shukri, was executed, and when its members, who amounted to no more than

Shukri's family, were arrested. This group ended organizationally with the rise of the star and ideas of the Jihad Group among the youth. Islam's ulema confronted this group's radical ideas.

The Atonement and Emigration Group's thought is based on three phases:

- First, the phase of powerlessness in which the group members endure the oppression and ignorance of the infidel society in which they live. It is to be noted here that powerlessness is a historical Shi'ite slogan.
- Second, the phase of emigration to remote parts to train and prepare.
- Third, the phase of returning to fight the infidel societies and establish the Islamic system.

The Iranian Shi'ite denomination is the denomination known to us as the Ithnay 'Ashari [Twelvers] denomination, considering that the Iranians believe that the imamate of the prophet's house is embodied in "12 imams" who belong to their denomination.

The Ja'fari Shi'ite denomination, ascribed to Imam al-Ja'far al-Sadiq—which is the same as the Ithnay 'Ashari denomination—is the Shi'ite denomination closest to the Sunnah. The Ja'fari faith does not differ from the Sunni faith, except in the Ja'faris' revilement of our masters Abu Bakr al-Siddiq, 'Umar Ibn-al-Khattab, and 'Uthman Ibn-'Affan as usurpers of the right of our master 'Ali Ibn- Abi-Talib, may God honor him, to the caliphate.

The problem of concerted organization is not denominational, as it outwardly seems to be. It is a problem connected with the Khomeynist activity, which is financed by the Iranian oil money, against Egypt's Arabism.

Survey of Recent Spying Cases

45040487a London AL-TADAMUN
in Arabic 21 Aug 89 pp 44-46

[Article by 'Adil al-Jawhari: "Death of Movie Star Sayyid Badir's Son Still a Mystery; Spy Saga Between Egypt, Israel, and America Goes On."]

[Text] All is calm in the morning press. Nothing at all arouses curiosity. There is a steady stream of news reports about the African summit, giving the Egyptian people the feeling that old times are back again and the sun is shining anew. News of inexcusable brutal killings in Lebanon keep coming in and the "intifadah" is intensifying. The dollar is falling in Egypt. The Egyptian national team is getting ready for the Zaire soccer match, and 'Adil Imam is on top with his movie "al-Mawlid" ["The Birthday"], and his play "al-Wad Sayyid al-Shaggal" ["The Boy is the Workman's Master"] has entered its 6th year on stage.

Everything is normal except for a short news item at the bottom of page one which said "Son of Late Movie Star

Sayyid Badir Commits Suicide." People realized that that was the first time they had heard news about the great movie star's children. Some assumed that Sa'id al-Sayyid Badir was the son of movie star Sharifah Fadil whom Sayyid Badir had married besides, his first wife who was not a movie star herself. Others tried to put together goings-on in Egyptian motion picture and arts circles. In Alexandria, however, Mrs Jihan Ahmad, wife of Sa'id Sayyid Badir, was giving the prosecution testimony of utmost importance.

Suicide or Slaughter

She said, first of all, that her husband, the rocket and satellite scientist, had a contract with "Duisburg" University in West Germany where he was known as "Egypt's Einstein", and that he had conducted 13 research studies on satellites of which Egyptian intelligence was aware of that because he, Sa'id Badir, had been an officer in the Egyptian armed forces before he resigned to pursue his studies and aerospace research.

Second, she said that Sa'id Badir's scientific accomplishments prompted the United States and Canada to offer him all kinds of inducements to lure him to their universities and institutions. Sa'id, however, preferred the United States and Germany was aware of that.

Third, that unknown persons and sides began trailing and harassing him by, among other things, constantly moving a painting hung in the hallway around in the apartment, and Sa'id and his family would not discover the change until the next morning, and by rearranging the furniture when the family was out on pleasure or business trips.

The wife added: "One day, after Sa'id left the apartment, I felt the presence of a person at our bedroom door and heard his footsteps in the hallway, but I fell back to sleep with the children. When Sa'id returned home, I asked him if he had come back to the apartment and was walking around it and he said he had not. He reported the incident to German officials, but they did nothing about it."

Similar stories recounted by the wife and her brother-in-law, Muhammad Sayyid Badir, prove that Sa'id was under surveillance and that someone was trailing him. The question the prosecution raised, however, was still unanswered!

Did rocket scientist Sa'id Sayyid Badir commit suicide or was he murdered?!

Who had an interest in murdering him?!

To begin with, the suicide theory is categorically ruled out by the brother and wife. The brother emphasized that Sa'id believed in God and could not have contemplated suicide regardless of the anxiety he was feeling.

The wife says "Sa'id was a religious man and, despite his anxiety, he could not have committed suicide."

The records of the case confirm these claims because a passport, 3,000 Deutsch marks, and an amulet with three supplications were found in Sa'id's pockets.

Who Killed the Egyptian Scientist?

If suicide is out of the question, then the alternative is murder. So, who killed him?!

The wife says: "Sa'id was afraid that someone in Germany might harm us. He lived in fear and anxiety because he had received offers from the United States and Canada, but he preferred the United States. The Germans were aware of these offers and they asked him him to renew his contract with them, but he refused."

She added: "The German university's officials, however, had nothing to do with this affair because they treated us well."

In reply to the prosecution's question of whether he suspected foul play in his brother's death, Muhammad Sayyid Badir said: "Sa'id expected to be killed by someone in the scientific community afraid that his new research would come to an end."

There is a strong possibility that Sa'id was murdered and that a German party had an interest in killing him. So, does German intelligence have a presence in Egypt, or did it rely on Israeli Mosad sources and assets?

To answer this question, let us go back a bit to examine the close relationship between German intelligence, "Pullach" [BND], and Israeli intelligence, Mosad.

Tel Aviv's Eye

Do you remember this name?

Wolfgang Lotz, the Jewish-German agent who arrived in Cairo 1 January 1961, sent by Israeli intelligence with the blessings of German intelligence, to carry out one mission: the liquidation of German scientists working on the Egyptian rocket project 'Abd-al-Nasir used to build his huge plan for an "Arab weapon capable of deterring Israel." So what happened?

Lotz infiltrated the equestrian clubs where he met a senior Egyptian police officer who introduced him to Cairo's high society, and he later befriended a senior Egyptian intelligence officer. It was rumored at the time that Husayn al-Shafi'i, the then deputy prime minister and a close Nasir advisor, used to attend dinner parties Lotz and his wife, as avid equestrians, used to give.

The important thing in this story is not the information Lotz leaked or the bomb letters that killed some German scientists and forced others to leave, but rather the relationship Lotz, the Israeli agent, had at that time with German intelligence.

A German tale in the book, "A General and a Spy," said that Israeli intelligence sought the help of "Pullach", or German intelligence, to infiltrate an agent into Egypt. The chief of intelligence, General Gehlen, agreed and

assigned one of his senior aides, "Lengko" [as published], a staunch supporter of Israel, to carry out the mission. Consequently, the Israelis dispatched their agent, Lieutenant Colonel Ziv Lotz, to German intelligence at the "Marienfeld" reception camp in West Berlin from where he was taken to Munich to receive various kinds of training at a safe house, including German table manners. From there he was taken to an intelligence camp, where he trained in marksmanship and received all the papers he would need in Egypt.

Fate

Moreover, when Lotz was uncovered by sheer accident, he received on 21 August 1965 a life sentence at hard labor and a 32,000 Egyptian pound fine. His wife "Waltrud" was sentenced to a 3-year prison term and a 1,000 pound fine.

The life term meant being behind bars until death or for 25 years, whichever came first. Lotz, however, only served 2 years because, meanwhile, the Six-Day war broke out and was followed by arduous negotiations between Egypt and Israel, through the mediation of UN Secretary General U Thant, concerning an exchange of Egyptian POW's captured by Israel during the 1967 war for a group of Israeli frogmen, spies, and pilots who were being held in Egypt. The Israeli prisoners were quietly released in total secrecy and Lotz and his wife were among them.

Should we go back into history, or should we consider the present reality to search for other evidence in order to answer the question: who killed the Egyptian scientist, the son of movie star Sayyid Badir?

Or should we go back to another story?

Unexceptional Spy

A physician, half-Egyptian and half-American with U.S. citizenship, grew up in a family prominent in the scientific field. He, along with his brother and father, emigrated to the United States in 1968 and returned to Egypt in 1979 to put his children through medical school. His brother, however, joined the American Central Intelligence Agency and, in 1983, dragged him into the world of espionage. The two brothers began passing information of all types magnitude, significance, and triviality to Nicholas Edward Reynolds, the CIA [Central Intelligence Agency] representative who recruited them.

At the North Cairo Court, Justice Sa'id Mahmud al-Sayyid was dropping the last curtain on another story of agents and traitors to the nation. He sentenced the two physicians, Sami Yusuf Ibrahim Wasif and his brother, Samir, to a 10-year prison term and a fine of 10,000 pounds each. The CIA representative received a 5-year prison term at hard labor. While Sami went to prison to serve out his sentence, his brother Samir and the CIA representative fled the country.

During the investigations, defendant Sami admitted that he had been aware that his brother Samir had contacts with an American who used the pseudonym "Tony" to whom he passed information. Sami confessed that he helped his brother collect this information and admitted going to America twice to attend training course, both theoretical and practical, in information gathering and transmittal and how to elude surveillance by Egyptian security officers.

He also confessed that he used to meet with the American representative in the bathroom of a famous restaurant in downtown Cairo for extreme secrecy, to pass to him all kinds of information, from Islamic groups' positions, movements, publications, and demonstrations, to sovereign political decisions issued by higher authorities in Egypt, parliamentary elections, the presidential referendum, and news about the PLO office in Cairo.

The defendant related in detail how the CIA representative gave him a telephone number to call in emergencies, which turned out to be a private office at an American company whose owner admitted to leasing the telephone line to the American embassy for a period of time.

The defendant did not make secret the fact that he had been asked but had failed to recruit Islamic group elements.

Exchange With Americans

While the defendant admitted to receiving a monthly stipend of \$200 from the American representative, his mother yelled out in court that the prosecution told her during the investigation to put pressure on the CIA to release engineer 'Abd-al-Qadir Hilmi.

Another account that made the rounds among journalists said that the defendant's mother went to the American embassy but was told by an embassy official that her son was not worth 'Abd-al-Qadir Hilmi.

'Abd-al-Qadir Hilmi is the Egyptian engineer who was arrested in America along with others, including Americans, on the charge of stealing rocket secrets and certain special materials. He is still in custody awaiting his trial next September. In Cairo, he is regarded as a national hero. So, did Egypt uncover this CIA spy network, at this time in particular, as a form of pressure on the American administration, or for the sake of a swap or exchange?!

Not a likely possibility since the facts of the case confirm that defendant Nicholas Edward Reynolds, the CIA's American representative, fled the country before the 5-year prison sentence was issued against him. It is possible that had he been arrested, a swap would have been likely, especially since the opposition newspapers, including Cairo newspaper AL-AHALI, had urged the government to win the release of the Egyptian engineer who is considered a prominent rocketry scientist.

At any rate, this case is not over yet. Other information published in AL-AHALI confirmed that Egyptian authorities are now questioning—in total secrecy—some persons thought to be connected to the spy case in which the two Egyptian physicians and the American representative have been charged, including two former police major generals, three employees at a major ministry, two undersecretaries, and a general director.

The newspaper said that the investigation included 12 diplomats and foreign nationals who were expected to be deported shortly, and that other individuals working for foreign concerns were involved in one way or another in this case.

Considering that not one Egyptian official has denied AL-AHALI's report, other developments in the case may come to light in the future.

Israeli Network

A few days later, the Cairo newspaper, AL-WAFD, published a news report about an Israeli spy net in Alexandria that included three Mosad agents with contacts in certain foreign circles in Egypt's second capital, Alexandria. It said that this network was gathering information on Egyptian army movements along the western borders. These spies were turned over to the Supreme State Security Court which will put them on trial in September.

Some political circles see a connection between this network, which was gathering information on the Egyptian army along the western borders, and the Egyptian spy, 'Abd-al-Hamid al-Labbad, who was arrested last June for collaborating with Israel by gathering information on the Egyptian army in Sinai. So what is his story?!

He was 25 years old when he decided willingly to throw his life and future into the arms of Israeli Colonel Abu-Harun who put him through a number of tests to verify his veracity and loyalty to Israeli intelligence.

At that very moment, dreams of riches had taken over al-Labbad's mind and conscience. Al-Labbad was born in January 1960 in the Jawz Ghanim region north of Sinai, an area which, in the wake of the 1967 occupation, was converted into the Yamit settlement. By attending a high school in al-'Arish, he was able to venture deep into occupied Palestine where he got his crazy ideas: why not strike a deal with the devil, giving it Egypt's secrets and getting a fortune in return. This idea kept going through his mind until he was graduated from al-Zaqaziq University's College of Education and went to work as a teacher in Rafah. When his father asked him to join the military service, he refused and fled to the Israeli colonel and Mosad officer who taught him all the tradecrafts of espionage: how to use code, electronic equipment, invisible ink, a small camera to photograph distant targets, and a list of accommodation addresses in various European countries picked by Mosad.

Al-Labbad began his activities in 1985 and no one, save for the Egyptian Intelligence Agency—knows exactly when he was arrested. All the information, however, points to the fact that he had been put under surveillance from the very beginning, and that all the information he passed to Israel had been controlled and may have also been prepared by Egyptian intelligence, hence his fall at the right time.

And as simple as can be, he was awakened by someone tapping him on the shoulder and saying: "Your mission is over, come with us." The Egyptian intelligence officer had finished searching the apartment and escorted the spy to the Supreme State Security Prosecution where they big surprise occurred: the prosecution asked him "How much money did you get from Mosad?" He tried to dodge the question at first, but then felt ashamed enough to say, "6,000 pounds."

"Only 6,000 pounds...the price of Egypt!?" This is what the prosecutor, astounded, asked him. The only answer al-Labbad had was more tears and then a scream when Major General 'Abd al-Ghaffar Hilal, chief of the Supreme Military Court, sentenced him to a life term (25 years) and a 10,000 pound fine. The case was then closed only to have another one begin. We do not yet know any details, but we do know that Egyptian intelligence is vigilant and alert, watching over Egypt's security and lying in wait for the nation's enemies, be they foreign or those who have sold their souls to the devil.

Dutch Company Studies Suez Canal Expansion

45040487d London AL-HAWADITH
in Arabic 18 Aug 89 p 36

[Text] The Egyptian government has commissioned the Dutch "NEDICO" Company [as published] to prepare a feasibility study on the expansion and deepening of the Suez Canal so that it may receive huge oil tankers beginning in the nineties.

The requested study will cost \$2 million and will be financed the Arab Economic and Social Development Fund. The Egyptian authorities' interest in deepening the canal's draft was spurred by the anticipated increase in oil shipping as a result of an expected boom in international consumption.

Balance of Payments Estimates

45040487b London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic
25 Aug 89 p 34

[Text] The People's Assembly budget committee in Egypt published balance of payments estimates for FY 1988-89. These estimates said that total revenues amounted to 22.340 billion Egyptian pounds [LE], 4.199 LE of which are from commodity exports, 6.936 billion LE from military exports and 8.400 billion LE from remittances by Egyptians working abroad.

Payments were estimated at 24.940 billion LE, 18.865 billion of which was for commodity imports, and 4.607 billion for military payments.

Statistics on Foreign Exchange Free Market Returns

45040487c London AL-HAWADITH
in Arabic 25 Aug 89 p 34

[Article: "Egypt: Foreign Currency Market Proceeds \$6.5 Billion"]

[Text] Dr Yusri Mustafa, Egyptian minister of economy and foreign trade, stated that the free foreign currency market has taken in \$6.5 billion in proceeds as of its founding in May 1987, almost 27 months ago.

He said that the market's proceeds are on the increase. The minister expected these proceeds to rise considerably in the coming months due to the fact that the dollar rate of exchange paid by the banks is close to the black market rate, prompting Egyptians returning from abroad to transfer their savings through official banks rather than the black market.

World Economy Forces Arms Industry To Re-evaluate Projects

45040518a Dubayy AL-BAYAN in Arabic 25 Aug p 9

[Article by Sami Fahim: "Egyptian Arms Industry Faces Challenges; Exports Decline as World Markets Slump"]

[Excerpts] [Passage omitted] Official statements put Egypt's military productive capacity in 1987 at about 1.4 billion pounds annually, compared with actual production of only 670 million pounds. Military production capacity has risen to 2 billion pounds in 1988, but actual production is estimated at only 1.3 billion pounds.

The situation prompted former defense minister Marshal Muhammad Abu-Ghazalah to emphasize marketing and bolster the competitiveness of Egyptian armament. His efforts, however, were unsuccessful. Western sources point out that the stagnation of Egypt's armament industry and its exports was the main reason for his removal from office. He was replaced by First General Yusif Sabri Abu-Talib who openly advocated the need for reassessing Arab production plans in light of armed forces needs, general budget resources, and foreign marketing capacity.

That is the framework within which Abu-Talib is considering the abrogation of an agreement with General Dynamics of the United States to produce the M1A1 tank in Egypt at a total cost of about \$2.5 billion.

The tank had met with opposition in Egypt on technical and military grounds as well as because of its exorbitant costs. [passage omitted]

On the other hand, the Egyptian government has focused on developing an armament industry based on 29 state-owned factories. It adopted a new manufacturing strategy based on diversifying the nations with which Egypt deals in the areas of weapons component manufacturing, spying, and joint production. The strategy is also based on modifying and adapting western and eastern weapons. [passage omitted]

Semiofficial estimates indicate that Iraq obtained Egyptian weapons valued at \$3.6 billion during the 5-year period from 1982 to 1987.

The Iraqi share almost accounts for more than 85 percent of Egyptian armament exports. It follows, therefore, that the Iraq-Iran cease-fire was a major factor in the decline of Egyptian armament exports. Another factor is depressed world weapons markets as a result of difficult economic conditions in the developing nations which account for the main demand for weapons. The weakening in world demand for armaments has caused supplies to rise and has intensified competition among producers of low to medium technologically advanced traditional weapons. These producers are led by China, Brazil, Egypt, and Korea. [passage omitted]

These problems, it seems, are prompting officials to re-evaluate military production in light of Egyptian economic problems and the creation of the Arab Cooperation Council. In that respect, certain sources have underlined the importance of bolstering the integration of the weapons industries in Egypt, Iraq, and Jordan. These sources pointed out the possibility of Egyptian-Iraqi cooperation in producing the T-72 Soviet tank as a substitute for producing the M1A1 U.S. tank in Egypt.

The Egyptian government, on the other hand, hopes that Arab countries resume participation in the Arab Manufacturing Authority. It also hopes to market postsales services, or even sell those services alone without the condition of prior sale. Such services include the supply of training, maintenance, and expertise to Arab and African countries that request them.

Private Investments Statistics

45040487e London AL-MAJALLAH
in Arabic 29 Aug 89 p 44

[Article: "Private Investments in Egypt Amount to 8 Billion Pounds"]

[Text] Private capital invested in Egypt during the last 10 years amounted to 8 billion Egyptian pounds, 65 percent of which is Egyptian money with 18 percent in Arab money and the rest in foreign money.

The total number of projects created with the approval of the General Investment Authority in Egypt is 1,371—1,200 of which are production projects, and the remainder are services and construction.

Public, Private Joint Projects Lose 630 Million Pounds

45040531b Cairo AL-AHALI in Arabic 30 Aug 89 p 1

[Muhammad al-Hadari report]

[Text] Several members of the committee set up to discuss the situation of the faltering companies in the public and private sectors proposed that joint companies operating with a loss since they were established be liquidated. Directors of public banks said during their meeting with Minister of Planning Kamal al-Janzuri that the liquidation of losing companies is the ideal solution so that public sector companies investing in them will be able to continue and their financial burdens will be lightened. The committee members also requested that projects owned by public and commercial banks which are economically unfeasible be liquidated, and that they be offered for sale after their assets are accurately estimated by neutral committees.

Data gathered by the committee shows that 62 joint companies out of 215 have been continuously losing since 1978. The losing joint companies include 53 whose future is insecure, and their continuation affects the shareholding banks and companies. Measures to liquidate or amalgamate them with public companies on the basis of the value of their assets alone have in fact been set in motion.

An official source said that efforts are being made with banks to make them bear part of the losses incurred by those companies to which the banks granted unsecured loans by becoming investors in those companies to the value of the loss they will bear. Some of the private companies have also exaggerated the value of their assets in the data they provided to the ad hoc committees looking into their situation.

The source added that the studies carried out so far indicate that 85 percent of the faltering projects and companies borrowed more than 70 percent of their capital, thus creating an economic imbalance.

He said that losses of the joint and investment companies during last year alone were 630 million pounds, while the public sector losses did not exceed 400 million pounds, despite the fact that prices in the public sector are fixed, while the others enjoy several exemptions.

With regard to the proposals concerning the losing public sector, the committee is expected to approve the industry's demand that the companies' bank debts be frozen, that the price of their products be increased, and that their debts to the public treasury be adjusted to be equivalent to their capital.

Article Lists Reasons Behind Parties' Ineffectiveness

45040515 Cairo ROSE AL-YUSUF
in Arabic 28 Aug 89 p 18

[Article by Dr Jihad 'Awdah: "Democracy in Danger of Bankruptcy"]

[Excerpts] Egyptian democracy these days is facing a real danger represented by its fall into bankruptcy. This means that the existing political parties, including the ruling party, are playing a marginal role in shaping public opinion and in expressing the interests of the various social and political factions. [passage omitted]

Before going into the reasons and possible results, let us explain the various manifestations of the parties' decline. One manifestation highlights these parties' inability to create a state of political consensus on any one of the important issues facing Egypt today. [passage omitted]

The parties are still occupied with minor conflicts and engrossed in a futile argument over historic and ideological matters.

Another manifestation is the parties' failure to grasp the issues, concerns, and problems of young people. Issues like the spread of drugs, delinquency, and broken families are not being faced by the existing parties. It has been observed that party bases and cadres do not interact with the environment around them.

A third manifestation is that the parties, perhaps with the exception of the Wafd Party to a certain extent, have failed to crystallize any specific social interests for expression or representation. For almost 13 years, the Egyptian parties have been floating in space without a clear definition of what they want or what they represent. This may be the deep-rooted reason behind their waning public support, despite the Egyptian public opinion's inclination to support democracy and the principle of party life.

As for the reasons why the existing parties are losing power, they can be divided into four major causes:

- First, the disappearance of democracy within the parties; no party chief can be replaced without a split within the party.
- Second, the laws regulating political activity and political rights; these laws only lead to the executive power's domination of Egyptian life in general.
- Third, the government's growing ineffectiveness in grappling with issues related to stability and the economy; the Egyptian government has shifted from being a director of political and economic life to playing the role of a supreme guide for this life.

The fourth reason is related to these parties' ideologies. For besides the fact that some parties espouse bogus ideologies, there are parties that adopt ideologies that do

not allow them to perceive the real problems that will be facing the Egyptian society and government at the end of the eighties.

Hence, Egyptian democracy is in danger of going bankrupt. This bankruptcy may be best exemplified by what the Wafd Party chief wrote on the 17th of this month when he said: "The Wafd Party does not seek power, for if the rule in Egypt were to be put up for auction, there would be no takers among the parties." Thus, the largest opposition and rival party in Egypt has announced its relinquishment of its tasks and its party functions. This stands as proof of the existing parties' bankruptcy in terms of its unwillingness, or its inability to substitute for, or to participate with the existing government, to solve the crises facing the nation.

It is evident that the existing parties, including the National Party, have not responded to the spirit of the call for a national dialogue of a new kind. If this is the case, the only thing Egypt will be facing is a future represented by a more marginal party life, which leads to more political violence, and consequently, to government security remedies, and from there to deep political stability. [passage omitted]

Head of Abu-Zahrah Islamic Society Profiled

45040518b Cairo AL-NUR in Arabic 30 Aug 89 p 7

[Column by Nasir Wahdan: "A Welcome to Dr Mustafa Abu-Zahrah, President of the Abu-Zahrah Islamic Society of Heliopolis"]

[Excerpts] Welcome. My name is Mustafa Muhibb. My father is the late Shaykh Muhammad Ahmad Abu-Zahrah, former professor of Shari'a at Cairo University's School of Law. I was born in al-Jizah governorate in March of 1944. I was educated in the public schools and enrolled in the College of Dentistry where I received my baccalaureate in Oral and Dental Surgery in 1969. I later earned a diploma of surgery in the same specialty. In addition to being president of the Abu-Zahrah Islamic Society in Heliopolis, I am currently director of the Medical Center at the College of Education of Heliopolis University. [passage omitted]

The mosque is the center of all society projects because the call of the mosque is societal, educational, and moral, as well as religious. As you see, it is constantly being renovated and expanded. The Society uses it to hold serial religious seminars that feature senior 'ulamas, especially during the month of Ramadan, in addition to Qur'an recitation classes for persons of all ages, and the al-Rahman Banquet that is held continuously during the month of Ramadan. The mosque has a story which I must tell you. My father, God have mercy on him, planned to build this mosque in his lifetime. I asked him during one of my visits why it was delayed. His answer took me by surprise as he charged me: "Son, I don't think I will get to build this mosque. I hope that you will build it in case I die. This is my charge to you". I smiled at that because he was in robust health then. I never imagined

that he would die only one hour after giving me his charge in April of 1974. It therefore became incumbent upon me to do his bidding even though my career as a dentist is quite removed from social work and the difficulties it entails. The mosque was built, thank God, and was accompanied and followed by other society projects in the service of its community. A number of youths helped with that.

It is true. Through our Qur'anic program, and in application of the honorable verse "cooperate in piety and doing good", we implemented the society's "producing families project" which aims at reducing the burden of breadwinners, especially as the school year begins. The "producing families project", in cooperation with the school's administration, has been able to provide pupils with clothes of the finest materials at the cheapest prices. We were therefore able to prevent merchants from gouging breadwinners. At the same time, workers within the "producing families project" benefited from an honest and steady income thanks to the success of their project—success that can be attributed to the Almighty God alone.

The society is also implementing other projects in the service of society and the concept of social security. The society's alms committee studies the cases of poor families and promptly extends financial help to them. The committee also visits and extends needed help to hospital patients and poor families.

Other projects being planned with God's help include the creation of a specialized scientific library that would comprise a data bank and computers to serve graduate students and facilitate their utilization of it, a huge prayer house capable of accommodating 2,000 women, and secondary school classrooms ready to receive students at the beginning of next year, if God is willing. If these classes are hampered by the lack of wide horizons, we will surmount this obstacle at a future date, God willing. [passage omitted]

Columnist Says Crime Requires Shari'ah Stricter Punishment

45040531a Cairo AL-JUMHURIYAH
in Arabic 12 Sep 89 p 5

[Muhammad al-Hayawan column: "Word of Love"]

[Excerpts] The spirit of law imposes itself both in application and interpretation. In certain cases the ruling differs if the source of law is European, as in the case of French law, or if it is Islamic, as in the case of the Islamic Shari'ah. The law gains completeness through work of jurisprudence, legislation, parliamentary debate, and judicial precedents. Law derived from Islamic principles is based on the Koran, the Sunna, and the consensus of ulemas. The spirit of law consists of all these together. Many examples can be cited:

The European law is lenient in certain cases and stricter in others according to the society's needs, while Islamic

Shari'ah is strict in these cases right from the beginning because it is aware of society's inclinations and the whims of its individuals. The law on drugs is one example. In the past, the drug possession penalty was a 15 piasters fine; it then became imprisonment with hard labor, and later became death penalty. But the penalty under the Islamic Shari'ah in this case is strict right from the beginning; it calls for drastic punishment right from the start.

The European law is lenient in certain cases involving honor, but becomes stricter in other cases, while the Islamic law is strict on all crimes involving human life, possessions, and honor. According to the recommendation of God's messenger during the final pilgrimage, the law becomes a decree and a command. God proclaimed that the property and honor of a Muslim are forbidden to another Muslim. Commission of what is forbidden is subject to drastic punishment.

Therefore, when the deputy Attorney General applies the French law he is dominated by the spirit of the law. But if he applies the Islamic Shari'ah, the Shari'ah imposes itself as the defender of society and its members against the evil trends in it. [passage omitted]

Those who demand a change in the laws so that they are compatible with the Shari'ah are right, because strictness means protection for society. Rape crimes became punishable by death only recently, and so have drug crimes. We have resorted to the Shari'ah in order to amend the penalty for these crimes. We should deal with crimes involving child abuse with even stricter penalties now that they have become frequent. Penalties should be imposed on the parents when a mother leaves a child with a juvenile teacher and goes to chat with the neighbors.

In summary, investigation into certain crimes differ, depending on the spirit of the law. In the case of positive law we become lenient, while in the case of Shari'ah law we become stricter. Strictness is desirable in order to fight certain crimes. In certain crimes which have become recurrent, we have raised the penalty to death.

ISRAEL

Darawishah Describes Israeli, Arab Links to Egypt, U.S.

900L0026a Cairo UKTUBAR in Arabic 20 Aug 89 p 80

[Interview With 'Abd-al-Wahhab al-Darawishah, Arab Democratic Party Chairman, by Miryam Rubin; "'Abd-al-Wahhab al-Darawishah: Through Egypt, We Seek To Break Arab Hoop Encircling Us"; first paragraph is UKTUBAR introduction; date and place not given]

[Text] Our pause today is with an Arab notable who heads the first Arab political party in Israel, namely the Arab Democratic Party. This is also the first time an

official delegation of this party visits Cairo, as 'Abd-al-Wahhab al-Darawishah, the party chairman, has said.

[Uktubar] It was natural that the first question addressed to al-Darawishah would be: Why this visit now?

[Darawishah] The objective is to coordinate with our brothers in Cairo in order to make contacts with the Egyptian political leadership, especially with the NDP [National Democratic Party] leaderships, to strengthen the two parties' relations and to bolster the relations between the Palestinian people at home and the Egyptian people. We also seek to establish contacts with all the forces active in the Egyptian arena so as to exchange information and opinions, because we believe that Egypt, with its distinguished position and its nationalist stances, is of great importance to us as Palestinians inside Israel. Regrettably, we don't have relations with any Arab country, and a blockade continues to encircle us. So far, we have not been fortunate enough to establish contacts with any state. This is why we are seeking to break this hoop and to open the Arab world's gates to ourselves through Egypt.

We are an indivisible part of the Palestinian people and the Arab world. We are proud of our Arabism and our heritage and it is unreasonable that a blockade should encircle us and that the Arab states should take part in this blockade. It is unreasonable that this blockade should continue, as if we are the Arab world's illegitimate son. We are legitimate sons and we are fully entitled to be so.

[UKTUBAR] How do you think this blockade will be lifted?

[Darawishah] First, by having the Arab countries open their doors to us so that we may visit them and make contacts with them. I believe that this can be done at the leadership and popular levels. We are here in Cairo and we are eager to meet the Arab ambassadors to Egypt and to convey through them our wish to meet with the Arab leaders. We have asked Dr 'Isma't 'Abd-al-Majid, the deputy prime minister and foreign minister, to broker meetings with the Arab ambassadors tied to Egypt by strong relations.

Dr 'Abd-al-Majid has promised us to make such contacts. He assured us with full understanding that there is need for such contacts and that Egypt will be happy to perform this role. Through these meetings in Cairo, we wish to crystallize our position as an ethnic minority in Israel. Under the current blockade, our position will continue to be marginal. The Israeli Government and the various Zionist parties view us from a marginal perspective even though we form one-fifth the Israeli society and even though we are of major political importance. We can form the third power in the Israeli society and we can have 16 deputies in the Knesset. On the one hand, the Israeli Government and parties ignore us and devour our rights, and on the other hand, the Arab world has not done us justice and considers us the illegitimate son. But we can form an important power if the Arab

countries help and aid us. We wish to return from this tour, having made the Israeli Government realize that the Arab Democratic Party has its weight in and its contacts with the Arab world. This will bolster our status and will allow us to demand a greater role and greater rights so as to end the racist discrimination practiced against our masses. We can also contribute to enhancing the peace process and to establishing a just and lasting peace that guarantees a complete solution to the Palestinian issue through establishment of the Palestinian state.

[UKTUBAR] Are these all of the visit's objectives?

[Darawishah] There are practical issues, in addition to the political party level issues. We want an exchange of visits between the Egyptian NDP and the Arab Democratic Party in Israel. We have agreed with Dr Yusuf Wali, the NDP secretary general, to exchange such visits and to soon host an NDP delegation in Nazareth, the capital of the Galilee and the party headquarters.

We have another demand, namely to enroll Arab Palestinian students in the Egyptian universities, especially in al-Azhar.

There were past promises to do this. Regrettably, they have not been kept. We, as Arabs and Muslims, believe that we have a right to al-Azhar and that our Palestinian masses in Israel cannot be denied their right to send their students to al-Azhar so that they may return to their homeland as clergymen, mosque imams, and religious judges. It is al-Azhar's duty to support us in this regard. We have asked Dr 'Isma't 'Abd-al-Majid to intercede with al-Azhar's grand imam to allow the enrollment of 30 Palestinian students in al-Azhar. The foreign minister has promised us to do this. We have another demand voiced by our Arab masses in Israel, namely that the way be opened for those wishing to perform the pilgrimage rites via Egypt, and via Jordan as well. We thank the Jordanian Government for all the facilities it grants us. But we want, moreover, our citizens to be permitted to go perform the pilgrimage via Cairo because Egypt is the only Arab country with which we have relations and through which we can travel to any other country. Dr 'Isma't 'Abd-al-Majid has responded very positively and has promised us to examine this issue.

[UKTUBAR] What is your party's assessment of Shamir's initiative?

[Darawishah] Shamir wants, in fact, to maintain the status quo. This is why he has come up with his initiative which he calls a "peace initiative", but which is as remote from peace as can be. What Shamir has proposed in this initiative, and what he and his government practice on the ground, are remote from peace. Daily, the acts of oppression are escalating, martyrs are falling, deportations are increasing, and homes are demolished. All these acts are in conflict with the terminology of a peace initiative. From my close and certain knowledge of Shamir, I believe that this government is not prepared for any peace initiative that includes the relinquishment

of any land. Shamir's concept stresses that Palestine's land is Israeli land. He will not sign any agreement entailing the relinquishment of a single inch of territories. All those who expect Shamir to follow a peaceful line are deluded. With Arab and U.S. pressures and with a united European stance, Shamir can be compelled to begin political dialogue. But I cannot imagine that Shamir or his government will sign any peace treaty. Shamir's current initiative is for deception and delusion. It is an endeavor to convince the world that he has a peace transaction countering the Palestinian peace plan. But the Palestinian plan is clear: two states for two peoples. What are the limits of Shamir's initiative and what are the limits of the peace plan? What Shamir seeks is to mislead the world and Arab public opinion. Regrettably, there are in the Arab world those who have been misled by this initiative. I tell them: Shamir is not serious in establishing any peace.

[UKTUBAR] So how is salvation to be achieved?

[Darawishah] Israel's political map is changing. There is an intensifying split within the Israeli society. The right is becoming more ferocious and it fears any solution entailing the relinquishment of land. The moderate parties are becoming more convinced of the need to attain a solution that guarantees the Palestinian people's right. The ordinary Israeli citizen is weak and the peace forces' influence on the government is weak. But I expect the influence to come from putting U.S., European, and Arab pressure on Shamir's government. This can be done if unified Arab agreement is reached to put pressure on the U.S. administration and, through it, on the Israeli Government. The U.S. administration is susceptible to such pressure. But to date, such pressure has not been exerted, and the U.S. administration has not felt that its interests will be harmed if it continues its policy of alignment with Israel. It is the Arab world's role to understand that the United States must end its partiality to Israel and must follow a balanced line. This will serve the interests of the United States and of all of the region's countries. In any case, a new position has developed in the U.S. arena—a position stated by Bush and reiterated by Baker—on ending the Israeli occupation, supporting the idea of the international conference, and entrenching the dialogue with the PLO. There have been some positive steps which we cannot ignore and which we welcome. We hope that the United States will continue to move in this direction and that it will put actual pressure on the Israeli Government so that it may rescue the Israeli society from this intransigent government which is also harming this society.

[UKTUBAR] Have you, as a party, tried to contact the United States?

[Darawishah] I have not visited the United States since the elections. However, we do have contacts with Brown, the U.S. ambassador to Israel. We always talk to the U.S. envoys who visit Israel. I notice that there is a change in the U.S. position and there is readiness to hear our viewpoint. In their discussions with the Israelis, there

seems to be readiness for a different U.S. position. The tone has changed and the readiness for dialogue has changed. These are the most significant features of the policy of Bush who understands the positions because he worked in the State Department and the intelligence agency, and because he is not the amateur politician Reagan was. I am optimistic and I plan to visit the United States at the beginning of October to meet with U.S. officials and with the Arab community in the United States in order to persuade the U.S. public opinion of our just cause. I believe that the Americans will retreat from their position, especially in the wake of declaration of the Palestinian line in the Palestine National Council [PNC] resolutions and of the announcement of Fatah resolutions which have reinforced the will for peace. They will understand the full picture. The time has come for President Bush to invite Palestinian President Yasir 'Arafat so that they may talk the talk of men about peace, because the U.S. president must realize that it is truly in the interest of the United States and of world peace to develop a just solution to the Palestinian issue. Such a solution cannot be developed without serious dialogue with the PLO.

Shaykh Tarif Addresses Druze, Regional Concerns

90OL0026b Nazareth AL-SINNARAH
in Arabic 15 Sep 89 pp 10, 17

[Interview With Shaykh Amin Tarif, Spiritual Leader of Arab Druze Sect, by Lutfi Mash'ur, Fayiz 'Abbas and Zayid Khunayfis: "Shaykh Amin Tarif in First Press Interview: Our Prophets Are Arab, Our Language Is Arabic, and We Cannot Deny Our Arabism; Druze Are Arabs and From Arabs; Nobody Among Druze Has Status of Sultan Basha al-Atrash; I Am Smallest Person Among Druze; Unification Is Against People's and Government's Interest; Strict Prohibition on Drug Dealers"; date and place not given]

[Text] An interview with His Eminence Shaykh Amin Tarif cannot be just a press interview because of the man's status in the country and the world, considering that he is the spiritual leader of the Arab Druze sect wherever it exists. As the shaykh himself has said, the Druze faith is everything for the sect members. It is the here and the hereafter. It is worth noting that Shaykh Tarif has never granted a comprehensive press interview. But he was kind enough and agreed to let AL-SINNARAH have the first such interview. There is no need to mention the reasons.

Shaykh Tarif, a 95-year old man, may God grant him a long life, was born in Jawlas, studied at al-Ramah school and completed his studies in the retreats of al-Bayadah Religious Institute.

Shaykh Tarif, who has gained greater knowledge of religious and worldly affairs with the years, maintains his

mental vigor. Whoever sits with him realizes his extreme humility, his bright intelligence, and his great knowledge of all affairs.

It seems that the years add to his wisdom, his uprightness, clear vision, and courage. These are only some of the qualities distinguishing this esteemed shaykh.

It is no secret to anybody that his firm positions have never changed. He refused to sign at the time the agreement on conscripting Druze youth and he has rejected the allegations, which some people try to portray as a fact, about the Druze sect's belonging to their Arab nation. He has also had honorable positions on a number of issues, some of which concern the current political conditions and developments in our country and the world.

Naturally, all the media and authorities have preferred and continue to prefer not to let the esteemed shaykh's said positions and others be publicized. Every government has its need and seeks to serve its policy. But no government can conceal the facts. With this interview, AL-SINNARAH hopes to shed light on some of these facts.

[AL-SINNARAH] Your eminence, let us begin with the unification [al-damj] issue. You say that it is a political process that undermines religion. Can you clarify this to us?

[Tarif] In the past, there were no sects. God sent His prophets—Prophet Shu'ayb, peace be upon him, Prophet Moses, and Christ. The prophets did not act on their own inspiration but on revelation from God. Acting on God's command, the prophets settled people's affairs and people split into religions and sects. Mankind cannot act against God's will. Unification is a faulty theory because it unites the people's opinions and the people then rebel against the government. This is wrong. Keeping conditions as they are is better for the government and the people.

[AL-SINNARAH] Meaning that nonunification makes people love each other and cooperate better, each from his position?

[Tarif] According to the unification, freedom of religion will continue to exist.

[AL-SINNARAH] Your eminence, you have said that unification may undermine religions and religious liberties. Can you explain this to us clearly?

[Tarif] The Druze sect now has its principles, its creeds, and its own law which it applies to contraveners. Unification is like a broom with a broken string. This means that religious officials will no longer have any power and will no longer be able to do anything. Principles from other sects will be embraced and this will lead to religious disintegration. Moreover, government officials will no longer have standing or influence. This will harm both government and sect.

[AL-SINNARAH] Dr Hamad Sa'b (chairman of Abu-Sanan Local Council), who is a Druze, is most enthusiastic for unification?

[Tarif] It is a secular policy that has nothing to do with religion. He is acting against religion.

[AL-SINNARAH] Dr Sa'b is acting against religion?

[Tarif] Yes.

[AL-SINNARAH] Our Druze and Christian brothers live amicably in al-Ramah, in 'Asfayya, and everywhere. So why shouldn't there be unification, especially since we have good examples?

[Tarif] In al-Ramah, the Druze have begun to imbibe the Christians' morals.

[AL-SINNARAH] And this is good?

[Tarif] They permit what our religion prohibits. Religiously, al-Ramah is not an active center but a small center. Therefore, the power in the clergymen's hands will be disappear and control will be lost. People will then scatter among numerous creeds. This is not good for the sect or the government. Division leads to disintegration, and this will kill the word of truth and the world of religion.

[AL-SINNARAH] Which is more dangerous to the Druze sect: to have unification, as in al-Ramah, meaning to have people influenced by another religion, or the issue of hashish and drugs?

[Tarif] There is agreement on hashish and drugs. They are proscribed evils and their use is tantamount to swerving from religion.

[AL-SINNARAH] You have proclaimed excommunication against drug dealers and users. Did you previously proclaim excommunication on another issue?

[Tarif] Yes, excommunication was applied to some issues. (The shaykh did not reveal those issues)

[AL-SINNARAH] Regarding drugs, you say in the excommunication decree that numerous Druze youths have begun to traffic in and use drugs. How do you interpret the fact that they engage in such activity, keeping in mind that Druze youths have been conservative? What are the reasons for this?

[Tarif] In the British era, people were closer to religion. When states were established, liberties proliferated and religion's power diminished. This is why those who use drugs are excommunicated religiously.

[AL-SINNARAH] The phenomenon of drug use has spread widely among Druze youths in the past 2 years. Is there a religious or secular explanation for this?

[Tarif] All our ideas seek to stop and prohibit drugs. But there are those who are not influenced by religion. The

proliferation indicates the diminishing power of religion. The more this power diminishes, the worse the issue will become.

[AL-SINNARAH] Do you mean that the excommunication will be of no use?

[Tarif] The more lightly religion is taken, the weaker faith becomes, meaning that the weaker religion gets, the less impact excommunication has on these people. The situation was better during the British Mandate. When Israel gave people liberties, religion's influence diminished.

[AL-SINNARAH] What does the excommunication of drug dealers and users mean? Does it mean that people are prohibited from talking to them?

[Tarif] We have special prayers. A contravener is denied these prayers.

[AL-SINNARAH] And socially?

[Tarif] Socially, the excommunication means that people will boycott drug addicts and will not participate in their festivities. There are pamphlets on this issue and they say, for example, that people should not participate in their funerals and other activities.

[AL-SINNARAH] Meaning that the excommunication is similar to the excommunication imposed by the Druze shaykhs of the Golan on those who acquired identity cards?

[Tarif] Yes. This excommunication is like any other excommunication.

[AL-SINNARAH] Isn't there tolerance for those who repent?

[Tarif] Among our Christian brothers, a sinner goes to church and he is absolved of his offenses and sins. Among the Muslims, a sinner goes to the mosque, and the same applies to the other sects. Among us, whoever commits what is proscribed is denied his religion and excommunicated. When prayers are held, he stands meekly and asks society for forgiveness.

[AL-SINNARAH] Is there absolutely no absolution?

[Tarif] God forgives and absolves whoever returns to the right path. God commands us to forgive. As for those who fail to return, they will be punished because the commission of sin deserves just punishment.

[AL-SINNARAH] Regarding people involved in drugs, what is the punishment imposed on a person—a drug dealer, for example—who wants to repent and retreat?

[Tarif] If a man commits an offense before God and then repents, he receives greater compassion than others. But if he returns to crime, his appeals for forgiveness are not answered.

[AL-SINNARAH] In your capacity as a clergyman, would you impose on such a person a different punishment, such as material punishment, so that he may compensate for his offenses with good deeds?

[Tarif] In accordance with the Druze creed, there is punishment for an individual who repents, such as denying him religious prayers for a period of time.

[AL-SINNARAH] Would you kindly tell us briefly: Who are Bani Ma'ruf and who are the Druze?

[Tarif] Our prophets are Arab and the last prophets sent are Arab. Therefore, we cannot deny or disown the Arabs because we are Arab and are from the Arabs. So how can we deny our Arabism.

[AL-SINNARAH] What is your opinion of the official allegation that the Druze are not Arabs?

[Tarif] This interpretation is wrong. The Druze are Arabs and are from the Arabs.

[AL-SINNARAH] Regarding the West Bank reports which say that the Druze conscripts are somewhat cruel, you have taken an honorable position on these reports and you have said that such cruelty contradicts religion. Can you tell us a little on this issue?

[Tarif] There should be no extremist soldiers. The duty of soldiers is to protect security and people, not attack people and treat them cruelly because such treatment contradicts religion. We are opposed to any soldier who tries to swerve from the right path.

[AL-SINNARAH] What is your opinion of the Druze Initiative Committee?

[Tarif] We consider it an abomination.

[AL-SINNARAH] Why?

[Tarif] Because excommunication is imposed on all committees formed.

[AL-SINNARAH] Do you mean for political reasons or for religious reasons?

[Tarif] For political reasons. But they are also an abomination insofar as religion is concerned.

[AL-SINNARAH] But if the objective of this committee or of some certain committee is to offer humanitarian assistance, would it still be prohibited?

[Tarif] The various committees perform their work for certain purposes and ends. What you are talking about has not happened.

[AL-SINNARAH] Do you keep up with the political developments and with the intifadah [uprising]?

[Tarif] I do not interfere in political affairs. But we do listen and keep up. There is deviation on the part of both

sides. The people must be conservative and must perform the duties entrusted to them. Soldiers must perform the duty entrusted to them justly and rightly.

[AL-SINNARAH] What is your opinion of peace and of a solution between the Palestinians and the Jews?

[Tarif] These issues need more than one session.

[AL-SINNARAH] But what is your view of an honest and fair solution to the issue. Is such a solution based on religion, for example?

[Tarif] I do not interfere in political affairs and I prefer not to touch on them.

[AL-SINNARAH] Do youth turn to religion as they did in your time?

[Tarif] God be thanked, there are many who proceed to al-Bayadah to learn religion. There, they gain morals and national religious awareness.

[AL-SINNARAH] How are your relations with the Druze in the Arab countries and in the other parts of the world?

[Tarif] There is a bit of correspondence, conversation, greetings and exchange of information on the religious conditions.

[AL-SINNARAH] Is your eminence a spiritual leader of the Druze sect in all parts of the world?

[Tarif] (Laughing) I am the smallest individual among the Druze.

[AL-SINNARAH] We have heard that the late Sultan Basha al-Atrash once refused to enter into a meeting held in Syria ahead of you. The shaykhs and people interpreted this as acknowledgment on al-Atrash part that you are the spiritual leader of the Druze in the world. Is this true?

[Tarif] Nobody among the Druze has the status of Sultan Basha al-Atrash. He was upright, honorable, and a principled man who achieved dignity for the Druze sect and for the entire nation. He worked for all people, not just for the Druze and not for himself.

[AL-SINNARAH] But is it true that he refused to enter into any meeting ahead of you as a sign of his respect and esteem for you?

[Tarif] Sultan Basha al-Atrash respected religion, clergymen and humanity.

[AL-SINNARAH] What is your opinion of the Druze canonical courts? I have heard that you are not pleased with their appointments and with their involvement in politics?

[Tarif] I am not pleased with the policy of the Ministry of Religious Affairs toward the Druze courts.

[AL-SINNARAH] Why? You are demanding independence...

[Tarif] There is no right or justice but rather partisanship.

[AL-SINNARAH] What are the aspects of the Ministry of Religious Affairs that you view as improper?

[Tarif] The lack of right and justice. All things are tied to party affiliations and objectives. They do not give people their rights.

[AL-SINNARAH] Does this undermine religion itself?

[Tarif] Justice is the foundation of rule. When injustice and tyranny exist, one fears that the sect or the people will collapse.

[AL-SINNARAH] Regarding the appointments, do they interfere in the Druze sect's affairs on a partisan basis?

[Tarif] Yes. There is no justice in the Ministry of Religious Affairs.

[AL-SINNARAH] Regarding the budgets, do they provide appropriations?

[Tarif] They are not fair insofar as budgets generally are concerned. For example, they do not provide budgets for religious retreats, holy places, and other sites. They have also failed to provide any exemptions to the tomb of Prophet Shu'ayb, may peace be upon him. So the tomb officials have to pay all the water, electricity, and telephone bills. The Ministries of Housing and of Energy have made some contributions. As for budgets, there is nothing.

Darawishah Discusses Israeli Arabs' Concerns, 'Ubayd, 'Arafat

90OL0026c Jerusalem AL-BAYADIR AL-SIYASI
in Arabic 19 Aug 89 pp 21-23

[Interview With 'Abd-al-Wahhab al-Darawishah, Knesset Member and Arab Democratic Party Chairman, by 'Abd-al-Salam Masariwah in Jerusalem: "Without Negotiation With PLO, No Plan Can Be Serious"; first paragraph is AL-BAYADIR AL-SIYASI introduction; date not given]

[Excerpts] 'Abd-al-Wahhab al-Darawishah is no ordinary parliamentarian. He is the man who founded the Arab Democratic Party [ADP] in July 1988 and became the spokesman and defender concerned with the causes of the country's Arabs, whether living within the green line or in the territories occupied since 1967, i.e. in the West Bank and the Strip. Since he entered the Israeli Knesset—parliament—he has recorded in this institution's files the largest number of encounters, interventions, questionings, and queries, all of which indicate his mettle and his special personality which is committed to his people's causes. In this exclusive interview, al-Darawishah answers a number of questions. In his

answers, he deals with fateful Palestinian and Arab issues which govern the Palestinian people's future, freedom, and independence, and which directly influence the fate of world peace. [passage omitted]

[AL-BAYADIR AL-SIYASI] You represent the Palestinian people's sons in Israel and you have been a parliament member for sometime. What are the prominent issues and problems from which the Palestinian citizen living in Israel complains?

[Darawishah] I am one of the Palestinian Arab representatives in the parliament. There are six Arab members and I am one of them. I represent the Arab Democratic Party. The issues are numerous. But today, we put the issue of just peace at the top of the ladder of priorities and of importance. We are now at the peak of the intifadah [uprising] and our people are struggling and striving for their freedom and independence. This is why we put the issue of the intifadah and of solidarity with the intifadah people and the effort to move the region's peace procession forward at the top of the priority ladder. A large part of our effort in the Knesset (parliament) and in the local and international arenas is dedicated in this phase to influencing the Israeli public opinion, government, Knesset, and the world public opinion, so that they may understand the Palestinian cause, may recognize the Palestinian people's national rights, and may negotiate with the PLO, the Palestinian people's sole legitimate representative.

We try to accomplish this in our daily work inside the Knesset and in the local and international arenas. At the same time, we have daily living issues connected with our civil rights as citizens in Israel. Regrettably, a policy of racial discrimination against our Palestinian masses in Israel has been adopted from the time Israel was created 41 years ago and until the present. This discrimination is founded on ethnic bases. They do not want to recognize us and acknowledge that we are a part of the country.

The racial discrimination policy is being entrenched. In recent years, official laws were issued against the Arab citizens, in addition to the previously existing laws. This is why the gap is widening between the Arabs and Jews living in Israel in the areas of education, housing, and local government budgets. Land confiscation continues. As a result of all these problems, big differences continue to exist. As a consequence of the adopted discrimination policy, the Arab citizen in Israel is worried about his future, considering that the calls for transfer, deportation, and expulsion are rising. In daily life, a policy of oppression is practiced against our Palestinian masses in Israel. They censure us, for example, because we sympathize and cooperate with the Palestinian people in the occupied territories. We tell them: It is logical and natural that we should be in solidarity with our people's valiant intifadah, as the Jews are entitled to act in solidarity with any Jew arrested or jailed in the Soviet Union or in any other place. It is our natural right to

sympathize with our Palestinian people in the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and elsewhere.

They do not want to understand this. This is why our struggle at present is the struggle of how to convince the Israeli Government, Israeli politicians, and Israeli public opinion that we have daily rights and national rights as well, and that we are important to making peace in the region. We want to and try to contribute to this process. Regrettably, the Israeli scene is closed to us. The Arab citizens have no representation in the Israeli Government. In the Knesset, we are few in number and are divided. This is why our influence is not commensurate with our population numbers. From this starting point, I sum up the two issues: the issue of just peace, and the issue of full equality in the country.

[AL-BAYADIR AL-SIYASI] Some press reports published in the past few days indicate that the blessed Palestinian intifadah may extend to the Galilee and the Triangle villages also. What is your opinion?

[Darawishah] The conditions inside Israel differ from the conditions in the occupied Palestinian territories of the West Bank and the Strip. We, as citizens of the state, try to engage in daily political and social struggle. We exert political pressure and, simultaneously, we demonstrate, declare public strikes, and take part in major demonstrations, some of them demonstrations staged by the peace forces of the Israeli and Palestinian peoples. We provide material, moral, and political aid to the sons of our Palestinian people. But I don't believe that the intifadah, in its present form in the bank and Gaza Strip, will extend inside Israel, because our real situation differs from that of the Palestinian brothers in the bank and the strip. This is especially true since we are aware that the ultraradical Israelis, including ministers such as Ariel Sharon, Ehud Olmert, and others, want the intifadah to be transmitted inside the green line (1948 territories) so that they may have an excuse to implement the policy of deportation against our Palestinian masses inside Israel, to suppress and strike these masses, and to restore the military rule that was imposed on our masses. We are very cautious because we know these politicians. We know their opinions and goals and we do not wish to enable them to accomplish what they want at the expense of our masses and our people's sons. This is why the the Arab national leadership inside Israel is dealing with this issue very intelligently and alertly, so as to foil the objectives these racists want to accomplish.

[AL-BAYADIR AL-SIYASI] They say in the 1948 territories and in the 1967 territories that you represent the Palestinian people in both parts of Palestine through your visits to Nahalin and other places. What are the motives that make you engage in this activity, keeping in mind that the capabilities available to you are limited?

[Darawishah] I proceed from the starting point that I am a son of the Palestinian people in all my concepts. At the same time, I am an Israeli citizen. I want to achieve a just and complete peace that guarantees the two peoples'

rights. My sentiments are Arab Palestinian sentiments, and I am proud of these sentiments. Secondly, I act in accordance with the ADP's program which views peace as the top priority. When we perform our duty toward our people's sons, we do not make a distinction between the Palestinian people in the occupied territories and the Palestinian masses inside the green line. Our duty is to offer any possible assistance and service to our people's sons everywhere.

This is a duty. I view Knesset membership as a service to the people and I act accordingly. At the same time, I try to influence the Israeli public opinion and to recruit more of the peace forces on the Israeli scene to support the just cause of the Palestinian struggle and to achieve a just and comprehensive peace that guarantees creation of the independent Palestinian state.

[AL-BAYADIR AL-SIYASI] Your latest endeavor in the Knesset was to ask the Israeli defense minister for a meeting with Shaykh 'Abd-al-Karim 'Ubayd, the Hizbullah leader kidnaped by Israel. Why are you engaging in these endeavors and efforts?

[Darwishah] Shaykh 'Abd-al-Karim 'Ubayd is a Muslim shaykh. As a Muslim, my emotions were stirred and I felt extremely angry when the Israeli forces kidnaped this shaykh. I consider this act an organized terrorist act committed by a government. This act is in conflict with international usage and constitutes an aggression against Lebanon's sovereignty. Despite the entire Lebanese ordeal, there are still Lebanese borders. Israel violated Lebanon's borders and kidnaped this shaykh and two of his aides. So I found it my duty to try to see the shaykh to reassure him, to reassure myself about his health and life, and to discuss with him how a solution can be achieved for his problem through an exchange of prisoners. When we talk of prisoner exchange, I talk of a comprehensive prisoner exchange that includes the Palestinian prisoners inside Israel. Meanwhile, I hope that I will be given the opportunity to see the shaykh, and to talk to him about solving the issues, including his personal issue.

[AL-BAYADIR AL-SIYASI] You have met with President Yasir 'Arafat and you have presented viewpoints to the Israeli Government. In 1984, you tried to go to Amman to take part in the Palestine National Council [PNC]. How do you view your task at present in light of the Palestinian-Israeli peace efforts?

[Darwishah] Palestinians in Israel constitute 18 percent of the population. There are nearly 800,000 Palestinians living as citizens of Israel. We have our role and our importance as part of our Palestinian people and as citizens of Israel.

We have not truly performed this role to date. They have viewed us as a marginal force. Regrettably, the Arab countries have closed their doors in our face. It pleases me to say that in recent years, the PLO opened its doors widely and effectively to the sons of our Palestinian people at home. At the same time, Egypt has attached

greater weight and greater importance to us and has strengthened its relations with us. I hope that other Arab countries will follow the PLO's and Egypt's example. Regrettably, the Israeli Government and the successive Israeli governments have become accustomed to viewing us as a marginal body and as a vote store, not as an influential force. Out of faith in our importance, I work and try to push the region's peace process forward forcefully, energetically, and with patriotism. We deal with all the issues, including the issue of just peace in the region which tops all other issues, sincerely and honestly.

Life in Ansar-3 Prison Examined

44230175 Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT
in Hebrew 24 Jul 89 p 27

[Article by Tzvi Alush: "4,000 Prisoners Broke Out in Applause"]

[Text] A few weeks ago, one of the guards, a reservist, noticed an unidentified object being thrown from one plot of Block 2 of "Ansar-3" to another plot. The object fell into the center of the second plot and was grabbed immediately by one of the prisoners. Other prisoners surrounded him immediately and crowded around him in one of the tents.

As it turned out later, this was a bar of soap to which a piece of paper was tied with string containing information which the prisoners in one plot sought to send to the prisoners in the second plot. Important information, apparently, if the prisoners involved dared to endanger themselves by throwing the "information soap." Perhaps it was the same information that led 2 days later to the liquidation of one of the prisoners in that plot. The prisoner's body was found covered with signs of violence, the kind reserved for traitors and collaborators, and it was found one morning lying at the entrance to the plot.

There have been seven cases of murder so far in the large prison installation in Ketzi'ot, better known by its nickname "Ansar-3." In most of the cases, the victim was presented as a collaborator, even though the commander of the installation, Colonel David Tzemah, asserts that collaborators were not involved. According to him, there are also cases of liquidation on the background of family honor, which the prisoners prefer to present as liquidation of traitors, so that others will see and fear. In any event, in those cases in which the murderer was discovered and arrested, he was highly honored by his comrades in the block. When he is taken out of the installation, all the prisoners in the block (there are about 1,500 in each block) cheer him and accompany him with songs and applause.

There are also cases in which candidates for liquidation succeeded in fleeing in time, and sought protection from the command of the prison. In the last 2 years, the lives of 10 prisoners who felt that their days were numbered were saved in this manner. In such cases, they are transferred to another prison facility, and if the balance

of their sentence is short, they receive an early release—not that their lives outside the installation are safer. But that is already part of the routine in the giant prison installation in Ketzi'ot. Following the murder incidents, the procedures and times for prisoners' roll call were changed recently to make it easier for those who are interested in getting away to flee.

A press tour was held last week in "Ansar-3" during the height of the media furor that was sparked by a female television reporter, who described life in the security prison in Nabulus. It was a very hot day in the Negev. As of last Thursday, 4,275 prisoners were held in the prison facility in Ketzi'ot. About 500 soldiers, most of them reservists, are responsible for guarding the installation.

The prisoners are held in three large blocks. Every block constitutes an independent unit, surrounded by three fences, paved with asphalt, and full of tents. Each tent has room for 20 or more prisoners. Usually, they sleep on mattresses thrown on the ground. Once, the mattresses were laid on platforms. In the earlier disturbances at the detention camp, the prisoners also threw the platforms over the fences. "Whoever throws out a platform, shows that he doesn't need it. Therefore, he sleeps on a mattress laid on the floor," explains Col Tzemah.

A block is divided into two plots. In the center of each is a wide space. At noontime when we visited, the central space looked like a bustling urban square. Prisoners moved about, some of them exercising, some of them conferring in secret.

In one corner, some of them were washing clothes in basins, others were waiting in line to take a shower. Outside the gate, there was an MP [military police] control point and next to it were two armed reservists. The military policemen are the only ones who come into any contact with the prisoners. One policeman calls to the "shavish" (similar to a soldier on duty on rotation) and scolds him for the behavior of some of the prisoners in his plot.

The kitchen for the entire block is opposite one of the plots. Seven or eight prisoners are engaged in cooking and preparing the noon meal. The main portion today is fish. One of the "cooks," a resident of Gaza, was detained for 5 years and is to be released in another 4 months. He tells with pride that meals for 1,500 persons are prepared here under his direction. The food has already been placed in large pots: soup, fish, hummus, crates of sliced bread, fruit. Gigantic quantities of food are unloaded from one of the trucks. The chief cook complains about things that are lacking: spices, more fruit, insufficient sugar and salt, only four knives for preparing food, and too much fish.

Following the recommendations of a committee of experts, special food items were introduced into the facility: hummus, tahina, lentils. A real problem then developed, which the members of the committee hadn't thought of: the prisoners announced that they are not able to eat hummus and tahina without olive oil and

za'atar [crushed herbs], as is customary. These items are not included in the IDF [Israel Defense Force] menu, so special permission was given to the lawyers to bring the prisoners jars of olive oil and za'atar. They receive meat three times a week and soon, at their request, they will get hamburgers.

There was a hunger strike yesterday in all three blocks of "Ansar-3." It was to identify with the strike declared by the leaders of the uprising in the territories. How do they know about the strike? They know everything, and in real time.

Three newspapers are brought each day to the prisoners in "Ansar-3": HA'ARETZ, JERUSALEM POST, AND AL-QUDS. The camp administration censors the papers only rarely, cutting out articles that, according to the definition of the commander of the facility, are liable "to arouse the facility, arouse dangerous unrest."

There is a system of public announcements through which the news broadcasts of Kol Yisra'el in Arabic are transmitted twice a day. By the way, when the prisoners heard over this system about the tragedy of bus number 405, they burst into stormy applause. What they don't get from reading the newspapers or hearing the radio is filled in for them by their lawyers, who visit the camp almost every day, in the framework of their legal duties for the prisoners.

The lawyers are the only ones who meet the prisoners. There are no visits by relatives to the detention camp. In contrast to the impression that many have, the reason is not a conscious policy of the IDF authorities or the command of the facility. According to the chief of staff of the Southern Command, Brigadier General Ya'akov, the reason is the refusal of the leaders of the uprising to arrange for visits through the Civil Administration, as required by IDF procedures. They simply are not willing to use a factor that they do not recognize. For the same reason, the prisoners refused, on the instructions of their leaders, to engage in any kind of useful work, such as binding books for Gaza Strip libraries.

In the IDF, they do not like to admit that the prisoners in "Ansar-3" have internal leadership committees. Even if such exist, they are not recognized and no negotiations are conducted with them. The only contact made is through the "shavishim," and they are indeed appointed by the camp command. Likewise, care is taken to move the prisoners around between the various blocks and plots, in order to foil any attempt to create additional foci of power and unrest.

Despite everything, it is clear that the instructions for the prisoners' behavior comes from the outside. In this manner, there is complete synchronization of the strikes held in the territories and those in the prison facility in Ketzi'ot.

The censor's room is a small room at the edge of the camp. A team of Arabic-speaking soldiers censors the thousands of letters that arrive for the prisoners from

Israel and abroad. One of the envelopes bears the address "Ansar Concentration Camp, Quseyma, Palestine." The piles of books also are censored. Many are copies of the Koran and literature that are sent by relatives of the prisoners. Lately, the camp commander reveals, several books dealing with incitement or communism were banned. Someone decided that the works of Marx and Engels could only disturb the peace and tranquillity of the prisoners in the camp....

Following the recommendations of a committee of psychologists that advises the prison commander, work began recently on lighting inside the tents, in addition to the lighting on the periphery of the blocks. Right now, the project is limited to one wing. The recommendations to introduce a Shekem [IDF] canteen to the prisoners are also being reviewed favorably, as well as the recommendations to provide the prisoners with various means of relieving the boredom, such as ping-pong tables, shesh-besh games, and nongroup games. Prayer is permitted only within the framework of the tent or small groups, and not in large groups—for security reasons, and in light of the bitter experience of the last Ramadan holiday.

The commander of the Ketzi'ot facility, Lieutenant Colonel Tzemah, from the Engineering Corps, has been running the facility since he was involved in setting it up about 2 years ago. It is a difficult job with a high level of personal risk. Tzemah, rotund and with a natural sense of humor, which seems so vital a thing in so dismal a place as Ketzi'ot Camp, is severe in everything concerning discipline.

He is angered by those Israelis who insist on holding demonstrations precisely in front of the prison facility. "What do they want, to ignite this camp?" he asks angrily. "Let them demonstrate in Tel Aviv or in Be'er Sheva. Not here." As long as no replacement is found for him, his task is to maintain peace and quiet in the detention camp, to keep this human volcano extinguished. So far, he has succeeded.

Palestinian Nationalist Trends in Galilee Noted

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in Hebrew 21 Sep 89 p 6

[Text] Me'ir Hare'uvani reports that police have interrogated and will place on trial a popular Arab singer from Haifa who sang a nationalistic song in praise of the stone throwing children of the intifadah at a wedding in the village of Tarshihah. At the end of his song the guests rose and sang "Biladi Biladi" ("My Homeland"), the song declared at the PLO Conference in Tunis as the official PLO anthem. Hare'uvani adds that in weddings in Arab villages in the Galilee it is customary to distribute to the guests key-chains with the map of "Palestine" from the Mediterranean to the Jordan River on them. According to Galilee Subdistrict Commanding Officer Ya'aqov Ganot, there has been a 120 percent increase in nationalistically motivated crimes in the Galilee, as compared with 1988. In a Galilee Subdistrict

police exhibition of items found in searches and investigations surrounding nationalistic events in Galilean villages, exhibits such as fabric and cardboard PLO flags and calenders with incendiary material containing nationalistic songs were displayed.

Demographic Future of Galilee Analyzed

TA2209095989 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ
in Hebrew 15 Sep 89

[Text] Roman Frister quotes Professor Arnon Sofer, dean of Haifa University's social sciences faculty, and a geographer, as saying: "Whoever deludes himself into thinking that it is still possible to solve the problem of Galilee Arabs through money and sewer systems is simply living in a dream world. Until the first Arab pilot serves in the IDF [Israel Defense Force]—and we know that this will never happen—they will continue to shout about discrimination. The increasing signs of nationalism point to a process that we are unable to stop. But the struggle over the future character of the Galilee will not be determined by stone-throwing, by the writing of hostile slogans, or even by the organizing of underground cells. It will be determined, first of foremost, in the beds of maternity hospitals. It is sufficient to note that there are more births each year in the village of Sakhnin alone than the birthrate that could be reached through the establishment of five new mitzvim [Jewish settlements in the Galilee]." Frister comments that Sofer, who has devoted 25 years to studying the demographic problem in northern Israel, "paints a rather gloomy picture: We have lost the Jewish majority in the Galilee. Last year, 3,000 Jews left the area. Their relative weight in the population declined from 52 percent at the beginning of the 1980s to 49 percent in 1989, but even these statistics, taken from the Statistical Abstract of Israel, do not show the full severity of the problem. According to Prof Sofer's calculations, the ratio is 74:26 in favor of the Arabs in the central and western Galilee, an area that was mentioned in the Partition Plan. In the lower Galilee alone, through which all the strategic roads from the lowland area pass in the direction of the Golan Heights, the population is only 20 percent Jewish, as against 80 percent Arab." Frister writes that "according to Prof Sofer, 'if it is correct to assume that national and religious desires have become the chief motivating factor in the behavior of Galilee Arabs, the country cannot remain indifferent to what is occurring in its periphery.' As a geographer, he cannot ignore historical experience, from the separatist movements in Quebec, Canada, and in Northern Ireland, to what is happening today in the Baltic republics of the USSR. 'It has been proven that wherever there is a small minority that becomes a majority in its own area of residence, an aspiration to secede from the central entity also develops,' Sofer said, concluding that if a Palestinian state is indeed established, pressures will arise to annex the Galilee to it on the basis of U.N. Resolution 181 (the Partition Plan). And even if such a state is not established in the foreseeable future, the day will come when the demand will be made in the Galilee for a measure of autonomy

that is liable to harm the character and nature of the State of Israel." Frister states: "Sofer believes that the thesis concerning coexistence between two peoples that live side-by-side, without nationalism-related friction, has not stood the test of reality anywhere, and that there is no chance that the situation will be different expressly in Israel. Sofer: 'If I believed that it were possible, and that it is possible, to rely on Galilee Arabs' loyalty to the state, the population percentages would be immaterial, and I would not warn about the dangers latent in the lack of demographic balance. But since this is not the case, devoting maximum efforts to populating the territories is liable to be the misfortune of the Zionist enterprise within the green line.' Frister writes that "Galilee Arabs have what the state is lacking: a feeling of strength. This feeling stems to a great extent from the number of people in the area. Right under our very noses, enclaves have been created in the Galilee in which the Arabs feel as if they are in their own independent state. Confederations of Arab cities have been established around Shefar'am and Nazareth, as well as in large areas around Sakhnin, 'Arrabah, and Dayr Hanna. This concentration gives them confidence and contributes to the development of nationalist feelings. Jews generally avoid entering these areas if they do not have to do so. Even if they do not feel physically unsafe, they feel a certain discomfort when they come face-to-face with a population, part of which no longer hides its hostility. These enclaves are characterized by a clear tendency to spread. The housing shortage in Arab cities and villages is causing migration into nearby Jewish areas. The non-Jewish population in Upper Nazareth has been growing slowly but surely. The number of Arab families moving to Carmi'el has doubled in the last 5 years, and today totals about 120. If this process continues—and it is also noticeable in Tiberias, Majdal, and Qiryat Shemona—the 'creeping annexation' of Jewish cities and towns to the 'State of Galilee' could occur in the next decade."

IDF Vehicles in Gaza To Be Protected Against Agitators

TA2109172989 Tel Aviv 'AL HAMISHMAR
in Hebrew 21 Sep 89 p 3

[Summary] Avi Benayahu reports that the IDF [Israel Defense Force] Southern Command has decided that all IDF operational vehicles in the Gaza Strip will soon be protected by a hard plastic material which will make them impenetrable to stones and Molotov cocktails.

Changes in IDF Tactics in Gaza Noted

TA2009170789 Tel Aviv MA'ARIV
in Hebrew 20 Sep 89 p 1

[Text] In the past 2 months, a drastic change has taken place in the policy employed by the IDF [Israel Defense Force] in the Gaza Strip. The IDF has stopped almost entirely placing curfews on cities and refugee camps, and has greatly increased planned operations against specific targets, which are carried out by elite IDF units. In the

past 2 months there has been a decrease of about 75 percent in curfew days in the Gaza Strip as compared with previous months. The change is attributed to new O/C Southern Command Matan Vilna'i, who believes that sophisticated pinpoint activity is more efficient, and that collective punishment places unnecessary pressure on the population and causes damage. According to figures obtained by "Ma'ariv," in the past 2 months the average number of curfew days decreased from about 120 days a month to about 37 days. In March, 125 curfew days were placed on the Gaza Strip, in April 143, in May 151, in June 101, in July 38, and in August 36.

Sephardim Better Suited To Deal With Palestinians

44230170 Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 14 Jul p 15

[Article by Avirama Golan: "The Sephardim of Israel and the Ashkenazim of the PLO"]

[Text] David Hemo, the editor of the journal A DIFFERENT NEWSPAPER, was revealed to the public only this year, in an interview with "This is the Time" and a conversation with Ya'el Fishbein in DAVAR. The public was a bit frightened by him, because he speaks about a social revolution and revolt. He argues that the Sephardim have a common language with the Palestinians and that they must regularly hold an open dialogue with them as the basis for life together. He accuses the Israeli Left of being cut off from the persons that it is supposed to represent and that it prefers to focus on North Tel Aviv. It's convenient for them, he says, to have a distant, aesthetic, artificial affair with the Arabs, but they don't want to live with them, any more than they want to live with the Sephardim. Last week, Hemo went to Toledo in Spain, the cradle of three cultures—Christian, Moslem, and Jewish—in the framework of a large and heterogeneous delegation of Sephardi intellectuals and academics and several representatives from Israel and other countries (France, for example. The French Jews, the people of "l'identite juif," were the ones who organized the meeting.) They met there with Palestinian representatives and spoke with them about peace.

[DAVAR] So what happened in Toledo?

[Hemo] There was a very interesting meeting there. There was, indeed, a certain asymmetry, and we didn't paper it over. Someone asked at one point—with whom are we speaking, with those who go to Ansar 3, or with the Ashkenazi people of the PLO—and the answer was quite clear. They are the politicians, and they are a little bourgeois and establishment, and until now they've met with the bourgeois and establishment politicians of our satisfied Left, and here they were meeting with somebody else. And they felt it. While they know that we do not have any importance as far as decisionmaking and government, they sensed us. And it's easy for them and for us to communicate. We don't speak with them about

the watershed, don't conclude agreements, and don't make declarations. We try to examine life together.

And they understood this very well. They said that, until now, they had met with Yosi Sarid and Shulamit Aloni and persons who spoke in political and diplomatic terms, and it was reasonable to expect from them some diplomatic development, but nothing happened. The main thing that didn't happen was a dialogue. Of course, most of our spokesmen took the trouble to tell the Palestinians that we and the Ashkenazim are after all one people, that they shouldn't forget that, heaven forbid...and one of the politicians, in a less official discussion, said something that astounded me: that he understood that something had happened that had turned the Israelis into a people.

And let's assume that they have adopted the peace strategy as a tactic—and I don't believe that that's the way it is, because some of them are really fed up with the situation—then even if that is the case, the moment that a dynamic of peace begins, things will go forward of themselves, and no one will be able to stop them. I believe that it's possible to come to terms even with the Syrians, but maybe here, among us, there are too many persons who have too many interests in keeping the war situation.

[DAVAR] And how do you explain that?

[Hemo] In a war situation, it is impossible to conduct social struggles. Indeed, if peace were to break out today, our real burning problems would finally surface: employment, persons on the verge of starvation, unequal education directed from above by the system, in order to create an elite, on the one hand, and simple laborers, on the other. Until now, the response of the Sephardi Jews was only passive. Today, there is no doubt that there are very militant workers in all the development towns. The ferment is increasing, and the people are under pressure from all directions: on one side, those local council heads who dramatically tied themselves up in order to get more money for environmental development—why, they can't really solve the employment problems—and, on the other side, the constant competition over a miserable work place, over pitiful wages. Thus a man that is struggling over a few lirot with an Arab who works almost for free, turns his anger easily towards that Arab. He is the nearest object, he is weaker, and he is an object common to them all.

[DAVAR] It's a convenient and well known solution in times of trouble—to incite against the minority.

[Hemo] Certainly. It's very convenient. The media have a field day with it. What's more natural, within the framework of the accepted stigma of being a Sephardi Jew, than his violence towards Arabs. And I think about this: Yuval Ne'eman, of Moledet and Tzomet, the settlers who rush about in command cars full of weapons in the Arab villages, are they hot-headed Moroccans? Kahana's men, who incite at funerals, are they Sephardi Jews? Where do they get this distortion from? I argue, from my experience, that on the basic level, the Sephardi

Jew does not fear the Arab. I can prove, one by one, regarding those who speak out in the open air markets for hatred of Arabs, that when you scratch away the thinnest layer that you find a whole world of rage and frustration that found its release in the lowest common denominator. Once I picked up a hitchhiker, a soldier, and on the way he wanted to start up a conversation. I saw that he was looking for something easy, common to the two of us, in order to create immediately a good connection. So he began to speak heatedly about the Arabs.

I listened and listened, and suddenly I asked him—so what do you want? What did the Arab do to you that you should hate him so much? No, he said, I don't hate, but...and here came a complete jumble of anger towards the school, the Establishment, the parents, toward economic distress. And, on the other hand, if you think about what happened in Ashdod, where over a short period two boys were killed by Arabs, and in addition there is really a struggle for bread—not over ideology or any beautiful words—over bread, with the Arab worker. Why, in this country there are complete industries that would not exist were it not for cheap labor. So I don't accept the outburst towards the Arabs that work in the factories in Ashdod and Ashkelon, certainly not, definitely not, but I can understand what it stems from.

We are a closed society, which doesn't have any answers. From the viewpoint of the worker in the development town, or more than that, the unemployed person in the development town, the trade union deceives him, and the unemployment compensation that he receives is given as a charity and not as a right, coming from the money that he always paid to the National Insurance, and his child is destined to become a simple laborer like him, and he can't get out of the town, because he can't exist in Tel Aviv with the miserable wages that they pay him, and the authorities succeed in convincing him that he is surrounded by Arabs who want to destroy him—he isn't even aware of this impasse. So what happened in Toledo is a kind of a new feeling of a lifting of the head of the Sephardi Jew, of the ability to have a dialogue. That's what happened there. And there was one Ashkenazic Jew, who had been invited, and believe me, he spoke differently and was avoided. Suddenly, when we wanted to go out with a common call, he jumped up and said, "No, I'm not signing, it's not legal"—like the things we were used to hearing from the establishment. But afterwards he felt threatened, isolated. Not a part of things.

[DAVAR] What revenge. So what do you need now? Will that solve the problem?

[Hemo] Don't expect mercy from me. I'm happy that what happened was mainly ours. I'm happy that the Sephardic Jews in Toledo suddenly defined themselves as a group. We were suddenly revealed to ourselves at the historic point where we now stand. It's suddenly clear to us that we must change society.

Financial, Employment Instability Plague Producer of Merkava-3

44230178 YEDI'OT AHARONOT (*Financial Supplement*) in Hebrew 25 Jul 89 p 2

[Article by Moriah Avnimelekh: "The Tank that Almost Ran Over Urdan"]

[Excerpts] Within the management of Clal they well remember the meeting that was held in the summer of 1987. Even the door of the conference room on the 20th floor of the building did not muffle the sounds of the explosion within. On one side stood—or was placed—the veteran director general of the Urdan complex, Michael Tamri, who was then still considered to be one of the best industrial managers in Clal, an entrepreneur of vision and courage. Opposite him stood the senior economist of the group, who raised severe criticisms regarding the functioning of Urdan and the credibility of the data and estimates that flowed from Tamri to Clal's management. The chiefs of the concern listened with gloomy faces as the picture was painted for them.

The difficult situation of the heavy metalworking complex was no longer a secret. Urdan, which had lost \$8 million in 1986, would present a similar loss for 1987, as well. It had worked out a tough plan to get back on its feet, including layoffs and the shutting down of units, but what was voiced at that meeting was different, and they began a process that led in the end to the dismissal of Director General Tamri in May 1988.

To this day, Tamri refuses to speak about anything connected with Urdan and Clal. He is convinced that he was right, even though he had, in fact, for a long time successfully hidden from Clal's management the dimensions of the disaster that he had wrought. Clal's attitude towards him was reminiscent of Elron's attitude towards Souhami before Elscint's downfall. [passage omitted]

Who Needs Vulcan?

Tamri's dreams embraced the entire world, but the main customer was and remained the IDF [Israel Defense Forces]. At the request of the Ministry of Defense, Urdan invested \$5 million in matko AOD, a sophisticated process for improving castings for the Merkava-3, and also brought robotics into the plant. The big purchase of those years was the competing plant Vulcan-Castings in the Haifa Bay area from Koor. On paper, there couldn't have been a better takeover: Urdan had an order backlog that exceeded its production capacity, while Vulcan, which had just invested in a modern steel casting production line, had no orders. In fact, Vulcan was already a corpse, while Urdan paid the price of a fine race horse for it. As a result of the purchase and combination, Koor obtained a holding in Urdan.

The awakening came quickly: only a few months after the deal had been concluded, Urdan found itself tied up in a revival plan and large-scale layoffs at Vulcan, a plan that involved sharp confrontations with the workers.

The labor sanctions and strikes did not deter Tamri, who said at the time: "Let them strike for a year. In any event, there's no work at Vulcan-Castings." And, indeed, Urdan quickly shut down the steel casting production line, leaving only the iron casting line for the domestic civilian market.

Urdan swallowed more and more and more, until in 1986 it received the first shock: the Ministry of Defense began a regime of cost cutting, and sales fell sharply to only one-fourth of their previous level. The IDF did not order steel of the type produced by the process in which Urdan had invested millions of dollars, and at the end of that year Urdan showed losses amounting to \$8 million.

Where were the export substitutes? There were such, but they were not successful. For example, MATAH Karmiel entered into long-term agreements to supply structures and castings to the American army, but for various reasons the exports have brought only losses. A second example: Urdan succeeded in gaining entry to the senior level of the management of Fiat and won a \$1 million contract to supply combustion chambers for Fiat cars, but it didn't meet the terms of the contract. Despite repeated attempts to produce what the Italians wanted, Urdan's combustion chambers for the Italian model of the Fiat failed in the automobile manufacturer's test labs.

Another export deal that brought big losses was an RFQ [Request for Quotation] for semitrailers for the American army. Urdan won the contract in 1986 to supply the semitrailers, after submitting a bid that was much cheaper than those of its competitors. Opinions are divided as to whether at the time of submission the job was profitable, and only the freezing of the exchange rate turned the small profit into a loss, or whether the bid was not profitable already at the time of submission.

What brought Urdan to submit a bid to manufacture semitrailers with imported inputs? The main reason was the need to supply work to the Rom Karmel plant in Tirat Hakarmel. A strange reason, considering the fact that when the contract was won, Rom Karmel was already locked up and its workers and management had already received (increased) severance pay and had dispersed. Instead of opening negotiations immediately with the Americans to cancel the contract, Urdan began to re-establish the production line for heavy vehicle chassis at Vulcan in the Haifa Bay area, including the rebuilding of the team that had carried out the project.

The project began a year and a half late, and the financial results were catastrophic: Urdan sent every one of the 280 semitrailers to the United States with a "subsidy" of \$55,000—that is, a total loss of \$1.5 million.

And another small problem: Urdan has not yet succeeded in selling the land and buildings of Rom Karmel, which it took on long-term lease from Benny Horovitz (today, a production line for exact castings is operating there), and it is paying \$1 million a year in leasing fees to Benny Horovitz's receiver.

The Campaign of Cutbacks

After the trip of purchases and expansion came the trek of cutbacks. The number of employees in the steel plant in Netanya was cut by one-third, and the number of employees in the entire complex was reduced from 1,650 to 950.

Vulcan was cut back considerably, the steel castings line was shut down, and instead there is now an iron casting line and a car body line that was transferred from Rom Karmel; the Kopper company was closed down and the production of spare parts was transferred to Sel'a Pumps; the Twilo plant in Cleveland was shut down, as well as the office in New York.

Meanwhile, the director general also was changed. Clal fired Tamri in July, 1988, and in his place came Barukh Bahat, who until then had successfully managed Iscar Blades, and was considered one of the best managers in the sophisticated metal industry. Bahat lasted less than 1 year, and in May 1989 he gave up his place to Moshe Steinberg, the director general of Clal Industries, who prefers for the time being to hold the hot potato himself.

Bahat had found a company that had posted losses of \$40 million in 3 years with gigantic debts and liquidity problems. He continued to sell and to shut down.

The metal works in Hatzor and Mahanayim were sold to Model Beton of the Azorim Group, in order to improve Urdan's capital structure; the office in Brussels was closed, and in its place a network of European reps was operated. This was done after it had become clear that in the 5 years of its operation, first in Frankfurt and afterwards in Brussels, the office had cost Urdan \$1.25 million while not succeeding in selling almost anything; parts of Urdan and Sel'a Pumps and the subsidiary Urdan Trade and Services also were put up for sale.

The Fate of Two Flotations

In January 1989, Urdan sold on the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange a rights issue—that is, special securities offered to those who already held shares of the company—in the amount of 8 million shekels. The results of the flotation surprised the chiefs of Clal. All of Urdan's shareholders fell upon the issue and maintained their ownership interest, including Koor, which was already under Banker's Trust's request for liquidation and nevertheless invested about \$1 million in the purchase of rights. Doubtless the chiefs of Koor also believed that Urdan would be out of the crisis in a jiffy so that the investment would be worthwhile.

But it was not worthwhile. Two months later, in March 1989, Urdan presented its balance sheet for 1988, showing tremendous losses, amounting to \$22 million, about one-third of them operational losses, due to the U.S. trailer contract and the influence of the devaluations in the final days of the year. The rest, about \$12 million, were previous losses, the writing-off of inventories (including products from the production line that

had been shut down), doubtful debts, and other monies that never existed. Urdan became the central problem not only of Clal Industries, but also of the entire Clal group. Not only does Moshe Steinberg, the director general of Clal Industries, manage it personally, but he also serves in fact as the long arm of Aharon Dovrat, the director general of Clal, who views the revival of the "steel producer at the service of the IDF" as a national challenge, in his words.

How has Moshe Steinberg handled Urdan? First of all, he sought to stop the hemorrhage. Steinberg announced that he was not willing to invest for the long run and that he was willing to close every unit that was not capable of quickly earning a profit. Instead of Tamri's strategy of expansion, Steinberg sees salvation in cutting out money-losing operations. He laid down for Urdan a revival plan with three main components:

- A long-term agreement with the Ministry of Defense for \$20 million in orders annually, and a 30 percent increase in prices. This was a battle that had already been started by the previous director general, Bahat, who had obtained a price increase from the Ministry of Defense and a certain promise to increase orders, but had refrained from a public confrontation with the largest customer. Steinberg, in contrast, does not shrink from demanding demonstratively that the Ministry of Defense recognize its responsibility to the manufacturer of the Merkava (Urdan produces one-third of the tank), which invested millions of dollars in order to meet the IDF's requirements, and threatens that if it does not do so, Urdan will close the plant for steel castings. In an extraordinary move, the chiefs of Clal appealed to Cabinet ministers Rabin and Peres. At the moment, it seems that a compromise is taking shape;
- Cost cutting, layoffs of workers and managers, and the sale of companies not involved in the main line of activity;
- An infusion of 17 million shekels in owners' equity into Urdan, by a special-rights issue to the present shareholders. This flotation had been planned for July, but was halted.

Why? Because at this stage, 3 years after the first losses, Urdan's future is still cloudy. It already lost \$3 million in the first quarter of this year.

KUWAIT

Decline in Number of Male Students at National University

44040542b Kuwait AL-SIYASAH
in Arabic 29 Jul 89 p 3

[Article: "AL-SIYASAH Asks High School Graduates: Why Don't You Enroll in University; Statistics Show That Male Student Enrollment Is Less Than One Half That of Female Students; al-'Ajami: I Wanted a Certain Specialization But Once Results Were Published I

Found Myself in a Dilemma; al-Hilal: There Are Prominent Arab and European Universities That Enroll Students With Lower Grade Averages Than That Set by National University; al-Subay'i: I Have Had The Opportunity To Work for Large Salary Which I Will not Get After 4 Years of College; Students: Ultimatums, Closed Branches, and Small Stipends Are Among Reasons"]

[Text] Why are our youth steering away from enrollment in Kuwait University?

This is a question that has been frequently asked in recent years. The answers have varied. Whereas the university offered in the past a broad horizon which accommodated the students' aspirations, it is noticed that there has been a decline in the demand for enrollment in the university, especially among young men.

Whereas the student's grade average determined in the past his eligibility for enrollment in the university, other factors have surfaced recently, reducing the number of male students to less than half that of female students. Statistics on this year's student enrollment in the university show that 815 male students have enrolled, compared to 1,767 female students.

Why do students steer away from the university? The answers vary, of course. However, the common denominator in a random sample surveyed by AL-SIYASAH is the avoidance of problems that students face at the university, including closed branches, difficult procedures for obtaining stipends and the unavailability of work opportunities for salaries commensurate with the effort a university graduate makes in 4 years of university education. That's not to mention the conditions required for higher studies, the ultimatums, people's view of college degrees, and so forth.

To find out why students steer away from the university, AL-SIYASAH has interviewed a number of students who have gone to other fields.

Badr 'Abdallah al-'Ajami said: "Upon getting my general high school certificate, I went to the university to submit my papers. I wanted to study a certain specialization. When the enrollment results were announced, I found myself in a dilemma because I had not been accepted for the specialization I had chosen.

"Moreover, I could not get into a sufficient number of classes because most branches were closed.

"My brothers, past graduates, had always warned me of the problem of ultimatums I might receive as a result of the heavy load a student has to study in a single semester compared to the short duration of the semester. If a student takes a minimal number of credits in a semester, this would cause a delay in his graduation."

There is also the post-graduation problem which faces the student, namely the inability to find a job in his field of college education. Al-'Ajami also pointed out: "The unavailability of adequate material assistance to meet

the university student's needs is also one of the reasons that have made me move in a direction other than the university."

Ibrahim Ahmad al-Hilal said: "One of the reasons that prevented me from enrolling in the university is my grade average in high school. The university administration has set a high average in comparison with the student's level, keeping in mind that the university suffers from the shortage of students applying for enrollment."

Hilal added: "There are Arab and European universities that are no less prominent than Kuwait University and that accept a lower average than that set by Kuwait University. There are problems which we encounter in the university, including the difficulty of enrolling in certain classes which causes a delay in graduation."

Yusuf al-Rashidi said: "The difficulty of finding job opportunities upon graduation is the main reason why I have not enrolled in the university. Moreover, the duration of university studies is very long and it is very difficult to shorten it under the current circumstances at Kuwait University. Moreover, the desired classes are unavailable during the semester. This is in contrast with the special courses offered by Kuwait Oil Company. Their duration is shorter and a job is guaranteed upon graduation, in addition to a substantial monthly stipend, compared to the irregular assistance offered by the university. We should keep in mind that it is very difficult to get this assistance which requires numerous documents that consume much of the student's time."

'Abbad 'Id said: "I decided to enroll in the Technology Institute rather than in Kuwait University because of the short duration of the studies and the substantial stipend offered by the institute in comparison with that offered by the university."

He added that the difficulty of enrolling in the specialization a student desires and the unavailability of work opportunities upon graduation have motivated him to head for a field other than university education.

Ibrahim Husayn Ibrahim said: "I have decided to enroll in the applied institutes which offer numerous opportunities. I have steered away from the university because of the unavailability of work opportunities upon graduation. Even if such opportunities are available, they are not commensurate with a university degree. He expressed the view that the problem of closed branches and of ultimatums to the university student put the student in a constant state of confusion. He also cited what is being said about the low standard of some university professors which undermines the student's achievement level. All these reasons motivate a student to refrain from enrollment in the university."

Muhammad Mash'al said: "I have decided to enroll in a European university because it is possible to shorten the time and to master English and because it is easy to enroll in the specialization I desire.

"In Kuwait University, I cannot study the specialization I want. Moreover, the standard of Kuwait University graduates is facing strong criticism. Furthermore, the standard of the English-language graduates is very poor when compared with the standard of the graduates of other universities."

He added: "One of the reasons that made me refrain from enrolling in Kuwait University is the difficulty of taking certain classes; i.e., the problem of closed branches and excessive overcrowding, and the accompanying chaos which develops during the registration period."

Battal al-Subay'i: "Upon graduating from high school, I had the opportunity to work for a company which pays high salaries compared to the salary I would get upon graduation from the university, not to mention the great hardship I would encounter in seeking a job. If such a job is found, it would not be commensurate with the effort I have to make throughout 4 years of university work."

He added: "Another reason that makes students refrain from enrolling in the university is the debilitating requirements demanded of students wishing to continue their higher studies. This weakens the enthusiasm students had in past years for enrolling in the university."

Hadi Sa'id said: "I decided to enroll in the Police Academy because of society's view of the importance of this job and because of the big material reward this job offers."

"Work in the police force depends on discipline and on a single organizational pattern to which all adhere. This is in contrast with the university where things often depend on the nature of the student-professor relationship in light of which it is determined whether the student passes or fails a required course."

Khalid Kazim noted that the reason for his not enrolling in the university is his low grade average which does not qualify him to select the specialization which he wants and which may provide him with a big opportunity to get a job that enjoys a prominent status in society.

He added: "My urgent need to work and earn a needed income has dissuaded me from enrolling in the university. I hope that I will have the opportunity to enroll in university education while continuing to hold my job."

MOROCCO

Administration Criticized for Lack of Initiative

45040476 Rabat AL-'ALAM in Arabic 9 Aug 89 pp 1, 8

[Excerpts] The city of Oujda was the starting point of the tour by the "important" cabinet delegation to explore the implementation of the royal directives on the subject of investments, the simplification of rules pertaining to them, and inducing the Moroccan administration and

the executive authorities in it to change the mentality which it used to approach this subject.

The Arab Moroccan news agency has reported that it is a "campaign to explain the royal dispatch." However, we believe that the royal dispatch is absolutely clear, and that the campaign ought to give its attention to two issues concerning it:

- First, that the cabinet committee listen attentively to the serious and profound proposals that have been raised and will be raised by speakers from among those present at the meeting.
- Second, that it direct itself responsibly and with determination to the representatives of the administration, that they may be equally responsible for taking on and implementing the contents of the royal dispatch, since it is reasonably certain that most of the obstacles faced by national and foreign investment projects come from the executive authorities in this administration.

The AL-'ALAM correspondent noticed that conditions at the meetings, especially in those halls that were extremely hot, were not comfortable; that some of those on the platform were trading stories and jokes while speakers from the floor were speaking; and that the list of such speakers had been prepared in advance, both in Oujda and in Fes, and we expect that their written comments had been subject to review.

However, it can be said that most of the comments were in agreement with raising problems in depth, linking investment to the infrastructure and installations which play a primary role in the drive to expedite investment projects, especially after the investment projects are liberated from the ills of the administration, such as bribery, influence, and the complexity and length of the rules.

Thus, as we said in our opening remarks in yesterday's issue, any real start to investment projects is decidedly linked to the establishment of an adequate industrial revival, and attention to roads, lighting, water, air and sea connections, wired and wireless communications, and rules for bank loans and customs transactions, which is what was brought up in many of the comments in the Oujda and Fes meetings.

We also note that the prime minister's speech contained an admission of the problems and ills which threaten the course of development in the economic, industrial, and trade sectors, and which have a negative social and political impact.

He said in his speech:

"Experience has shown that the state's effort to shoulder the responsibility of development is not enough so long as it is not backed by effort from the private sector. However, this sector, despite the incentives offered to it

and the arrangements made on its behalf, has not wholeheartedly taken on the role assigned to it in successive national economic plans.

"A study had to be done find out what obstacles and impediments there were that prevent the investor, whether national or foreign, from carrying out his projects. So the royal dispatch came to diagnose the disease and prescribe the medicine. As for the disease, it lies in the many, sometimes complex steps which do not keep up with the rapid technological developments seen by the economic, industrial, and trade sectors. As for the medicine, it is requiring the administration to adhere to a deadline for responding to the investment projects submitted to it, which his majesty has set at 2 months.

"Thus it has become obligatory for the administration, which is the foundation of the implementation of state policy, to move at the speed of the times. It cannot—being the cornerstone to every economic movement—remain isolated from the rapid development which the world is experiencing. If a known deadline of 2 months were imposed on the government to respond to every investment application submitted to it, it would mean more than one thing, and it would be an urgent call to keep up with the pace of the age and shake off the dust of slowness and red tape.

"We are not living in isolation from the world, and we are faced with huge regional economic blocs which only gain in strength and wealth as time goes by. If we do not modernize our steps, we will be doomed to backwardness and ruin.

"Ladies and gentlemen: "His Majesty's government has embraced the philosophy of the royal dispatch. The prime minister's edict came out defining what rules are to be followed in order to attain the desired goal, except that it is speeding up the response to investment applications. They may be summarized as follows:

- Requirements pertaining to the response time to investment applications.
- Arrangements which must be made to simplify measures at the regional level.
- Forming regional committees which would follow up on investments at the regional level.
- Finally, measures necessary to liquidate suspended files.

[passage omitted]

The points contained in the prime minister's speech concern an important part of the situation—that which pertains essentially to the administration, its committees, its agencies, and its rules. As for the second part, that was what was brought up by the speakers from the floor when they insisted that investment projects need a foundation, which means integrating development and seeing that its various parts support one another.

QATAR

Arab Capital Flight Analyzed

90OL0023e Doha AL-RAYAH in Arabic 2 Aug 89 p 6

[Article: "Commercial and Financial Market Sources to AL-RAYAH: Commercial Activity Dropped by 13 Percent Last July; Money Changers End Final Active Cycle of First Half of 1989"]

[Text] Dealers in the local markets have stressed that the country's commercial activity dropped by nearly 13 percent last June [as published] and by 5 percent below July 1988.

They said that the drop was obvious in the consumer goods, electronics, and clothing market. Some merchants estimate that their sales last July, especially in the second half of the month, dropped by 20 percent for foodstuffs, 25 percent for electronics, and 27 percent for clothing, particularly children's and women's clothing which constitute nearly 65 percent of the sales on ordinary days of the year.

A merchant has said that his sales, estimated at one million Qatari riyals monthly, dropped to 650,000 riyals last July as a result of several factors, the most significant being the stagnation which prevailed in the local market because of the summer vacations, and Arab labor's increased remittances to the outside world.

A fruit and vegetable merchant has said: "We expected July to see a reasonable drop of no more than 10 percent. But the drop was greater and this makes us expect to see the biggest drop in the purchase of consumer goods this August, especially fruits and vegetables. This may force a reduction in the imports so that there may be a balance between supply and demand, especially since summer is the season when fruit and vegetable consumption drops the most, reaching its bottom level in August."

In electrical and electronic equipment shops, merchants say that sales rose in May and June, and then dropped sharply, with the drop amounting to 21 percent according to the estimates of some merchants, and to as much as 32 percent according to the estimates of others, depending on the shops' marketing capability. The average drop thus amounted to nearly 27 percent.

The merchants also said that resident teachers and employees form the main component of the consumption market and that it is normal that their absence during the summer vacations would reflect on the market. This is what actually happened last August, especially in the second half of the month.

In the last week of July, the moneychanging market, especially changers dealing in dollars, Saudi riyals, and the pound sterling, registered its final active cycle of the first half of 1989 with daily exchange rates amounting to \$2.5 million, 1.2 million Saudi riyals, and 500,000 pounds sterling.

Exchange officials and people involved in money changing have pointed out that the current month of August is the "dead" month in the market cycle. But they expect this August to be better than August 1988 due to several reasons, including the fact that a large number of employees prefer to take short vacations at the end of the vacation season which begins in mid-August and ends in mid-September prior to the start of the school year.

Money changers say that most of those who have remitted money to the outside world, especially resident workers, decided to remit it in cash, not in money orders, because cash transfers save the difference embodied in the cost of money orders. They said that money orders remitted to Egypt are affected the most, followed by orders to Jordan and the other Arab countries.

Individual Consumption of Water, Electricity Recorded

44040552d Doha AL-RAYAH in Arabic 10 Jul 89 p 4

[Excerpt] Engineer Ibrahim al-Bakir, deputy director general at the Water and Electricity Administration for cooling and air conditioning affairs and chairman of the Committee on Rationalizing Water and Electricity Consumption, said the Water and Electricity Administration's fears of past years have come true as a result of cheap energy, free electricity, and water supply to certain categories of citizens, and cheap supply to those categories that pay the cost of electricity and water. This has raised the rate of consumption to international levels. The per capita consumption in Qatar in the past years has increased to 8,628 kilowatt-hours in 1980, to 1,359 [as published] kilowatt-hours in 1984, and then to 11,452 kilowatt-hours in 1988. Should the increase continue at this rate, any increase in the number of power stations will be insufficient to cope with consumption during the years for which they are planned.

At a press conference yesterday morning, al-Bakir said the rate of per capita consumption in Qatar in 1987 not only exceeded international rates but also rates in the Gulf states. For example, per capita consumption in Bahrain this year was 6,711 kilowatt-hours, Kuwait 9,744 kilowatt-hours, the Saudi Arabian Kingdom 5,883 kilowatt-hours, the UAE [United Arab Emirates] 8,069 kilowatt-hours, the Sultanate of Oman 5,464 kilowatt-hours, and Qatar 11,442 kilowatt-hours.

On the other hand, the rate per capita of electric power consumption in Qatar over the past nine years was as follows:

Year	Kilowatt-Hours
1980	8,628
1981	87,521 [as published]
1982	9,298
1983	9,830
1984	10,359

Year	Kilowatt-Hours
1985	11,093
1986	11,167
1987	11,349
1988	11,452

With regard to water production and distribution, the annual per capita water consumption in Qatar during 1988 was 44,859 gallons annually, at a daily rate of 124.6 gallons, which is an extremely high rate also exceeding international levels and levels in the Arab Gulf countries. In light of these rates, it was found that the state will have to spend thousands of millions of rials every 10 years to build additional plants in order to meet these high rates of consumption, which would also mean the exhaustion of our national wealth.

Replying to a question regarding the highest rate of water consumption during 1988, Eng Ibrahim al-Bakir said this was on 24 July, when water consumption reached 5,676,800 gallons, representing 139 gallons per individual, which is a world record, since the highest international rate of consumption is 50 gallons per day per person.

Al-Bakir said that the cost of electricity production and distribution is 15 dirhams per kilowatt-hour, while customers generally are billed at the rate of six dirhams per kilowatt-hour, representing 23 percent of the cost. Also, the cost of water production and distribution is 7 Qatari rials per cubic meter while the sale price per cubic meter is 4.4 rials. Therefore, the sale price is 63 percent of the cost. So if we translate this into real figures we would find that the Electricity and Water Administration's expenditures during 1988 under the articles of services, expenses, wages, spare parts, and arrears were 957 million rials, excluding capital expenditures and profits from previous investments in building power stations and lines. The total money collected from water and electricity bills was only 156 million rials, representing only 11.5 percent of real expenditure, for the direct and indirect waters [as published]. In other words, the state covers this major deficit and writes it off of its budget.

SUDAN

Information Minister Discusses Press Rules, RCC Policies

45040507 London AL-DUSTUR
in Arabic 28 Aug 89 pp 15-17

[Interview With 'Ali Shammu, Sudanese Culture and Information Minister, by Muhammad Sayyid Ahmad 'Atiq; "AL-DUSTUR Interviews Sudanese Culture and Information Minister; Talking of Sectarianism or Partisan-ship Positively Is Prohibited"; date and place not given]

[Excerpts] With what formula does the new Sudanese government want to change Sudan's conditions? How is

it dealing with the important national issues that continued to be a subject of dialogue between the political forces throughout the period following the overthrow of Numayri's regime? What are the bounds of the current democratic liberties in Sudan? AL-DUSTUR has faced 'Ali Shammu, the culture and information minister and the official government spokesman, with these questions and others. Here is the interview: [passage omitted]

[AL-DUSTUR] We have heard a lot on numerous occasions regarding the press and proclamation of the press and publication law from Brigadier General 'Umar and from Colonel Sulayman, the head of the RCC [Revolution Command Council] Information Committee. First, a long time has passed since it was announced that the law would be issued imminently. Second, we would like a clarification on some of the phrases included in the statements, such as the phrase "national press." Does this mean repeating Numayri's experiment with AL-AYYAM and AL-SAHAFAH papers or does it mean emulating the Egyptian experiment?

[Shammu] I am not concerned with clarifying the words of others. Regarding the national press, I understand it to mean the press that is not owned by the private sector, whether in the form of individuals or companies. It is a press whose creation is assisted by the state but which is given the freedom of movement and expression, and which can perform its watchdog role over all the state agencies and institutions. [passage omitted]

You are going to ask me for specifics. For example, insofar as red lines are concerned, it is prohibited to talk positively of sectarianism or partisanship. It is prohibited to assault the fraternal and friendly countries or their heads. It is also prohibited to incite ethnic tendencies and religious and sectarian disagreements or to publish reports on the armed forces, except for statements made by their official spokesman. All these are prohibited. In the binding rules, we have stated that inasmuch as possible, we want the papers to be owned by companies or groups, not by individuals. We have also demanded that a publication explain its financing sources, the number of editions it prints, and the number it actually distributes. We have also stated that setting the price of a publication will be within the power of the law. We have done all this to protect the reading consumer, exactly as we protect him in connection with any other commodity whose price is controlled by the public authority. As for anything else, there is absolute freedom.

[AL-DUSTUR] Absolute freedom for any criticism whatsoever?

[Shammu] Yes. Else, what is the value of the freedom which we say we guarantee if we do not secure the freedom to criticize all the officials, beginning with the head of state, provided that the criticism is objective and concerned with the country's interest?

[AL-DUSTUR] What about censorship on the Arab and foreign press? From time to time, we hear that AL-WAFD, AL-AHALI, AL-YAWM AL-SABI', or some other paper is confiscated?

[Shammu] We have not confiscated any newspaper or magazine. What has happened is that we recently issued a decision suspending the circulation of partisan papers in Sudan—when we noticed excesses on the part of the Egyptian partisan press. If we permit their circulation then it would behoove us to permit the publication of Sudanese partisan papers. By the way, AL-WAFD's criticism is not objective. [passage omitted]

[AL-DUSTUR] We interrupted Shammu to inquire about the bases for the selection of these gentlemen [Muhammad Sa'id Ma'ruf and al-Najib Qamar-al-Din to be in charge of the government-controlled AL-INQADH and AL-SUDAN AL-JADID], especially since one of them is famous in the press circles as a well-known official of the Islamic Front.

[Shammu] I don't know because I am not the one who selected them. The RCC Political Committee did the selecting, and it certainly did so according to certain bases.

As for the independent papers, when the press and publication law is passed, an opportunity will be provided for the publication of independent dailies and weeklies. Passing and issuing the law is just one phase. At a later phase, we will consider if we need to permit the publication of independent papers immediately or after a certain period of time. When the time we deem fit arrives, we will make an announcement inviting those wishing to issue papers to submit their applications. [passage omitted]

[AL-DUSTUR] What are the [government's] new visions?

[Shammu] The new government is the party most eager for peace for a very simple reason: Its members, not the politicians, were the men who fought and died in the south. They are the ones who appreciate peace more than others, and the experienced is not the same as the inexperienced. As for John Garang, the political circumstances are different now. Previously, there were lengthy procedures, there were delegations and there were debates between the parties, the movement, the opposition, the Constituent Assembly and the head of state. All is now abridged and confined to a single authority which has the power to implement and legislate. Any agreement with this authority is final. All can say whatever they wish at the negotiations table. John Garang may propose that all the previous agreements and announcements be the subject of discussion. Whatever the parties concerned develop will be the agreement.

[AL-DUSTUR] To be specific, can this new authority abolish the September laws and separate religion from politics, considering that mixing them leads to major problems and sedition? Can it do this as a way to open

dialogue and to create real possibilities for solving the country's problems, led by the southern problem, especially since there is abundant talk that the authority is so determined on the Shari'a issue that it is prepared to submit this issue, not the September laws, to a popular referendum? Everybody will say yes to the Shari'a. Viewing the Shari'a, Islam, all the divine religions and noble beliefs as a source of legislation is one thing, whereas involving them in politics and adopting the Islamic Shari'a as valid laws, regardless of the method of application (whether on geographic, personal or other bases), is something else. We will all support the Shari'a. But we will not support religious laws that make distinctions between the citizens and that threaten to destroy national unity.

[Shammu] I don't think that the Shari'a will be the issue raised. Not even John Garang will raise the Shari'a issue. The issue raised is the September laws. To return to the crux of the question, I cannot tell you that the RCC will or will not abolish the September laws. The new authority found the September laws as valid, though not implemented, laws. Neither the democratic government nor the transitional government abolished these laws when they could have done so. The parties left the laws in force while excluding application of the part connected with the [Islamic] penalties. The same applies at present. So why are we asking only the new regime to abolish the September laws? Why should the September laws be abolished in advance? Why shouldn't they remain as a "card" in the expected negotiations. They are not a priority now, (and they are not the cause of the war in the south). This is more pressure than there should be.

Arrests and Displacement

[AL-DUSTUR] There have been arrests in the country. What concerns you here as an information man and as an official in charge of the information sector is that there is a journalist under arrest, and that another journalist was arrested for just one night, but who is summoned by the security authorities from time to time. What is your position?

[Shammu] My position toward them is the same as my position toward any other detainee. The first (Muhammad 'Uthman Abu-Shawk) was not arrested because he is a journalist, and not because of an issue connected with his practicing his profession, but because of a purely unionist act. If the arrest were due to an issue connected with publishing, I would be responsible for it. As for the second (Yusuf al-Shanbali), I have inquired about him and I have received a cable from the brothers in the Arab Journalists Federation regarding his case. I have learned that he has been released and that his case concerns the publication of a faulty report (pure rumors) saying that the RCC has initiated dialogue with the parties. The report is untrue. I believe that inasmuch as we protect the journalist, it is his ethical and professional responsibility and duty not to publish lies and rumors. Why does a man seek his right and ignore the rights of others? I

have inquired about him as a brother and a colleague and I have denied the report. Had this actually happened, I would have acted differently. I hope that we will not involve the entire group in an individual's position. [passage omitted]

[AL-DUSTUR] It is the Sudanese people's experience that the talk about inefficiency was always used by Numayri as a screen to cover political reasons, and used by the Islamic Front and by some other parties to the government in the democratic period as a screen to politicize the civil service by inserting their followers and party members into this service.

[Shammu] No, all the reasons are objective now. If we consider the number of those displaced during the partisan rule in accordance with article 26, we would find that they were more than those displaced at present. As for the Ministry of Information, there is no similar list [of civil servants to be dismissed] now. But there are committees [looking into the issue].

[AL-DUSTUR] Mr Shammu is an educated man armed with knowledge and with a broad experience. He is a widely-known information expert. Whether in this regard or in other aspects and with all the qualities I have said he possesses, Mr Shammu does not need political power or a regime on which to lean or under which to seek a shady refuge. But it is noticed that you work with military, not democratic, regimes. Is there an intellectual or ideological conviction in this regard?

[Shammu] The basis on which I worked with Numayri is different from my present basis. Had I responded to certain demands, I could have also worked with the recent democratic administration. In the first experience, I, as an ordinary citizen, participated in the government with a regime which ruled the country for 16 years. I had my private convictions which motivated me to cooperate with two governments of Numayri's regime until the uprising occurred. I then retreated from public action after spending a year in Kopar Prison. Fundamentally, I am not a politician. I was a civil servant who rose to the rank of undersecretary of the Ministry of Information. I was surprised to find myself selected for the post of information minister. I considered this a great honor and assignment and I accepted it. After the uprising and my detention, I returned to my life and my work as an ordinary citizen. I could have returned as a minister in the democratic administration. But I realized that I would not be honest with myself. Had I gone to the electoral district where my kinsmen live (al-Muslimiyah), won a seat to the parliament and then was appointed from there as minister of information, and if you had come and asked me questions about the defunct regime, what would I have been able to tell you? This is why I abandoned political action. I did not expect to be selected for the post of minister after the inception of the 30 June revolution. As an ordinary observer, I inquired about these men [who staged the coup] and I watched them without allowing myself to be influenced by other people's impressions and by what they say about their

affiliation. I became convinced that they are patriotic men. The truth is that our country has now sunk to a level which nobody can imagine. If it is not rescued immediately and promptly, it will falter forever. Therefore, when I was offered the chance to participate, I accepted. I did not accept because I am looking for privileges and allowances, (even though the government and the country's capabilities do not permit such privileges and allowances). I do not need them in the first place. I agreed because I was aware of the danger and because I was prepared to give. You are aware that in this phase, the government cannot afford the well-known ministerial privileges and allowances. The job now calls for extraordinary efforts. We must all sacrifice and give this country instead of just talk. Why are we negative, why doesn't anything please us, and why do we only criticize? Why do we demand privileges when we know that the treasury is empty? We are aware of the low production and yet we accept unemployment. I agreed to participate as a sacrifice on my part and to give what I have. I do not consider the regime an authoritative regime, but a revolution against conditions and a reality whose continuation would mean the final end of our country. The government has not yet settled in the form of a certain regime that we may judge it as dictatorial or authoritative. I do not need anybody, any regime or anything. It is my conviction that these individuals are patriotic. [passage omitted]

Karrar Calls Liberal Democracy 'Dreaming and Fantasy'

45040492b London AL-TADAMUN
in Arabic 21 Aug 89 pp 20-21

[Interview With Colonel Bahri Salah Karrar, Chairman of Revolution Command Council's Economic Committee by Salih Zaytun in Doha; "Number Three Man in Engineering Sudan's Salvation Revolution to AL-TADAMUN: First Bread and Then Democracy; No to Revilement Press"; date not given]

[Excerpts] [Passage omitted]

Economic Program

[AL-TADAMUN] In your capacity as chairman of the Revolution Command Council's Economic Committee, you must have in your mind plans for a long-range cure, not just for a quick short-term cure. This makes me ask if you have an economic program to rescue the country.

[Karrar] Of course. After controlling the market, we embarked on the next step, namely drafting an economic program from which three plans emanate: The first is a short-term plan, the second is a medium-range plan, and the third is a long-range plan. In the initial phase, we will focus on rehabilitating the existing projects, such as al-Jazirah, al-Rahad, the White Nile, and the Blue Nile projects. If implemented, these projects will boost the national economy and will rescue the country from starvation and unemployment.

In the second phase, we will focus on building and restoring the country's infrastructure, such as means of transportation and improved health and educational services, and on establishing security, because we believe that these areas have been neglected in past years. The citizen must also be rehabilitated so that he may be the objective of future development.

[AL-TADAMUN] Does this mean that implementing this economic program will be the backbone of your personal tasks, or will it be among the duties of the new cabinet, including the Ministry of Economy?

[Karrar] The cabinet is, of course, responsible before the Revolution Command Council. The minister of finance and his advisers are now drafting, each according to his specialization, the features of the development plans I have pointed out. Moreover, the ministry has a first undersecretary for planning who has past experience with the Ministry of Finance. We believe that he is competent and capable of helping in this regard. [passage omitted]

[AL-TADAMUN] What sum do you estimate is required to implement the plan to rescue the Sudanese economy?

[Karrar] There is an urgent need at present for \$100 million to rescue the agricultural season, which needs fertilizer and fuel primarily, and to rescue the sugar plants which need to be readied to receive the crop.

[AL-TADAMUN] How about Sudan's debts? How will you overcome them?

[Karrar] We have inherited from previous administrations a heavy legacy amounting to \$13 billion in total debts and interest. We expect to overcome this crisis with the resolution of the Sudanese citizens primarily, especially the Sudanese expatriates. We also look to Arab brothers to assist us materially and morally by influencing the IMF and the international institutions that have made loans to Sudan, so that they may facilitate future negotiations and improve the debt repayment terms.

Sudanese Expatriates

[AL-TADAMUN] How will you benefit from the Sudanese expatriates?

[Karrar] We are in the process of organizing a conference for the expatriates so that we may exchange opinions and ideas and develop common visions for rescuing the national economy and strengthening the expatriates' bond with their homeland. In return for the hopes attached to the expatriates, 10 seats will be set aside for the expatriates' children in every high school which has a boarding section, with the expatriate paying the necessary costs. In any case, a committee will be formed to develop solutions for the educational problems of the expatriates' children.

Democracy and Military

[AL-TADAMUN] Putting the economic concerns aside, let us talk about the dream of democracy which you, as military, are said to have buried with your coup.

[Karrar] It is true that we are military. But we are also a part of the people. The democracy which prevailed was a false democracy that protected tribalism and sectarianism. To be honest with you, restoring democracy to Sudan is not now the immediate concern of the Sudanese. There is the question of livelihood first. Then we will draft a national charter to improve democracy's cultural performance which codifies the press so that it may perform its positive role and not turn into a revilement press, as it was under the previous administration. We will welcome any constructive criticism serving the public interest.

[AL-TADAMUN] Does this mean that the Sudanese should expect a development in the concept of government after a period of stability?

[Karrar] There is no doubt that our objective is to please the Sudanese. The coming phase will witness the possibility of free expression, popular participation, independence of the judiciary, and of all the virtuous principles.

[AL-TADAMUN] Will you provide the opportunity for another democratic experiment?

[Karrar] There will be a civilized democracy governed by numerous controls because our people include Christians, Muslims, the literate and the illiterate, and varying dispositions. These factors require firm controls. As for the talk about democracy in its liberal sense, it is a dream and a fantasy. [passage omitted]

Al-Karrar Summarizes Economic Measures, Effects

45040489a London AL-DUSTUR in Arabic
21 Aug 89 pp 21-22

[Article: "New Economic Measures in Sudan"]

[Excerpts] A meeting of the Council of Ministers was held on the 13th of this month in an attempt to find solutions and remedies to the deterioration of services and the hardships of life in Sudan. The Council of Ministers made decisions on several economic measures and procedures, which included a decision to suspend the importation of small buses and cooperative taxicabs, and a decision to use those vehicles that were already in the country for mass transportation. The Council of Ministers decided that the use of these vehicles to provide private transportation would not be permitted, and that fees which are presently collected for transportation are to be reconsidered. The council made those decisions to deal with the transportation problem in the capital, Khartoum. The council decided to explore using the Nile River to solve the transportation crisis after evaluating the experiment with the river bus, which is operating now between Khartoum and Khartoum North.

The council also decided to look into the fact that some citizens who work in government offices own vehicles used in public transportation. These individuals would be given the choice between operating their vehicles or working for the government. [passage omitted]

The minister of finance also announced the suspension of customs clearance procedures for cars owned by trade unions, which had been granted customs exemptions. The suspension of these procedures, which will continue until further notice, covers cars for physicians, professors, and others. The decision to suspend customs exemptions also covers exemptions previously issued for cars owned by various trade union groups.

Colonel Salah Ahmad al-Karrar, chairman of the Economic Committee, stated that "The revolution started implementing an economic reform program which includes limiting government spending and reducing expenditures." Col al-Karrar indicated that the Ministry of Finance instructed government units to reduce their expenditures by 20 percent. He said that government subsidies for some consumer goods would be reconsidered. Col al-Karrar indicated that the four-part rescue program, which was operational during the previous administration, will remain in effect, and that an effort will be made to correct any of its shortcomings. [passage omitted]

Regarding the situation with the IMF, Col al-Karrar expressed his belief that Sudan will reach an agreement with the fund. He said that the situation will be discussed at a joint meeting next September, and he indicated that the government's reform program was compatible with the fund's proposal which will be implemented without putting any pressures on citizens. Col al-Karrar added, "After Sudan demonstrated its good intentions, the fund postponed the discussion of Sudan's position for another 4 months." [passage omitted]

Regarding the sums of money which may be converted by citizens traveling abroad, Col al-Karrar said, "Present economic conditions make it necessary to limit the sum of money which the state would be allowed to sell to a citizen to \$50.00. We hope that economic conditions will improve so that we may be allowed to increase the amount of money which may be converted for citizens." [passage omitted]

Darfur Supervisor Discusses Conference, Libyan Presence

45040492a London AL-DUSTUR
in Arabic 21 Aug 89 pp 29-30

[Interview With Brigadier General al-Tijani Adam al-Tahir, National Salvation Revolution Council Member and Darfur Province Political Supervisor, by Muhammad 'Abd-al-Rahman, at Republican Palace: "Brigadier General al-Tijani Adam al-Tahir, Darfur Province Political Supervisor, to AL-DUSTUR: Tribal Peace Conference Has Served Its Purposes"; first passage is AL-DUSTUR introduction; date not given]

[Excerpts] [Passage omitted] At the outset, Brigadier General al-Tijani Adam al-Tahir talked about the results produced by the [tribal peace] conference [held last July] and about whether these results are enough to bring stability to the province, saying: [passage omitted] "It is my belief that the tribal peace conference between the feuding tribes has resolved 90 percent of the tribal problems existing in the province. However, there are some small problems that occur here and there, such as thefts, incidents of individual looting, the recent monopolies in grazing and agriculture, and so forth. But these problems have no impact on tribal relations. I believe that they have no connection with the poor relations and ties between the warring tribes. What helped bring about the peace is, of course, dissolving the parties which were the main cause of the problems existing in Darfur Province." [passage omitted]

[AL-DUSTUR] The Darfur tribal peace conference put its finger on the causes of all the problems in the province and produced solutions and recommendations. Have you carried out any executive steps in this regard?

[Tijani] The executive steps have been carried out by the feuding parties and by the mediating "good offices" committees that are qualified to implement what was agreed upon. The local authorities shoulder the burden of observing implementation. To date, all steps are moving as agreed upon, God be thanked. There hasn't been any conflict or a single incident between the feuding tribes. Stability and security have begun to take hold and the citizens are moving to restore normal life.

[AL-DUSTUR] The final statement of the tribal peace conference says that the government has undertaken to pay one third the sums assessed for blood money and for compensations. What has been done in this regard?

[Tijani] The government has undertaken to pay 11 million Sudanese pounds as compensation to the feuding parties and it has fulfilled its commitment. The minister of finance has been instructed to pay this sum to the province governor. I believe that the money is now in the governor's hands or on its way to the governor. [passage omitted]

[AL-DUSTUR] What guarantees are there that the Libyan and Chadian parties feuding on Sudan's western borders will not interfere?

[Tijani] We have declared our external plan to the entire world. We have contacted the neighboring countries and explained to them our external plan and our viewpoint on how to settle the border problems and the conflicts that arise when some citizens from one country take refuge in another. We have met full understanding and acceptance of our proposals for dealing with our common problems.

[AL-DUSTUR] In your joint meeting with the Libyan Government, what do you discuss generally and what do you discuss in connection with Darfur security in particular?

[Tijani] We have already made this known to the press and I have said that the discussions include respect for neighboring countries, nonintervention in domestic affairs, and helping the Chadian brothers solve their domestic problems, which produced military units that have entered Sudan. Our role in helping Chad, should it ask for such help, is to try jointly with the Chadians to hold negotiations. In other matters, we will not permit Sudan to become a theater of armed operations. Our domestic war since independence is enough. There is war in the south, war in Darfur, and war in Kurdufan. There is no sense or interest in continuing these wars which are alien to the Sudanese people and whose purpose is to shackle Sudan. Why should Sudan be the instrument of other countries who engage in certain policies to achieve their objectives while we become the victim and the instrument for achieving their objectives? If you ask a party to the conflict in Darfur, for example, about the reason for the war between the Arabs and the Fur, you would not get an objective and convincing answer. Some circles supplied the weapons and the munitions and the parties involved started to fight. Darfur citizens began to resort to the use of arms to settle simple problems which could be settled by dialogue.

[AL-DUSTUR] This discussion leads us to the question of taking away sophisticated weapons from individuals and groups.

[Tijani] These weapons are not as sophisticated as you say because sophisticated weapons require a certain standard of education for their use. The weapons present in Darfur consist of rifles, machineguns, and RPG.7's. These are not sophisticated weapons but they are abundant. Our armed forces have seized a part of these weapons which I cannot say is a very large part. As for the unseized part, one of the points agreed to by the conference is not to resort to the use of arms. This means that the citizen will use these weapons only for self-defense and defending their honor. Moreover, an appeal has been issued to everybody who possesses a weapon to hand this weapon over. The government is prepared to pay the price of any weapon handed over by the owner, considering that the owner has paid a very large sum of money for it. The security authorities are watching and they will arrest any person who does not hand his weapon over within the grace period set by the responsible province authorities.

[AL-DUSTUR] Are there statistics on these weapons?

[Tijani] No.

[AL-DUSTUR] What is the effect of the administrative agency's absence from the area?

[Tijani] By the administrative side, I believe you mean the local government.

[AL-DUSTUR] No. I mean that there are administrative officers who diagnosed Darfur's problem, dotted the i's and crossed the t's. But they were treated oppressively and removed from their work.

[Tijani] The administrative officers who were present previously are present currently. If they have not increased, they have also not decreased. The other point is that brother 'Abd-al-Hafiz, and I think he is the person you mean, is now in al-Fashir and carries out his work there. But the administrative agency was inefficient, either due to lack of resources, which were meager, or due to the previous government's policies and, I can say, due to the politicization of some officers. What is more, an administrative officer needs the proper climate, security, stability, and respect for authority in order that he may be able to move and perform his duties. All this was nonexistent. This is why the officers' role in maintaining security was weak or substandard.

[AL-DUSTUR] What has been done regarding the militias in Darfur?

[Tijani] I believe that the presence and use of militias is the most eloquent proof of the failure of the other security agencies, because security is one of their fundamental duties. I believe that it would have behooved the previous government to strengthen the security agencies so that they may perform their full role in such situations. The militias will not protect the citizen. All the militias have now been disbanded. We heard of the militias which were organized, in part, to defend themselves—hence the name. If the government cannot protect people, this means that they will get together and acquire weapons to defend themselves and their honor. Other militias were formed to serve the parties. Consequently, any activity by the militias is illegal and illegitimate and accountable before the law. Moreover, the militias' weapons are not sophisticated and one can be taught how to use them in a matter of just 2 hours. [passage omitted]

Army Reorganizes Units, Upgrades Vehicles

45040489c Khartoum AL-QUWWAT AL-MUSALLAH in Arabic 31 Jul 89 p 1

[Article: "Chief of Staff Reviews Seventh Armored Division and Investigation Department in al-Shajarah, Announces Plan To Organize All Units in Armed Forces"]

[Text] Staff Major General Ishaq Ibrahim 'Umar, the chief of staff, accompanied by Staff Major General Hassan 'Abd-al-Rahman 'Ali, the deputy chief of staff for operations, conducted an inspection and review visit of the leadership of the Seventh Armored Division in al-Shajarah.

The two major generals were received by Staff Major General Ahmad al-Zayn Ibrahim, the director of the Armored Department; by Staff Brigadier General Mirghani Yasin Babakr, commander of the Seventh Armored Division; and by officers of the division.

In a meeting he held with officers, noncommissioned officers, and soldiers, his excellency talked about the efforts which are being made by the command to solve

the problems associated with the armed forces. These are problems which have to do with the armed forces' training and development, and with making various vehicles suitable for use. His excellency announced a plan to reorganize all the units of the armed forces in the wake of the National Rescue Revolution; he confirmed the efforts made by the commander in chief for peace; and he explained the steps which have been taken to negotiate with those who took up arms so that this abominable war can be brought to an end.

The chief of staff was frank when he answered questions from the officers, the noncommissioned officers and the soldiers. Afterwards, he and the delegation accompanying him toured all of the units, facilities, and warehouses of the Armored Department, and he was briefed about the possibility of making many of the vehicles suitable for service.

His excellency also visited the Investigations Department where he was received by Staff Brigadier General Ibrahim Hamid, the director of the Investigations Department, and by department officers. The major general visited all of the department's units and met with officers. He heard a detailed explanation of the problems and impediments standing in the department's way and interfering with its efforts to achieve the objective for which it was established. The chief of staff issued many instructions and recommendations for overcoming the difficulties.

It is worth noting that the chief of staff's delegation included a number of branch heads in the general command of the people's armed forces.

First Session of al-Banna Case Detailed

45040489b London AL-DUSTUR in Arabic
21 Aug 89 p 21

[Article: "Trial Begins for Former Vice President of Sudan's Presidential Council"]

[Text] A report was filed on 11 August this year in accordance with Articles 362, 348, and 345 of Sudan's 1983 Penal Code. Mr Idris 'Abdallah al-Banna, the former vice president of the Presidential Council and leader of the Ummah Party, was put on trial on the basis of that report. Mr al-Banna, who is accused of treason and fraud, is one of the first political detainees to be put on trial in Special Court Number 3. Mr al-Banna's trial comes 6 weeks after al-Sadiq al-Mahdi's government was overthrown when the army seized power in Sudan on 30 June of this year. The trial comes after the ruling National Rescue Council issued a series of decisions, formed containment and investigating committees, and established special military courts.

The court held its first session in Mr al-Banna's trial on the 12th of this month. At the beginning of the session, the chairman of the investigating committee read the indictment against al-Banna. It mentioned how the defendant had used his position to realize personal gain,

and it spoke about the morals and the conduct which a public servant must observe to protect public property.

The chairman of the investigating committee mentioned that the committee had heard from seven witnesses, and had sought the assistance of the public comptroller's office and the Ministry of Social Care. The report was filed after that.

The details of the case, as mentioned in the indictment, indicate that in 1985 al-Banna attended the Arab People's Conference in Libya with a Sudanese delegation. The conference decided that an Arab committee was to be formed to offer Sudan support in coping with the drought and the disasters which had occurred in that country. That committee visited Syria and obtained support from Syria. The Libyan Jamahiriyyah offered Sudan two drills as a gift so that Sudan could fight against the lack of water. The governor of Darfur received one drill, and the other was moved to the capital.

In Khartoum, a water well was drilled on an experimental basis in one of the farms. The operation cost 60,000 pounds which were taken from the state's treasury. A crew of engineers, geologists, and drivers were appointed to operate the drill, and all of them receive their salaries from the state.

The indictment mentioned that al-Banna had joined the Ministry of Finance in establishing the People's Cooperative Corporation to sell Syrian aid. He purchased a number of cars, which were found in his home and in the possession of his family after the new regime came to power. He also disbursed the sum of 100,000 pounds so that wells could be drilled in the area of al-Jazirah. And yet, no wells have been drilled, and no money has been returned. The defendant had also registered this drill with the Society for Relief to the Poor and Destitute, but the prosecutor considers this society an illegal society which, according to a report from the Ministry of Social Care, is staffed by a number of the defendant's proteges and by members of his family.

Mr Idris al-Banna appeared to be calm. He smiled more than once as he listened to the charges that had been made against him. He did, however, object to the fact that the official media had confounded the case and had tried him and convicted him before his day in court. He asked for a defense attorney, and the court complied with his request. The court was then adjourned until the 18th of this month. Sudan's television, which had carried the proceedings of the military court session, broadcast these proceedings a second time.

SYRIA

Critical Electrical Power Shortage Discussed

90OL0021 Damascus AL-THAWRAH
in Arabic 8 Aug 89 p 5

[Interview With Mahmud al-As'ad, General Director of Syria's Public Electricity Authority, by Isma'il Jaradat;

"Will the Electricity Problem Be Surmounted in the Near Future; The Authority's General Director: Our Daily Shortfall in Generated Power Is 5-6 Million Kilowatt-Hours"; first three paragraphs are AL-THAWRAH introduction; date and place not given]

[Text] The electric power crisis has become a main problem for all of us, considering that, during the past year, we have gotten used to getting uninterrupted power. Last July, the crisis intensified unreasonably.

What are the causes of this crisis, how long will it persist, and will it be dealt with now? Will a fair rationing be achieved between the city and the countryside? We will discuss all of these questions with Mahmud al-As'ad, the general director of the country's Public Electricity Authority.

To begin, let us talk frankly. What are the causes of the electric power crisis and, consequently, why the rationing?

Numerous Causes

The first cause is due to the abnormal load, which by the end of last July, throughout the country, increased by 15 percent over 1988. This increase has varied, reaching 30 percent in some governorates, especially the eastern governorates. During some months, the load increase amounted to 60 percent. This is due to the high temperatures and the drought which prevailed in the region, thus causing increased electric power generation resulting from the drop in the underground water level, from refrigeration, and from air conditioning, which is widespread in the country.

On some days, as in the days of July for example, consumption rose by 10 million kilowatt-hours. The average increase ranged from 5 to 6 million kilowatt-hours daily.

The second cause is due to the diminished water resources from the Euphrates River, whether in comparison with past years or with 1988. The power generated from the al-Thawrah plant was limited to 2 million kilowatt-hours daily, in order to maintain a proper water-flow level into Aleppo's water inlet. In 1988, the power generated from al-Thawrah plant exceeded 10 million kilowatt-hours daily. In the preceding years, it exceeded 6-7 million kilowatt-hours daily.

So compared to 1988, the power generated from the al-Thawrah plant has dropped by 8 million kilowatt-hours daily. Compared to 1987, the drop amounts to nearly 5 million kilowatt-hours daily.

The third cause is due to the breakdown of two generating units, each with a capacity of 150 megawatts. This has deprived the network of the capability to generate 6 million kilowatt-hours daily. The breakdown of these units has forced the authority to put into operation all the units at its disposal in order to meet the demand with the available means. We notice that the average daily

shortfall in generated power amounts to 6 million kilowatt-hours, even though, on some days, it has reached 10 million kilowatt-hours.

But we can say that the increased demand for the load ranges from 5 to 6 million kilowatt-hours daily, that the capacity to generate power from the Euphrates has dropped by nearly 8 million kilowatt-hours, and that the capacity to produce power from the generating units has dropped by nearly 6 million kilowatt-hours, meaning that the total decrease amounts to 20 million kilowatt-hours daily, whereas the actual electrical power shortfall does not exceed 6 million kilowatt-hours.

Gradual Approach

[AL-THAWRAH] How long will the rationing continue? We want a clear and frank answer on this issue.

[Al-As'ad] When a unit breaks down, the power drops by inasmuch as this unit generates. Consequently, the shortfall increases. All available steps have been taken to repair the two idled units. One of the two units is expected to be put back into operation in mid-November 1989, and the second unit in mid-December 1989. Now that it has been completed, the fourth unit of the Baniyas power plant will be put into operation for the first time in the middle of this month of August. This unit will, when stabilized, increase the generation capacity by 170 megawatt or 3.5 million kilowatt-hours daily. It is well known that when a new unit is first linked to the network, it is charged with different loads and then switched off for some calibration. Generally, this unit will be introduced into actual service 2 months after it is launched. In any case, it will increase the generating capacity by nearly 2 million kilowatt-hours daily in September and October.

It must be noted here that the demand for power drops in September and October, because there is no need to pump water, and because temperatures drop. Consequently, there is no need for air conditioning and refrigeration. This will help reduce the current difficulties.

In addition to the above, a power plant is currently under construction in the al-Tim area, and it will be operated by oil-accompanying gas. The plant includes 3 units, each with an average capacity of 34 megawatts. The first unit is expected to be completed at the beginning of March 1990, the second at the beginning of May 1990, and the third at the beginning of July 1990. This plant will generate nearly 2.5 million kilowatt-hours daily. The Tishrin thermal plant near Damascus, which consists of 2 units with a capacity of 200 megawatts each, is expected to be completed by the end of 1990. Work is also currently underway to build the Tishrin water dam which will have 6 generating units, each with a capacity of 105 megawatts. This plant is expected to go into operation in 1993. Moreover, studies are underway on building a natural gas-operated plant near Hims with a capacity of 600 megawatts.

It is obvious from the above that the idled units will return to service next November and December, thus increasing the generating capacity by 6 million kilowatt-hours daily.

This is in addition to the introduction of a new unit in the Baniyas plant which, when put into actual service, will increase the generating capacity by 3.5 million kilowatt-hours daily, as I have already pointed out.

Demands To Surmount the Crisis

But to surmount the crisis, it is essential that the citizens cooperate and curtail unnecessary power consumption. If each citizen dispensed with lighting one light bulb in his home, we would save 200,000 kilowatt-hours every hour. This is what makes us talk of rationing electric power consumption to make it possible to supply water to every home constantly and continuously.

Reasons Beyond Control

[AL-THAWRAH] What about the causes of the plant breakdowns, and what point have you reached in repairing the plants?

[Al-As'ad] It is well known that we have two idle units. One was idled by a normal breakdown caused by alternators which need to be repaired. The breakdown cannot be discovered in advance, and it cannot be repaired locally.

As for the second unit, it is well-known that an explosion, resulting from the mixture of hydrogen with oxygen, put it out of service.

As to who is responsible for these breakdowns, we cannot determine this responsibility.

Fair Rationing

[AL-THAWRAH] Fair rationing between the city and the countryside is extremely important. Will this fairness be achieved or will the current situation continue endlessly?

[Al-As'ad] As far as fair rationing is concerned, there was coordination with the Rural Damascus Governorate and the other governorates at a meeting in which the outlets excluded from rationing were reconsidered, thus confining the exclusion to outlets that supply the water-pumping installations, whether drinking or irrigation water, and to some important activities. Previously, the exclusions affected nearly 70 outlets in Damascus. After examination and coordination with the governorate, the number was reduced to 13 outlets. This will help reduce the rationing hours for the rural citizens. All of the electricity directorates have been given the necessary instructions to announce the rationing schedules, and to adhere to the start and end of rationing hours, depending on the power-generating circumstances. If the circumstances permit, power will be restored before the end of rationing hours. We are working ceaselessly to enhance the readiness of the generating units. Numerous steps have been taken to open the credit needed to secure the spare parts and to get approval for the appointment of technical personnel at the power plants. We should also note that all of the important industrial plants are

excluded from rationing. We are trying to make the second half of this month better than the first.

Finally, we say: Will we overcome the electricity crisis which we are experiencing? Of course, there isn't a problem which does not have numerous solutions. The solution to the electricity crisis is possible through, first, good cooperation between the citizens and the Public Electricity Authority, and through rationing the consumption of this energy, especially since we are experiencing bad weather conditions.

The second point we must stress is that to overcome the electricity crisis, all the power plants must be maintained periodically, meaning that we should not wait until they break down and then conduct the maintenance work and rush the importation of all the requirements needed to put the idle plants back into operation. I don't think that this is difficult because the government, when making its appropriations, gives power production priority. But in any case, there are good signs that the crisis is being overcome gradually. This means that the rationing hours will not be eliminated but will be reduced gradually.

INDIA

Reports on Developments in Indo-Soviet Cooperation

Working Group Established

46001017 New Delhi PATRIOT in English 5 Sep 89 p 9

[Text] India and the Soviet Union have set up a working group on new forms of cooperation other than trade to give a boost to their bilateral ties, according to Mr I. E. Khotsialov, Co-Chairman, Indo-Soviet Working Group on new forms of cooperation, report agencies.

Addressing a meeting organised by the Confederation of Indian Engineering Industry (CEI) in the Capital on Monday, Mr Khotsialov said this working group would look into all aspects of cooperation other than trade. The areas identified for promoting mutually beneficial relations include, joint ventures, technology transfer, production cooperation and third country projects/exports, Mr Khotsialov said.

Computer Joint Venture

45001017 New Delhi PATRIOT in English
26 Aug 89 p 9

[Text] Computeronics India has finalised an agreement with the Soviet Union to set up in Tashkent a joint-venture company with 50 percent equity participation to manufacture computer peripherals, reports UNI.

Mr Vivek Singhal, President of Computeronics India, told reporters the computer peripherals will be manufactured for personal computers and the turn-over in 1990 is expected to be around Rs 150 crore. In two years, the turnover will be about Rs 500 crore a year.

The agreement has been signed with the USSR State Committee and a few others as their partners.

Mr Singhal said the Soviet Union is now importing computer peripherals and the joint venture called "Sovind Electronic, Tashkent", will meet only part of the Soviet demand for these items. With an investment of Rs eight crore in the first year, Sovind Electronic will go into production by early 1990. They will also export part of their production of foreign exchange areas as their products will be of high quality.

Computeronics India, one of the oldest Indian firms, manufactures computer peripherals and is one of the largest suppliers of printers in the domestic market, Mr Singhal said.

Mr Singhal said his company was responsible for introducing the concept of software exports from India in 1974 by bringing orders for software development worth crore of rupees.

Meanwhile, Mr Manubhai Shah, President of IUCCI said the Chamber will organise here a seminar-cum-exhibition in November on agro-chemical insecticides, pesticides and weedicides industries in India and the Soviet Union.

"We are inviting 30 leading Soviet organisations and Ministry of Chemicals of the Soviet Union to this seminar and more than 50 Indian manufacturers of these products".

Commerce Minister for Closer Ties With PRC, USSR

46001013 Madras THE HINDU in English
29 Aug 89 p 10

[Text] Hyderabad, Aug 18. The Union Commerce Minister, Mr Dinesh Singh, today advocated closer economic cooperation among India, China and the Soviet Union so that "a balancing economic force could be generated in the areas of liberalisation and foreign investment".

Inaugurating a seminar on "India-China relations" organised by the Institute of Asian Studies here, Mr Singh said such a "force with the coordination of the economic strategies of the three countries" was necessary in view of two important developments on the world economic scene.

He said that while there was an attempt to liberalise the trading system, with the Uruguay round of negotiations under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) under way, attempts were being made to forge regional economic groupings.

"While the European Community is targeted to be a single market by 1992, the North American Economic Entity (NAEE) is now a reality. Efforts are also under way to establish a Pacific Rim Community (PRC)", he said and added, "obviously the attempts at liberalisation in the Uruguay round of negotiations and establishment of economic grouping are not in harmony".

"The two groups taken together could be disadvantageous to other countries, especially the developing ones, as these groupings would have a considerable economic clout to influence trade liberalisation in their favour. Their attempt could be to force other countries to open their markets to the goods of these economic communities without any reciprocity," the Minister said. "In such a situation countries with large markets and having considerable growth potential such as China, the Soviet Union and India could play an important role to restore the balance between the emerging economic entities and others," he added.

It was necessary that these countries enter into a dialogue to evolve a common strategy to acquire foreign capitals and technology to protect the developing countries' infant domestic industry and fulfil the growing needs of the people, he said.

However, he said he was not suggesting that the three countries should build an exclusive economic club but only they should have closer cooperation, to follow the path of liberalisation and development which would be in harmony with their social and political systems.

The visit of the Prime Minister, Mr Rajiv Gandhi to China last December, he said, had opened up possibilities of cooperation and avenues for collaboration in trade.

Chinese team coming: Mr Zhou Xing Xing, Charge d'Affaires, Chinese Embassy, said the Chinese Minister of Commerce could lead a delegation to India next month to have talks with his counterpart, Mr Singh, on improving economic relations.

The diplomat said the two countries should forget the "unpleasant past" and work for the future, building more and more contacts. Both countries, having reposed confidence in the five principles of peaceful co-existence, which have stood the test of time, should now work for a new international political and economic order.

Among the prominent persons participating in the seminar are Messrs K. P. S. Menon, A. P. Venkateswaran (both former Foreign Secretaries) Prof Tan Chiung, Prof Sarvepalli Gopal and Prof Bhabani Sengupta.

Election Commission Rules on Secessionist Parties

46001009 Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA
in English 4 Sep 89 p 7

[Text] New Delhi, September 3 (PTI). The election commission has said that it has a "duty and responsibility" to deny registration to parties "professing or advocating secessionist policies or programmes or indulging in unlawful or disruptive activities".

Granting registration to such parties might amount to the election commission "putting a seal" on such activities, the commission has said in an affidavit before the Delhi high court.

The affidavit has been filed in response to a notice by a division bench comprising Mrs Justice Leila Seth and Mr Justice P. K. Bahri.

The notice was issued on a petition by the Socialist Unity Centre of India (SUCI) challenging the constitutional validity of the amended representation of the Peoples' Act, 1988 laying down a new procedure for registration of a political party.

The petition moved by Mr Prithvi Chanda, member politburo of the central committee of the SUCI, was filed days before the August 14 deadline set by the commission for the registration.

It had sought an order restraining the respondents from enforcing sections 3 and 6 of the Representation of the Peoples (amendment) Act, 1988 and paragraph three of

the election symbols (reservation and allotment) order, 1968 and declaring them "null and void".

The petitioner had contended that the consequence of non-registration of a political party was that it would be denied a common symbol for its candidates under the new symbols order read with the amending Act.

The commission, in its affidavit filed this week, said it had also a duty to look into the membership of political parties and its relation with the voters to see that there is no mushroom growth of political parties.

The commission said therefore para three of the Act was not ultra-vires of the power of the commission and the ground advanced by SUCI that the commission has no power to look into the philosophy of political parties or their membership and relation to voters, cannot be accepted.

The affidavit said the power of the commission of superintendence, direction and control of elections under Article 324 had been held by the supreme court to be of the "widest amplitude".

The commission said its powers "extend to registration and recognition of political parties" as well, to ensure regulation of matters relating to allotment of symbols of the candidates of political parties.

Quoting the supreme court observations in the Kanhiya Lal case the affidavit said the apex court had held that "none of the provisions of the symbol order suffered from want of authority on the part of the election commission".

The commission made it clear that the procedure of registration of political parties under the new electoral law was "substantially the same as it was under para three of the symbols order".

The affidavit said a political party already registered with the commission before June 15, 1989 should in normal circumstances not have any difficulty in complying with the requirements of the new law.

It said the SUCI had already been registered with the commission as a registered unrecognised party and would have retained its status without difficulty.

The commission said it did not agree with the SUCI contention that a statutory provision enacted by Parliament, requiring a party to seek registration, would be violative of the fundamental right to form an association under Article 19(1)(C).

The commission also denied the SUCI allegation that it had been conferred "unfettered discretion and despotic power" in the manner of registration of political parties.

The affidavit further stated that the new procedure of registration "does not transgress the requirements of the

rule of law and natural justice" as a mandatory hearing had been provided for before rejection of the application.

The commission said it was wrong to construe that the rejection of an application for registration had a complete finality. "It affects in no way the overriding power of the high courts and the supreme court to subject the decision to judicial scrutiny."

The commission has also denied that the restrictions imposed in section 29A of the Act was "excessive or unreasonable".

CPI Central Executive Committee Member Dies

46001014 New Delhi *PATRIOT* in English
26 Aug 89 p 1

[Text] Moscow, Aug 25—Veteran CPI [Communist Party of India] leader and freedom fighter Sarju Pandey passed away today early morning at the Moscow Clinical Hospital after a massive heart attack.

Doctors said he suffered from coronary and acute lung insufficiency and his death was instantaneous. He came to Moscow on August 20 for treatment and was admitted to the hospital on August 22.

Secretary of the UP [Uttar Pradesh] state communist party and a member of the UP State Assembly, Mr Pandey was the legendary leader of the famous Balia uprising of August 1942, which had led to the independence of the area from the British yoke for about 10 days.

Mr Pandey's body will be taken from here to Delhi.

Mr Pandey had been elected to the Lok Sabha for three consecutive terms from the Ghazipur constituency from 1957 to 1967.

Mr Pandey was also a member of the party's central executive committee since 1978.

Spy Caught Carrying 'Sensitive' Papers to Pakistan

46001010 New Delhi *PATRIOT* in English 1 Sep 89 p 1

[Text] Chandigarh, Aug 31 (UNI)—In a major breakthrough, the Border Security Force (BSF) nabbed an Indian national, spying for Pakistan for the past few years, in the Khem Karan sector of Amritsar district last night.

Elsewhere in Punjab, a police constable and a terrorist were among six people killed in Punjab during the past 24 hours.

The BSF apprehended one Tauheed Ahmad while he was crossing over to Pakistan in the Khem Karan sector of Amritsar district last night.

Ahmad hails from a village in the Muzaffarnagar district of Uttar Pradesh.

Official sources claimed that Tauheed had been carrying sensitive defence documents to Pakistan intelligence agencies with the help of the Pakistan rangers.

During his interrogation Tauheed revealed that he used to get instructions from one Hazi Madzoor, a businessman operating from Delhi's Jama Masjid area.

Terrorists entered the house of police constable Harbajan Singh at Patiala village in Ropar district and shot him dead last night.

An official spokesman said it was believed that the gang of terrorist Bhupinder Singh, who was caught by the deceased constable some time ago, was responsible for the killing.

Opposition Leaders Comment on Success of Bandh

46001011 Calcutta *THE STATESMAN*
in English 31 Aug 89 pp 1, 7

[Text] New Delhi, Aug 30—The Opposition parties claimed that today's Bharat bandh was "near total" at the all-India level. Addressing separate Press conferences here, the National Front convener, Mr V. P. Singh, the BJP [Bharatiya Janata Party] president, Mr L. K. Advani, and the CPI(M) [Communist Party of India-Marxist] general secretary, Mr E. M.S. Namboodiripad, thanked the people for a "spontaneous and magnificent response" to the bandh call.

Thanking all Opposition party members for having worked to make the bandh a "success", Mr V. P. Singh said it showed "the people are against the corrupt and anti-people policies of the present Government and support the demand for his resignation".

Mr Singh said that the "very unusual" methods the Government took to foil the bandh was "itself proof of their defeat. They virtually held their own employees captive. That way, in a jail you can ensure 100 percent attendance. But still we come out winners. No Government employee entered his office today".

Talking about the "picnic atmosphere" in Ministries and Union Government offices since last evening, Mr Singh said: "This is a Government of crooks becoming cooks. They can cook anything from food to forgeries. But in spite of everything, buses in Delhi plied empty today".

Mr Singh accused the Government of "using anti-social elements through their front organizations apart from the State machinery in their attempts to foil the bandh".

Mr Advani said the Government's action over the past week showed that it had gone "berserk", and even a Congress(I) M.P. had told him so. "The Congress(I) is jittery, it has pressed the panic button, it is a party on the run. And the Congress(I), supported by its goons and the police, has launched a war on the people".

Mr Namboodiripad also talked of the "complete success of the bandh despite organized attacks, specially in Kerala and Tripura". In Kerala, he held "the Congress(I), Muslim League and RSS responsible" for violence. "In Kerala, the BJP did not formally oppose the bandh but joined the Congress(I) in launching attacks on bandh organizers".

The CPI(M) central office circulated the names of five of its supporters killed in bandh-related violence today: Dr Ajit Roy Choudhury, Mr Jyotindra Majumdar and Mr Bimal Banik in Tripura and Nazir in Thodupuzha and Kuttiappa in Wyned districts of Kerala.

In the Wyned incident, a Janata Dal worker was also reported to have been killed. The CPI(M) Politburo said in a statement that the ex-Chief Minister of Tripura, Mr Nripen Chakraborty, was assaulted and lost consciousness for a while. "Over 200 CPI(M) men have been hospitalized in planned and widespread attacks by Congress(I) men in Kerala", the statement added.

"The call for a bandh panicked the Congress(I) as never before," the Politburo said: "The Goebbelian propaganda unleashed through Doordarshan and Akashvani reached nauseating depths. Despite such lying propaganda and Government and goonda repression, the people have moved into action. Intimidating circulars and coercion of Union Government employees to report for duty were resorted to. Despite such threats in many places, Government employees did not report for duty".

"It is a bandh by the people, an unprecedented mass action against the Government. The Congress(I) rulers should read the writing on the wall. Its failure to quit will only fuel wider mass actions. The coming together of the Left, democratic and secular forces to channelize this mass discontent and carry it forward will ensure the defeat of the Congress(I) in the forthcoming Lok Sabha elections".

The BJP general secretary, Mr K. L. Sharma, also said in a statement that "the success of the bandh services as a clear signal for the Prime Minister that he has lost the confidence of the Indian people and he must resign forthwith". A Forward Bloc statement made the same demand.

While Mr Namboodiripad did not wish to speculate on the political fallout of the bandh, saying "the elections are still far away," Mr V. P. Singh was sure it would be "very positive. Today's bandh proved that all attempts by the Government to divide the Opposition have failed. It also showed that the attempt to confuse people through the electronic media does not work".

The Central offices of all Opposition parties were flooded with reports from their State units. Mr K. L. Sharma said that according to reports from Shimla, Bhopal, Jaipur, Ahmedabad, Lucknow and Patna, the response to the bandh call was "tremendous, despite indiscriminate arrests last night and this morning".

Mr V. P. Singh said he had received reports that train services had been disrupted in West Bengal, Kerala, Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, Haryana, Assam and parts of Uttar Pradesh, Bihar and Rajasthan. In Tamil Nadu, many DMK [Dravidian Progressive Foundation] leaders were reportedly arrested while squatting on rail tracks.

The Dal leader, Mr Arun Nehru, said that in Himachal Pradesh, the State unit president Mr H. S. Mankotia, and many other Opposition leaders had been arrested last night.

About Tripura, apart from violence, Mr V. P. Singh's information was that the Chief Minister and other members of the State Cabinet had gone around markets in Agartala today forcing shops open. The CPI(M) reported that traffic was paralysed, tea gardens and educational institutions in the South district were closed.

Similarly, the CPI(M)'s report was that the bandh was total in West Bengal, and no trains plied. Union Government offices, banks and public sector units were also reported to be deserted. There were reports of brickbats from three or four places, for which the CPI(M)'s Central Committee blamed the Congress(I). It said three policemen were injured in stone-throwing. In the police firing that followed, no one was injured. Central Industrial Security Force personnel fired at the MAMC [Mining and Allied Machinery Corporation] factory in Durgapur. A CPI(M) leader of Panchla in Howrah district was injured when Congress(I) men attacked a CPI(M) procession and tried to force open some shops.

Despite the violence in Kerala, the CPI(M) described the bandh a "complete success", with only the Cochin shipyard reporting some attendance.

The success of the bandh in Maharashtra had been a big question mark, with the State unit of the BJP joining the Shiv Sena in staying away from it. Despite that, a member of the National Front secretariat, Mr P. Upendra, claimed that no buses or taxis had plied in Bombay and shops and factories had been closed. The CPI(M) reported that attendance in Union and State Government offices was less than normal, there were minor clashes with Congress(I) workers and several arrests. It also said that all except two large factories in Pune were reported closed.

In Bihar, Mr Upendra said, there had been "over 100,000 arrests," including those of senior leaders of the Janata Dal, BJP, CPI, CPI(M) and the Indian People's Front. Despite that, he claimed, the bandh was successful in Patna, Muzaffarpur, Gaya, Ranchi, Jamshedpur and Dhanbad. He said there were "several" lathi-charges in Patna. The CPI(M) reported that the Congress(I) "mobilized anti-social elements and were forcing shopkeepers to open their shops. Despite this, shops remained closed all over the State. The industrial belt also remained closed, with 80 percent of the collieries shut".

Information reaching the National Front from Punjab indicated that the bandh had been total in Amritsar, Jalandhar, Ludhiana, Firozepur, Bhatinda and Patiala, Mr Upendra said. He said industrial establishments, markets and educational institutions were closed and buses did not ply.

Mr Biju Patniak had telephones to say banks were closed all over Orissa, Mr V. P. Singh said. Mr Upendra claimed the bandh had been total in Bhubaneswar, Puri, Cuttack, Balasore and Sundergarh. The CPI(M) reported that all markets were closed, public transport was off the road, the industrial strike was complete and trains were stopped at Bhubaneswar.

In Rajasthan, Mr Upendra said, the bandh was total in Jaipur, Jodhpur, Udaipur, Ajmer, Bikander and Bharatpur. He had received reports of lathi-charges from Jaipur, Jodhpur, Ajmer and Beawar. He added that the bandh had been total in Gujarat, Haryana and Himachal Pradesh. He had also received a report that the bandh was successful in Bhopal.

In U.P., Mr V. P. Singh said, trains were stopped in Allahabad and the bandh was total in Lucknow. The CPI(M) said industrial establishments were closed in Kanpur and Saharanpur.

Both the National Front and CPI(M) reported that the bandh was total in Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh. Despite earlier misgivings, till the afternoon no report of violence came in from Tamil Nadu. In Vijayawada, however, some Congress(I) men attacked CPI(M) workers, its central committee reported.

Paper Reports Developments in Satellite Technology

Space Chairman Interviewed

46001018 Madras *THE HINDU* in English
8 Sep 89 p 10

[Text] Madras, Sept 7—The third flight of the Augmented Satellite Launch Vehicle (ASLV) from Sriharikota is expected to take place "in the next 12 months," according to Dr U. R. Rao, chairman, Indian Space Research Organisation [ISRO].

In an interview to *THE HINDU* here, he said the ASLV flight would undergo modifications to improve its controllability. The second developmental mission to ASLV, which took place on July 13, 1988, failed because the control of the vehicles was lost. "We had severe winds last time and the strap-on booster motors worked one second less than specified. Basically, the control has to take care of such things in a solid engine unlike a liquid engine which cannot be cut off at the right time. However, the controls were not strong enough. We have to improve the control margins. We expect the flight in the next 12 months," he said.

PSLV flight: The Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle (PSLV) flight would take place in the beginning of 1991. Some of the technological problems with regard to launching the gigantic PSLV had been solved. It will launch a 1,000-kg remote-sensing satellite. "We will have a major test in Sriharikota in a month or so. It will be the last static firing of the 125-tonne solid propellants of PSLV's first stage. We have solved the problems of casting and curing of the propellants. Now the ground test of the first stage is awaited."

The second, third and fourth stages have been successfully tested a number of times. "If the first stage goes through next month, we will progress very fast," he said.

On whether ISRO planned to send an Indian cosmonaut to the Soviet Mir space station, he said there were no such plans. But India would conduct scientific and application experiments on board Mir. "We are talking about it because the cost will be less. But right now, all attention is on ASLV, PSLV and the second generation INSAT."

Asked what kind of experiments would be conducted on board Mir, he said, "Some of these things need to be firmed up. It is a long-time programme."

INSAT programme: The second-generation INSAT satellites were under production at the ISRO satellite centre, Bangalore. They would be heavier than the first generation INSAT. The first generation consisted of 1A, 1B, 1C and 1D. All of them were made by Ford Aerospace and Communication Corporation, the U.S. But the second generation would be made in India, he declared.

He said INSAT-1D would be launched between March and June next year. Its launch from Cape Canaveral was postponed some months ago after a crane-hook damaged the satellite when it was being mated with the Delta vehicle.

Dr Rao said the antenna of the INSAT-1D was damaged in the incident. "After the antenna comes, the satellite has to go through a series of tests. They cannot be compromised. Even if you change a screw, the spacecraft has to be tested. After the arrival of the antenna, its pattern has to be tested because it has to radiate towards India. It has to be made exactly like the previous one. You cannot have somebody (some other country) objecting that it is pointing towards them. The carbon-paper antenna takes time to make. Otherwise, the satellite is all ready. Six of the 12 C-bend transponders are fed by this antenna. The most optimistic date for launching will be March and the most pessimistic is June," Mr Rao said.

Know-How From Britain

46001018 Madras *THE HINDU* in English
9 Sep 89 p 10

[Text] Bangalore, Sept 8—The Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) has sought transfer of technology with regard to the pressurant helium tanks which from

part of the liquid propulsion system in satellites, from the British Aerospace Systems and Equipment (BASE) for its INSAT-II series of satellites. The tanks are usually spherical and are made of titanium metal or titanium alloys which carry helium under pressure. These are connected to the liquid oxidizer and fuel tanks through pressure valves. The pushing action on the oxidizer and fuel is achieved by a controlled release of helium into the respective tanks.

The technology is a specialised one and the British company, which was given the contract by the ISRO to supply six such tanks for the initial phase of the INSAT-II spacecraft project is one of the few companies engaged in the field. The officials of the company were here recently when technology transfer was discussed. It is learnt that the BASE is, in principle agreeable to the proposal, but it has to obtain clearance from the seven-nation embargo on missile related technologies.

Second generation: The INSAT-II series constitutes the second generation of the INSAT satellites to be entirely designed and built in the country. Before INSAT-II comes into the operational phase two "spaceworthy" test spacecraft (TS), at a sanctioned cost of Rs 403.8 crores, including the launch costs, are to be fabricated to demonstrate and test the indigenous design. The INSAT-II (TS) will be identical in configuration as well as service capabilities to the INSAT-II operational satellites.

Originally the helium pressurant tanks, two of which will be used in each INSAT-II satellite, were to be fabricated indigenously. The indigenous design was based on titanium alloy tanks with Kevlar windings to give it strength to withstand the high pressure of helium inside. However, this did not prove successful because it was found that the tank became heavy. Weight considerations being critical—the satellite is designed to weigh about 1900 kg at lift-off and 860 kg in orbit—it was decided to go in for imported ones.

An American firm was identified first, but the company refused to comply with the request for fabricating a demonstrator tank first, with the ISRO specifications, before firm orders would be placed with it. The British firm, on the other hand, agreed to this condition and recently carried out the demonstrator project successfully. The order for six tanks is worth \$500,000. The deliveries are expected to be completed during 1989—in time for the launch of the first Insat-II (TS), which has been signed for between October 1, 1990 and September 30, 1991 with Arianespace.

Unrealistic: It may, however, be remarked here that this committed launch date is highly unrealistic because even the structural model (SM) and electrical thermal model (ETM), that precede the actual flight model (FM), have not yet been completed for the test spacecraft. Nominally, these exercises take about two years for complete validation. IN this case, in fact, the situation has been compounded by a mishap on the SM around the same time as the INSAT-ID accident in the U.S.

Like INSAT-I, INSAT-II will also be a multipurpose spacecraft with enhanced capabilities. In order to meet the additional requirements, based on 15 percent per annum growth rate of services which it is intended to provide the satellite will include some new features designed to exploit the so-called "extended C-band" apart from making use of the normal C-band transponders.

The normal C-band range is in the downlink with a corresponding uplink. The extended range will include the upper portion 4.5-4.8 GHZ of the C-band as well for the downlink (with the corresponding uplink). With the usual 40 MHZ bandwidth for each transponder this can accommodate an additional six C-band transponders.

The allocation of this C-band range for civilian satellites was made only recently in 1983 by the international authority concerned and INSAT-II will be the first satellite to have the opportunity of using these additional frequencies.

Papers Report, Comment on Eighth Plan Formulation

Draft Approach Approved

46001015 Calcutta THE TELEGRAPH
in English 29 Aug 89 p 8

[Text] New Delhi, Aug 28—The draft approach to the Eighth Plan will aim at a moderate six percent rate of growth of GDP [gross domestic product] per annum. This was approved today by the full meeting of the Planning Commission chaired by the Prime Minister, Mr Rajiv Gandhi.

The six percent growth rate which is now finally approved after much acrimony among the Planning Commission members is the highest ever growth rate adopted by any of the previous five year plans. The public sector outlay would be in the region of Rs 350,000 crores at 1989-90 prices compared to Rs 180,000 crores finalised at the beginning of the Seventh Plan.

Providing adequate work opportunities, food, clothing, shelter, education and health care, specially to weaker and vulnerable sections of the masses are the main objectives of the Eighth Plan. The draft Eighth Plan which was "Generally Approved," today by the planning commission will receive the final stamp of approval when placed before the Union cabinet sometime next month.

The full meeting also discussed the savings rate, exports and import, government budgeting, efficient use of capital etc.

The targets set for Eighth Plan the include bringing down the population below the poverty line by another 10 percent. [sentence as published] The Planning Commission expects the poverty ratio at 28 to 30 percent by the

end of Seventh Plan and this would be brought down to 18 to 20 percent by the end of the Eighth Plan.

The other targets are:

- Raising the employment growth from the present level of 3 percent per annum. This would be done by building on the experience of Jawahar Rojgar Yojana. Explicit attention would be paid to problems of urban employment.
- Ensuring annual average foodgrain availability at 195 kg per person by the terminal year of the Eighth Plan. At present this is 175 kg per person per year.
- Facilities for universalisation of elementary education, eradication of illiteracy in working age population.
- Supply clean drinking water for all and contain communicable diseases with special emphasis on development of women, children and other vulnerable groups.
- Commitment to self reliance and modernisation through "Purposeful Use" of science and technology. Ecological and environmental safeguards would be inbuilt into every major project.

The government would make an appropriate policy changes implement these targets.

Further Details Given

46001015 New Delhi PATRIOT in English
29 Aug 89 p 1

[Text] The full-meeting of the Planning Commission on Monday endorsed a six percent growth rate as envisaged by the approach paper to the Eighth Plan with the public sector outlay being put at Rs 3,50,000 crore.

The approach paper to be presented to the Union Cabinet next month aims at bringing down the percentage of population below the poverty line by 10 percent during the Eighth Plan.

Also, the paper seeks to raise employment opportunities by three percent annually; exports by 12 percent per year in volume forms; and reduce the incremental capital output ratio (ICOR) further from the present 4.3.

Initiating the discussion, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi who is also the Chairman laid particular emphasis on the need to step up the growth rate through the better management and efficiency.

Later, briefing newsmen a Commission spokesman said, the approach paper envisaged that the next plan would build on strength and resilience of the Indian economy and aim at lifting it to a faster growth rate.

The public sector outlay of Rs 350,000 crore is based on the 1989-90 prices as against Rs 181,000 crore during the Seventh Plan which was based on 1984-85 price line.

Within the last five years, according to some of the senior Commission officials, the price line has moved up by nearly 35 percent. Thus, it is apparent that the actual

layout for the public sector is not really double that of the Seventh Plan in actual fiscal terms. Even then, they emphasise, that the public sector would continue to play a dominant role in the country's economy as is clear from the allocation made towards it.

By the terminal year of the next plan (1990-95), the spokesman added, that 195 kg of foodgrains per year per person would be made available as against current 175 kg.

Monday's Planning Commission full meeting puts at rest the controversy over the growth rate. Some members had wanted it higher while others were equally opposed to a growth rate and had at times aired their views publicly also.

Special emphasis will be laid on development of women, children and other vulnerable groups.

People's involvement and decentralisation have acquired high priority following the move to revitalise panchayati raj and nagarpalika institutions, the spokesman said.

Seven Cabinet ministers of Planning, Finance, Energy, Agriculture, Justice, environment and the minister of State for Planning were present besides the full time members. They are: Professor M. G. K. Menon, Mr Raja Chelliah, Mr Hitan Bhaia, Mr Abid Hussain, Mr Y. K. Alagh and Professor P. N. Shrivastav.

Planning Secrecy Scored

46001015 Madras THE HINDU in English
29 Aug 89 p 8

[Editorial: "The Eighth Plan—the Larger Issues"]

[Text] The protagonists of the higher than 6 percent growth rate in the Eighth Plan period had their case strongly buttressed by the growing evidence of the Seventh Plan exceeding the targeted 5 percent. On the face of it, the rise in the GNP [gross national product] of the order of 3.6 percent in 1987-88 (the year of the so called unprecedented drought) and the impressive 9 percent increase last year provide incontrovertible indices of a much stronger growth impulse in the economy than has ever been achieved in the past. This combined with the obvious need to make the economy to acquire sufficient strength to counteract the incidence of poverty affecting almost 40 percent of the population seems to demand that the planners had better work for a rate higher than the 6 percent which has guided their approach so far. The process of projecting a higher rate of growth on solid substantive grounds is no doubt an arduous one. Yet, taking the two critical parameters—the savings rate and the efficiency of capital investments measured by the incremental capital output ratio (ICOR)—the plausibility of a 6 percent plus rate of growth appears to have been canvassed with some unusual vigour. But it is difficult to know whether all this has been nothing more than a spirited response to the unfair criticism that the

Planning Commission itself has become a discordant outfit vis-a-vis a Government which claimed that it had no patience with mere incremental approaches to the growth process. For the exercises involved in the formulation of the Approach Paper for the Eighth Plan have been needlessly kept as closely guarded secrets. It has been made out that the operational efficiency in major industries, including critical segments in the infrastructure, has shown significant improvement during the first three years of the Seventh Plan period. Dr Y. K. Alagh, Member of the Planning Commission, has asserted that the claim regarding a declining ICOR is borne out by rising productivity in at least 10 major industries including steel, coal, cement and aluminum. The largely empirical questions bearing upon disparities in ICOR as between agriculture and industry, or between the private sector and the public sector, which have prevailed during the Seventh Plan period, may not go into the decision making matrix of the Planning Commission before the broad contours of the Eighth Plan are drawn up. But it is doubtful whether the postulate currently being emphasised by the Commission that the aggregate ICOR would decline from 4.6 to 4.3 by the end of the current Plan period would bear critical statistical scrutiny. A decline in the ICOR alongside of an improvement in the savings rate, or what could be translated into a condition of increasing rates of new investments accompanied by higher rates of utilisation of capacity, can be easily seen as the strong premise of a higher rate of growth, 6 percent or more. The question, even apart from ICOR, is about the behaviour of savings in the economy. Can an investment rate of 24.9 percent of GDP [gross domestic product] (compared to 23.1 percent projected for the Seventh Plan) be sustained and, if so, what would be the policy implications in terms of the savings rate? Domestic savings as a proportion of GDP are known to have declined from 21.6 percent in 1986-87 to 20.2 percent in 1987-88. Those who advocate a higher rate of growth base their case on the possibility of raising the savings rate to more than 24.1 percent although the Commission itself predicates a 23.3 percent rate as the precondition for a 6 percent rate of growth. Reckoned in terms of what the Ninth Finance Commission described as imminent fiscal collapse—the unmitigated negative balance on current revenue (BCR) in the Union and State budgets—the strategy called for cannot but be inflationary, given the inevitability of an extended resort to indirect taxation. The tenor of the debate on the growth rate has itself been such as to divert attention from the more fundamental qualitative issues about precisely what the next Plan should be aiming at. The fact that a particular growth rate, say 6 percent, could be achieved through more than one route, favourable or otherwise from the standpoint of poverty alleviation, cannot be lost sight of. There is a view that if only the public sector outlay can be channelled to a greater extent to agriculture (including irrigation and rural development) as well as to social services such as education and health and in favour of a vastly expanded wage goods sector, a higher rate of growth can be churned out relative to a given level of investment. Such a belief can

well provide the major building block to a more realistic Plan than the ideas which have so far been put through. Yet that view, if it is to constitute the axiom of the Eighth Plan, will also call for far-ranging strategic adjustments, particularly in the methods of financing the needs of the sprawling public sector enterprises (with the concomitant reorientation in pricing and internal generation of funds). Then there is this long evaded question of prioritising industrial production in terms of the unmet basic needs of the low income segments in the economy (and, if necessary, away from luxury consumption pockets) which must be answered. The oft repeated complaint that each Five Year Plan tends to carry forward the same methodological inadequacies and lapses in implementation of its predecessors can hardly be discounted. How do the experts in the Yojana Bhavan propose to recast their planning model in the light of the much touted resolve to carry out devolution of power and resources to the democratic institutions at the grass-roots? Much more than the intellectual battles about the growth rate (which are undoubtedly caught up with the politics of planning), what calls for serious pragmatic attention of the planners are the issues about fostering a culture of efficiency in the economic system, particularly in the effective use of resources, above all human resources, whether by governments or by the multiplicity of institutional agencies.

Reserve Bank of India Issues 1988-89 Report

46001016 New Delhi *PATRIOT* in English 9 Sep 89 p 9

[Text] Bombay, Sept 8 (UNI)—The Indian economy's performance was "exceptionally good" during fiscal 1988-89 with real gross domestic product (GDP) touching 10 percent growth rate as against 3.6 percent in 1987-88, according to a Reserve Bank of India [RBI] report published on Thursday.

In its annual report for the year ended June 30, 1989, the RBI said the excellent monsoon of 1988 contributed to such a remarkably good macro-economic performance with an estimated record increase of nearly 23 percent in agricultural production in contrast to declines in the previous two years.

Industrial production made a quick recovery with a growth rate of 8.8 percent as against 7.3 percent in 1987-88.

With this growth profile, the central bank of the country expected that the annual average targets including five percent growth rate in real GDP for the Seventh Five Year Plan ending June 1990 would be exceeded.

However, expressing concern over huge budgetary deficits and persistent inflationary pressures on the economy, the RBI felt that the level of fiscal deficits as a proportion of GDP needs to be much lower than what it is now. The attainment of this objective would be greatly facilitated by a substantial reduction of the Centre's revenue deficit which had been rising rapidly to reach Rs 11,030 crore in 1988-89.

Emphasising the need to increase Government saving the RBI said, the rapid growth of revenue deficit was mainly due to dissavings of the Central Government administration which reached Rs 8,602 crore in 1988-89 as compared to Rs 1906 crore in 1984-85 and Rs 266 crore in 1980-81.

As a result, a significant portion of the Government's current expenditure is being financed through large borrowings. As on March this year, external debt was Rs 70,000 crore as against Rs 55,000 crore in March, 1988.

For 1989-90 total interest payments of the Centre were estimated at Rs 17,000 crore which accounted for 27.4 percent of the total revenue expenditure and 44.3 percent of total tax revenue.

According to the revised estimates for 1988-89, the RBI said the Centre's deficit increased slightly to Rs 7,940 crore as against the budgetted deficit of Rs 7,484 crore.

It also observed that there was no improvement in the rate of domestic savings remained at the previous year's level of 21 percent annually.

This was because of the inherent lags between the increase in real income and the rise in savings and due to the existing opposing trends at sectoral levels.

While the savings of the public sector came down from a peak of 4.6 percent of GDP in 1981-82 to about 2.1 percent in 1988-89 the corresponding ratio in private savings rose to 18.9 percent.

Papers Report Changes in State Ministries

Andhra Pradesh

46001023 Madras *THE HINDU* in English
4 Sep 89 p 1

[Text] Hyderabad, Sept 3—The Andhra Pradesh Cabinet was expanded today, with the induction of five Ministers, Dr D. Venkateswara Rao, and Messrs D. Satyanarayana, B. V. Mohan Reddi, Koneru Nageswara Rao and Maradala Ranga Rao—taking its strength to 29. The Governor, Mrs Kumudben Joshi, administered the oath of office and secrecy.

The entire Raj Bhavan Road was closed to traffic for the first time, for today's swearing-in ceremony. Mr Ranga Rao, one of the new Ministers, who was travelling in an autorickshaw with his family, had difficulty in coming to Raj Bhavan, as he had to identify himself to several constables.

On February 8 this year, Mr Rama Rao took the unprecedented step of dismissing his entire Cabinet, on the ground that someone had leaked budget figures to the press. Later he inducted a whole new team of 24. This led to the resignation of five Telugu Desam MLA [Member of Legislative Assemblys], who later formed the Telugu Nadu Party.

The Chief Minister, Mr N. T. Rama Rao, later told newsmen that the Cabinet was expanded mainly to give representation to certain unrepresented districts. The portfolios would be announced in due course.

He was prepared to go in for Assembly elections any time, Mr Rama Rao said, responding to a question whether the Cabinet expansion was a preparatory move. The State Assembly has been convened to meet at 8.30 a.m. on Wednesday.

He had not selected the TDP [Telugu Desam Party] candidate for the Rajya Sabha byelections from Assembly constituency, to fill the vacancy caused by the death of Narsing Naik, Mr Rama Rao told a questioner. "Some suspense should be there". He was not interested in a panel but would select one person. Asked whether the seat was reserved for Girijans, the Chief Minister said Narsing Naik was selected not because he belonged to the Scheduled Tribes but on the basis of merit. Now also a person with merit would be selected as the TDP candidate.

Centre Criticised

Deploping the Central Government for refusing to send additional CRPF [Central Reserve Police Force] companies to Andhra Pradesh to meet naxalite violence, Mr Rama Rao said his Government, has been driven to approaching the neighbouring States for police assistance.

The Chief Minister's observations followed a message from the Union Home Ministry, regretting the inability to make available two battalions to the State for dealing with naxalite activities. The Central forces were already overstretched at present and the extra forces sought were not available for long-term deployment.

At present six companies of CRPF were available in the State. The State Government had earlier written to the Centre to send 12 more companies. Recently, the State Government asked for six more companies, but the Centre expressed its helplessness in this matter. The State Government has since contacted neighbouring States for police assistance and the Chief Secretary has been handling the matter.

Asked whether the Government was contacting Tamil Nadu and other friendly Governments, the Chief Minister said he was contacting all the neighbouring States. When it comes to the security of the country, every State was equal to him. Whenever other States needed help, Andhra Pradesh provided all assistance. When the Centre refused to extend help, there was no way other than seeking the help of neighbouring States.

PTI reports:

Centre Justified

Justifying the Centre's decision while talking to newsmen here later in the day, the Union Industry Ministers, Mr J. Vengala Rao said the State Government

had no right to seek any help from the Centre when the Chief Minister, Mr N. T. Rama Rao, was blaming Congress(I) and the Centre for naxalite violence in the State.

The Chief Minister and the State Home Minister were making baseless allegations against the Congress(I) and the Centre, only to hide their "inefficiency," he said. The Congress(I) would fight the TDP politically and would never indulge in things like disturbing peace and law and order, Mr Vengala Rao said.

Bihar State

46001023 Calcutta THE TELEGRAPH
in English 25 Aug 89 p 1

[Text] Patna, Aug 24—The much-awaited expansion of six-month-old Satyender Narain Sinha ministry was today finalised with the induction of 33 ministers. With this, the number of ministers including the chief minister, rose to 45.

The Governor, Mr Jagannath Pahaida, administered the oath of office and secrecy to the new ministers. Five of them were of Cabinet rank. They are Md. Husain Azad, Sumitra Devi, Arjun Vikram Shah, Prof P. N. Sharma and Mr Rishikesh Tiwari, the last two being new faces. Twenty-one ministers of state and seven deputy ministers also took the oath.

The 21 ministers of state include Mr Kumud Ramjan Jha, Mr Chandan Bagchi, Mr G. S. Ramchander Das, Gayatri Devi, Mr Shyam Sunder Singh Dhiraj, Mr Vijai Shankar Dubey, Mr Thomas Hansda, Md. Isa, Mr Sharad Kumar Jain, Mr Gunanand Jha, Mr O. P. Lal, Mr Girish Narain Mishra, Mr Raghunath Pandey, Mr Kirpanath Pathak, Mr Bishwanath Rishi, Dr Khalid Rashid Saba, Mr Madan Parsad, Mr Dilip Singh, Mr Bhola Singh, Dr Vijai Singh and Mr Brij Kishore Narain Singh.

The deputy ministers are Ms Jyoti, Mr Tirlochi Kalindi, Mr Keshav Mahto Kamlesh, Mr Karan Marandi, Mr Rajender Parsad Singh, Mr Sanjiv Kumar Tony and Md. Shakiluzzaman.

With today's expansion, the three-tier ministry of Mr S. N. Sinha is complete. At least 28 ministers are new faces. Three tribals, four minorities and three women were given representation. The portfolios among the new ministers will be allocated tomorrow.

The oath-taking ceremony was attended by the chief minister, the state PCC(I) [Pradesh Congress Committee (India)] president Dr Jagannath Mishra, the Chief Justice of Patna High Court, the state Speaker, Mr Hidayatullah Khan, the chairman of the state Legislative Council, Mr Umeshwar Prasad Verma, and a large number of legislators, and civil and police officials. The [words indistinct] of Raj Bhavan was packed and hundreds of people gathered outside with garlands.

Assam Chief Minister: Delhi Incites Troubles in State

46001012 New Delhi PATRIOT in English
30 Aug 89 p 5

[Interview with Assam Chief Minister Prafulla Kumar Mahanta's. First three paragraphs are introduction by PATRIOT.]

[Text] Even after the first round of tripartite talks on the Bodo issue, Assam Chief Minister Prafulla Kumar Mahanta's suspicion over the role of Central agencies in the Bodo agitation exists still. The Prime Minister's unusual silence even after he received the CM's letter has deepened his suspicion.

The Home Minister or his deputy are not competent to answer his queries about RAW [Research and Analysis Wing (Intelligence Agency)], according to Mr Mahanta. He is, however, tight-lipped about the outcome of the Bodo talks with his government and the Centre. "Let us see, the talks have only just begun", is all that he ventures to say about the problem.

In a joint interview to PATRIOT, BBC and a Calcutta daily, the Chief Minister answered questions on peace in the State and in his party—which he claims is more democratic than others.

[PATRIOT] Mr Chief Minister, is there any move to topple the Asom Gana Parishad Government?

[Mahanta] You probably know that the Congress wants to displace the Assam Government. But, we are not bothered about it.

[PATRIOT] In what way are they trying to do so? Any concrete proof?

[Mahanta] They're doing it by different means—sometimes by passing on disinformation, sometimes through disturbing the Government.

[PATRIOT] Is it a fact that the Central Agencies are organising antinational elements in collusion with the Congress?

[Mahanta] Yes, I have also written to the Prime Minister to clarify it, but I have not received any reply as yet.

[PATRIOT] Is it RAW or any other agency?

[Mahanta] It could be RAW or SSB [Special Services Bureau].

[PATRIOT] Do you have any evidence that RAW has been inciting the Bodos?

[Mahanta] We have a letter that a RAW employees forum has written to the Prime Minister.

[PATRIOT] Was it intercepted or received?

[Mahanta] Somebody sent it to us—you can call it our own source or any other, but we collected it.

[PATRIOT] You wrote to the Prime Minister on that basis—when was it?

[Mahanta] Well, about 15 or 16 days ago.

[PATRIOT] What did you write in that letter?

[Mahanta] I don't want to disclose that right now.

[PATRIOT] Was the proof very incriminating?

[Mahanta] I think so.

[PATRIOT] But a few days ago, Minister of State for Home Santosh Mohan Dev told the press that "the Assam Chief Minister has written a letter to the PM, but I can show you there is no basis in it".

[Mahanta] He is not the competent authority to give a reply to the letter. The Home Minister cannot reply on what RAW is doing. Only the Prime Minister and Cabinet secretary can reply.

[PATRIOT] What are you going to do with the Bodos—give them some autonomy...?

[Mahanta] Let us see. The talks have begun only yesterday.

[PATRIOT] What are you contemplating? There must be something at the back of your minds on the basis of which you have come for talks.

[Mahanta] It is the duty of the Government to negotiate with the people if they have some demands. Some demands may be genuine, some may not be.

[PATRIOT] But if you succumb to the Bodos, you'll have other tribes coming in...

[Mahanta] There are more than 19 tribes. Therefore, we suggested to the Centre you should start talks with Bodos. Suppose they are ready to give some concessions to the Bodos tomorrow, other people will come forward—Awangs and Mishings.

[PATRIOT] Yesterday some people came—

[Mahanta] Yes, they joined them in the talks and later submitted a memorandum to me asking for a Nilachal State.

[PATRIOT] Mrs Bajpai suggested formation of a committee—what was it for?

[Mahanta] To discuss the welfare of tribals.

[PATRIOT] What role is Mr Santosh Mohan Deb playing?

[Mahanta] You all know, I don't want to say anything for or against him.

[PATRIOT] So his role is positive?

[Mahanta] It may be positive, it may be negative.

[PATRIOT] Is he inciting violence in the State?

[Mahanta] He keeps close touch with the All Bodo Students Union (ABSU) there.

[PATRIOT] What about the Cachar area?

[Mahanta] It is alright, I think.

[PATRIOT] What about the bigger problem you have been facing in the last 10 or 12 years: (The electoral rolls issue)?

[Mahanta] (laughs): Not fulfilled properly. The revision of electoral rolls is going on the basis of the Assam Accord—on the 1966 roll and before that also.

[PATRIOT] When are you going to finish the revision—in time for the elections?

[Mahanta] Maybe in October, let us see. As of now, it is going on satisfactorily.

[PATRIOT] There is apprehension in the minds of minorities that after revision of electoral rolls, there might be evictions from the State.

[Mahanta] That is not correct. Supposing my name does not appear in the 1966 rolls, I'll have to give a clarification that I was not eligible to vote then, but my parents' name was there. Then my name will be included.

[PATRIOT] Since your party came to power, how many people have been evicted?

[Mahanta] About 9,000 illegal immigrants—I do not want to mention their nationality.

[PATRIOT] There is a move from within your party to destabilise the leadership.

[Mahanta] I don't think it is correct.

[PATRIOT] Is anything being done to counter it?

[Mahanta] In any political party, some people may like this or that. We are a more democratic party than others. We can discuss it in our party meetings—there is no problem.

Meeting Discusses Facilities for Astrophysical Studies

46001021 Madras THE HINDU in English
4 Sep 89 p 4

[Text] Bangalore, Sept 3—Training and manpower development are likely to be the most frustrating parts of the Giant Metrewave Radio Telescope (GMRT), according to the Project Director, Prof Govind Swarup, of the Tata Institute of Fundamental Research (TIFR). Prof Swarup made this observation at a two-day meeting held here last week to discuss the proposals for major investments for existing facilities or for setting up major investments for existing facilities or for setting up major facilities in astronomy and astrophysics during the

Eighth Plan. The meeting had been organised by the Department of Science and Technology (DST).

Largest facility: The GMRT project, at an estimated cost of Rs 35 crores, was approved by the Government in January 1987 to be executed by 1992 during the Seventh and Eighth Plans. The telescope is being set up by the TIFR about 80 km north of Pune as a national facility operating under the auspices of the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE). With a total effective area of about 35,000 sq. metres the GMRT will be the largest facility in the world for astronomical research in the metre and decimetre wave bands (equivalent 38 to 1420 megahertz frequency) of the electromagnetic spectrum.

Equipped with 344 fully steerable parabolic dishes of 45 metre diameter each, the results from the GMRT are expected to fill a longstanding gap in astrophysical studies of galactic and extra galactic radio sources resulting from the lack of a large synthesis telescope operating in this wavelength region. Sixteen of the antennae will be placed in a compact central array of about one sq. km. area with the other 18 along the three arms of a Y-shaped configuration.

Novel design: The dishes are based on a novel design, called SMART, that uses rope trusses placed between 16 parabolic frames to support a reflecting surface made of stainless steel wire mesh. The first dish is expected to be ready by July 1990 and subsequently one antenna will be completed each month. A prototype for the dish alone has already been fabricated at Ooty. The electronics system is under development, Prof Swarup said. The GMRT is being developed entirely indigenously.

By March 1993, Prof Swarup expects the telescope to be completed in all respects, which includes the development of a parallel processing system with supercomputing capabilities upto at least 250 million floating point operations per seconds (mflops), necessary for the synthesis, analysis and image processing of data gathered from the network of antennae.

C-DoT to develop computer: The computer is being developed by the Centre for the Development of Telematics (C-DoT) in association with the TIFR and the Raman Research Institute (RRI), Bangalore. However, he expected that partial astronomical observations would be possible by mid-1991 itself and detailed observations by 1992 end. About Rs 7 crores has already been expended and, though an additional Rs 5 crores or so had requested for during this Plan itself, it is learnt that the project might end up spending an additional Rs 3 crores during the rest of the Plan period leaving about Rs 235 crores to be carried over for the Eighth Plan.

The GNRT will form part of the National Centre for Radio-astronomy and Astrophysics (NCRA) and the TIFR and will work closely with the newly established Inter-University Centre for Astronomy and Astrophysics (IUCAA) at Pune. The IUCAA, in association with the NCRA, expects to spawn local centres and consortia of universities during the Eighth Plan so that experimental

facilities will be generated in regional centres across India, permitting optimum interactions among these, the IUCAA and the NCRA, the GMRT in particular.

PAKISTAN

Nasrullah Urges Bhutto To Defuse Center-Provinces Problems

46000008c Karachi DAWN in English
11 Sep 89 pp 1, 10

[Article by Nisar Osmani]

[Text] Lahore, Sept 10: Veteran political leader and PDP [Pakistan Democratic Party] President, Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan, is of the considered opinion that Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto alone can, and should take an initiative to defuse the present state of confrontation between the Center and provinces which is taking the national politics to the point of no return.

He believes that however well-meaning the conciliation efforts of the Federal Minister. Mr Iftikhar Gilani, might be, an initiative from the Prime Minister, whose office demands some bold steps, can provide a way out of the present deadlock.

Talking to the "Dawn" on Sunday, he said the Federal Government could take a few steps to normalize the situation and pave the way for negotiations across the table. For instance, it could revise its policies on the questions of the People's Programme and provision of jobs through the Placement Bureau. In all fairness to everybody, he said, the present policy of associating only party workers and leaders with the development programme should be discarded and elected legislators, irrespective of their party affiliation, should be taken into confidence to draw plans for the development of their respective area. Similarly, jobs should not be provided on the basis of loyalty to a party.

The government should not allow an impression to be created that members of other parties were second class citizens.

To resolve the question of allocation of funds, he suggested that if the time was not ripe for a meeting of the Council of Common Interests, an early meeting of the National Economic Council [NEC] should be convened. He was confident that a gesture from the Center would succeed, but if the leaders of provincial governments failed to respond to public opinion would take due note of it and read accordingly.

He was of the opinion that the present climate of confrontation was unfavorable not only for the political parties involved, but it also threatened the very future of democracy, and, consequently of national integrity. The present situation was closer to tribal rivalry rather than healthy political competition. If not checked well in time, it was bound to lead to an unending chain of retaliatory actions.

He noted that an understanding emerging from the negotiating table would be in everybody's interest. It would put an end to the reprehensive practice of black-mailing the governments by the legislators and exterminate horse trading in the houses but, above all, it would restore the people's respect for, and confidence in democratic institutions.

Reiterating his stand, he said the Prime Minister should convene a meeting of the NEC and if the representatives of the provinces failed to turn up, everybody would hold them responsible for the confrontation. He was of the view that the emergence of an understanding should pose no problem as there were no basic differences between the two sides, particularly on the questions of foreign policy and economic reforms.

He opposed mid-term elections at this stage as they would only aggravate the existing acrimony and might, in fact, lead to total disaster.

The Nawabzada also criticized the practice of gathering people from various parts of the country at rallies just for a "show of strength". Politics, which was already an expensive affair, would fall into the hands of people who were engaged in heroin trade or were getting money from foreign sources. A party which had limited resources but was committed to principles would not be able to survive, the Nawabzada concluded.

Pro-Zia Sentiment Said Threat to PPP

46560070a Karachi JASARAT in Urdu 25 Aug 89 p 1

[Article by Sayyed Mohammad Ahmad: "First Anniversary of Ziaul Haq: There Is a Shift in Public Temperament"]

[Text] The zeal and emotion that the people showed on the occasion of Ziaul Haq's first death anniversary can be interpreted as silent criticism of the present government and its policies. About four lakh [400,000] people gathered at the last resting place of Ziaul Haq in the Faseel Masjid in Islamabad on 17 August. A majority of those present were young people. The people had travelled from all over the country to participate in this ceremony. Mian Nawaz Sharif, the prominent opposition leader, was the focus of everyone's attention. According to a news source, Afghan Mujahidin were not permitted to attend this ceremony by the government. Armed forces were stationed at the Mujahidin camps in Peshawar and Attock bridge. Section 144 was enforced in Islamabad. The family of the late president were served notices by the income tax department for an audit the same day. Buses and trucks coming to Islamabad were searched on the day before the anniversary. The government had warned the organizers of the anniversary to organize this as a religious ceremony and not as a political rally. The late president's sons had announced that this was just a religious ceremony.

President Mohammad Ziaul Haq was killed in an airplane crash while returning from Bahawalpur to Islamabad on 17 August 1988 at about 4 pm. About three lakh [300,000] people participated in his funeral procession, but there were only about 40,000 people at his Chehlum [40th day ceremony]. The present government should wake up at this huge gathering 1 year after his death. It should think about the reason why the people had to demonstrate their lack of faith in this government. The present government came to power because of foreign pressure, even though it had a negligible majority in the National Assembly. The military also decided to help the bud of democracy grow. The Pakistan People's Party [PPP], however, followed its old policy of not sharing power with anyone and never accepted the Islamic Jamhoori Ittehad [IJI] government in Punjab. The purpose of breaking the Baluchistan assembly was to have a reelection there. According to some observers, former Punjab governor Makhdum Sajjad Hussain Qureshi was instructed not to let Mian Nawaz Sharif take the oath for chief ministership. He did not agree to it, and he was transferred.

Nawab Mohammad Akbar Khan Bagti was appointed chief minister in Baluchistan, after the assembly was reinstated. He later had a meeting with the prime minister. Nothing resulted from this meeting or the one after it. Nawab Bagti, in association with Mian Nawaz Sharif, filed a petition to president Ghulam Ishaq Khan asking him to call a meeting of the Council of Common Concerns to discuss mutual interests.

In Sarhad, the National Awami Party [NAP], fed up with the PPP's habit of breaking promises, has cancelled its alliance with the PPP. The Sherpao cabinet is on its last legs, according to some newspapers. Aftab Sherpao is trying to prolong his hold on his shaky seat of power by giving out ministerships.

In Sindh, where the opposition has only a few seats and where the PPP can pass any law that it likes, the PPP and its ally Muhajir Qaumi Movement [MQM] are not happy with each other. Rarely a day passes without the parties issuing statements against each other. Only a few unimportant parts of the agreement made with the MQM were followed up by the PPP. According to observers, the law and order situation in Sindh is very bad. Robberies are common, and people are being kidnapped. According to some sources, harassed people are leaving their homes and jobs and moving to the cities.

Pakistan's economy has worsened. Industrialists and investors have stopped starting new industries and investments, as they are not protected by the government. Appeals to protect businessmen were published in the newspapers recently. Inflation is rampant, and the new taxes, imposed in the new budget presented by the PPP government, are unbearable to the industry.

This government, which calls itself the supporter of freedom of the press and media, has forgotten the promises it made to help the press when it took power. It

established an information agency that gives all government advertisements to its favorite newspapers. A new duty of 3,000 rupees a ton on newsprint has been levied to destroy small newspapers. Party faithfuls have been appointed to all government information agencies. The government arrests a journalist whenever it wants. The arrest of Zahid Malik, editor of THE PAKISTAN OBSERVER and the weekly HURMAT is an example of this practice.

Jobs are being distributed by the Placement Bureau (being called the Displacement Bureau now) to unqualified party faithfuls and favorites. All of this has caused the people to become wary of the PPP government within 1 year. The people had thought that the PPP, instead of repeating its old mistakes, would have learned its lesson, and would win the people's trust by improving their lot. The haphazard politics of the PPP have soiled the silken mask that the PPP wore. According to political observers, the PPP will face Ziaul Haq's disciples in the next elections. The rolling sea of people that attended Ziaul Haq's anniversary clearly indicates that the graph of the PPP's popularity is dropping fast.

Role of Sindh National Alliance Condemned

46560070b Karachi JASARAT in Urdu 27 Aug 89 p 3

[Editorial: "What is Sindh National Alliance?"]

[Text] The Sindh National Alliance [SNA] is one of the remnants of the Zia era in Sindh. It is supported by the Pakistan People's Party [PPP]. The SNA was formed during the previous government under its "divide and rule" policy. The SNA, the Muhajir Qaumi Movement [MQM], and the Pakhtoon and Punjabi coalitions were created to counter and destroy the influence of the national political parties. Of these, the MQM has become an ally of the PPP, after going through the election process. The SNA neither had the courage to accept the challenge of running for the elections, nor did it accepted the popularity of the PPP in Sindh. This party is trying to use the fire of prejudice and hatred to destroy democracy and Benazir's government. It maintains secret contacts for this purpose, and has emerged with its full powers. The recent SNA meeting in Hyderabad, and the statements issued by its leaders, support this assumption. It is surprising, however, that the PPP is avoiding a confrontation with this party, which is trying to bring a martial law regime by working with [foreign] intelligence agencies and spreading prejudice. Not only does this group have full freedom, but it also has the support of the PPP. It is important that the PPP leaders, especially Benazir, tell the people of Sindh openly that the SNA, its factional demands, its coercive activities, and treason by its workers are all part of its efforts to destroy democracy. The SNA is actually acting as a front. This group, allegedly the enemy of non-Sindhis, is actually the enemy of the PPP and its leadership. It is sad to note that the members of the ruling party in Sindh are helping this enemy, directly or indirectly,

because they have also forgotten the federal government and are involved in factional prejudice.

Conspiracy Afoot To Create a Communal Province

46560067 Lahore CHATAN in Urdu

15 Aug 89 pp 29-30

[Article by Fakhar Alam Mujaddadi: "Conspiracy Afoot Under Official Patronage to Turn Northern Areas Into a Communal Province;" paragraph numbering as published.]

[Text] For some time now, there has been renewed discussion in the newspapers of a proposal, sponsored by the leaders of a pro-Iranian communal group from the northern areas, and certain ministers and advisors of the Pakistan government, to the effect that the northern areas be detached from Azad Kashmir and annexed to Pakistan, and by declaring it a province of Pakistan, the local residents be given representation in the national assembly. This is not a unanimous demand from all of the area residents, but rather this demand is only being made by the Shia residents of Gilgat and Baltistan. The federal organization Ahl-e Ahsunnat Aljamiat, which represents most of the area residents, having knowledge of the implications of this proposal and believing it to be a disturbance by anti-nationalists and communalists, has been opposing and denouncing this proposal. That is why all patriotic and pro-Islamic elements of the area also believe it to be a despicable conspiracy of antinational elements. Their sectarian interests have blinded these elements so much that they do not remember the geographical situation and the constitutional and political background to Gilgat and Baltistan and the controversial status of Jammu and Kashmir state, of which this province has always been a part. They do not realize that, by this proposal, they are, on an international level, hurting the Kashmiris' 40-year demand for plebiscite and self-determination, and that they are damaging Pakistani ideology. And supposing that they are doing so having understood its implications, then it is clear that they are bent upon sacrificing the country's broad interests for the sake of their sectarian interests. How can we bring it home to them that the surrounding imperialist forces have made them their agents in order to maintain control over this sensitive area, and that they have been blinded by prejudice and hatred to such an extent that they are incapable of discerning and discriminating.

Certain partisan writers, in the national newspapers and magazines, are also mocking history and are trying to mislead public opinion by stating that Gilgat and Baltistan were never a part of Jammu and Kashmir. Or that, even according to the 1846 Amritsar agreement, these areas remained free of Dogra control. Or that the Kashmir rulers, on several occasions, requested permission from the British government to acquire control over the Northern areas but this was denied.

In view of this misleading propaganda campaign, it becomes necessary to shed light on the historical background to the geographical, constitutional, and political status of Gilgat and Baltistan, so that this conspiracy may not succeed and the integrity, unity, and freedom of our beloved country may not fall victim to the enemies' unholy designs and schemes.

In every period of history, Gilgat and Baltistan, and the connected areas, always formed part of Kashmir state. It is absurd to believe that the small and dispersed population of this area ever dared to raise its head against the supreme authority of Kashmir state. In the time of the Afghan Sultans, the Wali and Mughal period, as a rule, Kashmir state, including the northern areas, was ruled from Delhi. And when the British acquired control over India and the Sikhs were defeated, the British, according to the 1846 Amritsar agreement, transferred control of all the hilly regions of Kashmir, including all the independent areas lying between the eastern bank of the river Sindh and the western bank of the river Ravi, to the last Sikh ruler, Gulab Singh, and his descendants, and recognized their free and independent status.

2. In 1848, after the partition, Pakistan's foreign minister, in a United Nations debate over the Kashmir issue, described Gilgat as part of Azad Kashmir.

3. Further confirmation of this can be seen in the Pakistan-China Final agreement, in section 6 of which, it has been made clear that consequent upon resolution of the Kashmir issue between India and Pakistan, the controlling power will once again hold talks with China regarding demarcation of the Kashmir boundary. This clarifies the fact that, in the north, Kashmir's border touches China. On constitutional and legal grounds, control of this area should have been transferred to Azad Kashmir state. But according to the 1948 Karachi agreement, it was decided between two parties, the government of Pakistan and the government of Azad Kashmir, that the administrative structure of the British days should be retained in this area of Azad Kashmir. Therefore, as long as the Kashmir issue is not resolved by the United Nations, this area, under the terms of the agreement, is temporarily under the administrative control of the Pakistani government.

We also learn from the history of this area that most of Gilgat's population consisted of Alsana people, while Agha Khan's Ismailis were in a majority in the principalities of Hunza and Nagar. During the Muslim period, they had migrated from Iran and settled in these far flung and barren hilly areas. When the Nur Bakshi movement began in Kashmir, it became popular in Gilgat and Baltistan but, despite this, the local majority population was not affected by this change, and this social condition continued until the partition of India. But immediately following the formation of Pakistan, a significant change was noticeable. In former times, the Ismailis of Hunza and Nagar were not issued state subject certificates in Gilgat agency. As a result of this, they were not in a position to settle and buy property in Gilgat agency. But

because Sir Aqa Khan and his Ismaili followers had a lot of influence in the Pakistani government, this restriction became inoperative and the Ismailis got an opportunity to flourish in all of these areas. Because of their efforts, the minority community in the area received encouragement. In Hunza and Nagar, because of Karim Agha Khan's various schemes for rural and economic progress, the condition of a state within a state was established. And because the holdings of these Ismaelis touch the Afghan strip of Dakhan in the north, tyrant Russia has fully armed the Ismaeli residents of this area so that, in a time of need, Russia may, by inciting the Dakhani Ismaelis and by including Pakistan's border Ismaelis, form an independent Ismaeli state. Evidence of this conspiracy can be found in news published in the national papers, NAWA-I-WAQT of December 1988 and JANG of 31 January 1989.

On the other hand, the process of personal and moral help for the Ismaelis of Gilgat and Baltistan, through Iran and its Pakistani agents, is in full swing. A look at the census figures provides us with an idea of their growing influence in local administration. In the 1974 census, the population of Gilgat and Baltistan agency was 500,000 but in the 1984 census, through a conspiracy, this population grew by 60 percent to 800,000, and this increase would have been reflected in the population of only one community. Iranian literature, arms, and material assistance has brought the local minority to a position of making plans for the creation of an independent Ismaeli state in the area. They have begun this with a demand for a separate province. India's role can in no way be overlooked in this international conspiracy. India's occupation of Pakistan's territory, Siya Chin, has put muscle into the local Ismaeli residents' separatist movement. Thus encouraged, this antinational section has started challenging the Pakistani government by saying, we are far closer to India than to Islamabad and when the time comes, the great India will come to our aid. What it means is that, while there is an Iranian and Russian hand behind this conspiracy, the role of India is also clearly visible, that by inciting the local population against Pakistan, it wants to realize its expansionist designs in the region. India was dreaming of crossing the Siya Chin glacier and cutting the Silk Route, thus joining its ally Russia in Dakhan, in order to paralyze Pakistan and surround China, but it could not advance in Siya Chin and this dream could not materialize.

Because of an agreement on a control line in Siya Chin, as a consequence of the Pakistani government's peaceful foreign policy, India will get an opportunity to bury the Kashmir issue for ever and ever and to resolve the issue on the basis of a control line allowing each party to keep whatever areas are under its occupation. There is an overwhelming impression that perhaps an agreement between the two parties on the question of a control line already exists. Proof of this can also be found in that a proposal to detach Gilgat and Baltistan in the northern areas from Azad Kashmir and annex them to Pakistan is

under consideration by our government. This proves that the Kashmir issue has already been long settled on the basis of the Simla agreement. Now all that is needed is the formality of an official announcement.

The president and prime minister of Azad Kashmir have not only opposed the proposal to include the northern areas into Pakistan, but they have instead demanded that this area be handed over to Azad Kashmir so that no conspiracy may mature here. Apart from this, other patriotic political parties, and religious organizations have also rejected this proposal, branding it a conspiracy of the enemy. But the government's mysterious silence gives the appearance that it has made implementation of this proposal a matter of prestige. Under these conditions, it becomes the duty of every patriotic Pakistani, who wants the security of Pakistan's geographical and ideological borders under all circumstances and who wants to expose every conspiracy against Pakistan and Islam, demonstrating mutual harmony and unity, to stand up against this international conspiracy promoted by elements hostile to the country in Azad Kashmir's Northern areas of Gilgit and Baltistan.

- In view of this critical situation Musalmanan-e Ahle-Alsunnat Pakistan (the northern areas) demand that:
- Advisors, connected with the federal cabinet, who in this campaign speak for this communal organization should be kicked out immediately.
- All proposals relating to this, which are under official consideration, should be nipped in the bud with one stroke.

It should be announced that the administration and control of Gilgit and Baltistan by Pakistan's government is on a temporary basis, and that following resolution of the Kashmir issue, this area will be handed over to Azad Kashmir state so that the conspiracy, which is flourishing here at the behest of foreign powers, may be scotched. Otherwise, as a result of the hatred and passion, murders and robberies will run riot here which, by providing India, Russia, and Iran with an excuse for interference in our internal affairs, will confront the government with an extremely serious situation.

Qurban Ali Shah Attacks Zardaris

46000009c Karachi THE MUSLIM
in English 22 Sep 89 pp 1, 6

[Article by Tariq Butt]

[Text] Islamabad, Sept 21: PPP [Pakistan People's Party] "rebel" Qurban Ali Shah (Tharparkar) was on the "war-path" and the target of his incisive attack were the Zardaris, close relatives of the Prime Minister.

He greatly embarrassed the Treasury Benches with a shower of allegations against the husband and father-in-law of the Premier and son-in-law of Hakim Ali Zardari. But he was a lone fighter, complaining "victimization of the worst king." His colleagues from Sindh remained visibly unmoved and did not come to his help.

As he created the rumpus, the Opposition joyfully thumped desks and supported every assertion he made. They did not hide their happiness over the first major split in the ranks of the ruling party and tried to exploit it.

Only Minister Ali Nawaz Shah (Sindh) countered the angry member dubbing him as a "blackmailer and hypocrite." He put up an heroic defence of his party and passed highly obnoxious remarks against the member, which the Speaker expunged.

The Prime Minister was not present in the House and neither was Hakim Ali Zardari. They were away in Karachi in connection with the celebration of the first birthday of Bilawal.

Minister Khawaja Tariq Rahim tried to scuttle the member's efforts to make an issue of his "victimization" and suggested that he should discuss his grievances with him in the Speaker's Chambers. But Qurban Shah rejected the offer saying: "I do not need a plot or permit or want to negotiate a secret deal. Whatever I want to say, I will say in the House."

Khawaja Tariq made another attempt to assuage the member. He said: "Let me talk to the Sindh Chief Minister about your complaints." Qurban Shah said: "I know the Minister has written to the CM [Chief Minister] but to no avail. I can gauge that these efforts will bear no fruit."

He was finally allowed to move his privilege motion. He said: "I have applied for a separate seat along with 10 members from Sindh. I have often ventilated my views on the Sindh situation and given an interview to The Herald where I have expressed these in detail. After these developments, a process of victimization has been started against me to cause me financial loss. Water supply for my lands have been cut off at the behest of Asif Ali Zardari."

The PPP he alleged had not fulfilled the promises it had made during the election campaign in Sindh. "Twenty-two MNA [Member of National Assembly]s including four ministers have signed a memorandum highlighting these promises which has not so far been handed over to the Prime Minister. The government got the clue about it."

Then he levelled serious allegations of corruption against Munawar Ali Talpur, Minister for Irrigation, Sindh, who was son-in-law of Hakim Ali Zardari. These remarks were expunged after Minister Khawaja Tariq objected.

Qurban Shah complained that his Mirpur Khas residence was raided by the police to arrest him on a false charge. "I have them granted relief by the courts about the cutting off of the water supply to my fields, despite the fact that the Sindh Government has challenged every judicial order in a higher court."

"The way I and my relatives are being threatened every day, anyone of us may be kidnapped at any time. Then the conscience of every member of this Assembly should awaken and they should register an FIR. They have

stopped the water supply as was done in Karbala, although I am a Syed. Rana Chandar Singh (MNA) can confirm my assertion because his land has also been affected by the action. (He was not present in the House)," Qurban Shah said.

Here Minister Ali Nawaz Shah interrupted. In a fit of anger, he said: "Now you are trying to become a hero of Sindh. You have acted as an agent of the Pak Army when bullets were being fired in the province (during martial law)."

"I have been jailed for two times during this period. You are the person who is involved in a Rs 30 million scandal in the purchase of palm oil. You are the person who got the release of dacoits in Sindh," Qurban retaliated with a stunning force.

The Minister became more violent and unnerved. He said: "I demand an inquiry into the allegation and will resign if it is proved true. Otherwise, the member should resign. He is a blackmailer and has started making noises after not being given a permit for setting up a sugar mill." Qurban Shah said the language the Minister had used just now was that of a "dadagir" and not of a member of the august House.

Ali Nawaz Shah said: "The member has been raising such complaints since the Ayub regime. He did the same in the previous Bhutto government. And again he did so in the Junejo era, simply to win the sympathy of the PPP and get the party's nomination in the November elections. He has always told lies".

The member wanted to speak in detail, but he was not allowed. Interruptions were frequent. Many Opposition members interceded when he was not granted more time.

Certainly, the situation would have worsened had Meraj Khalid not been in the chair. He acted like a true Speaker who knew how to cool tempers. He rightly gave enough time to the angry Qurban Shah to highlight his grievances, but put his foot down after he started going too far. At the peak of heightened tension, he reserved ruling on the motion, despite the fact that Khawaja Tariq had no objection to its admissibility and referring to the Privileges' Committee.

The loud voice of dissent raised by Qurban Shah for the first time in the House, is food for thought for the ruling party. The "disappointed" members of the PPP have to be given mild and soft treatment, it was suggested in the lobbies.

Ghafoor Opposes Army Deployment Curfew

46000009b Karachi THE MUSLIM in English
23 Sep 89 p 8

[Article by Hussain Mujtaba]

[Text] Hyderabad, Sept 22: Professor Ghafoor Ahmed, Naib Amir Jamat-e-Islami, has advised the government not to call troops and clamp curfew in cities time and

again, because repeated imposition of curfew may lead to martial law in the country again.

He was addressing a news conference at the end of his Sindh tour at a local hotel here today.

The Secretary General of Islami Jamhoori Ittehad [IJI] said, the present Sindh government was facing no threat from the IJI, as the ruling party enjoyed more than one third majority in the province. He said no single member of IJI from Sindh has been elected to National or Provincial Assembly.

Prof Ghafoor said, the Sindh government should face no difficulty in restoring peace in the province.

Expressing his concern over the deteriorating law and order situation in Sindh, he said, the economy of the province is on the verge of collapse.

He said the IJI, will hold a public rally on Oct 6 at Hyderabad.

Earlier, Prof Ghafoor Ahmed visited the city hospitals to inquire about health of victims of Hyderabad incidents and offered Fateha for the killed ones at their homes.

Ishaq Speaks Against Regional Prejudices

46000009a Karachi THE MUSLIM
in English 22 Sep 89 p 1

[Text] Islamabad, Sept 21: President Ghulam Ishaq Khan said Thursday that eschewing of regional, linguistic and group prejudices was the imperative need to reinvigorate the spirit of love and affection and promote national unity and stability.

Speaking at a ceremony, where he was installed as the (10th) Chief Scout of Pakistan, President Ghulam Ishaq Khan said that if the creation of Pakistan was the result of the Muslim unity, its survival and progress also depended upon it. In this connection, he said, the boy scouts could play an effective role in the promotion of national cohesion and spirit of brotherhood in different segments of society. As a matter of fact, they should accord top priority to this task in their programme of action, he stressed.

The President said that the scouts should also wage crusade against tendencies of violence, which had corroding into the vitals of national fibre. There might be diverse causes for violence, but if love for humanity, truthfulness, and spirit of sympathy and subordination of personal interests for the good of others could be promoted, the wounds could be healed and the cancer of hatred could be eradicated. This, he said, was the founding spirit of scouting.

The President noted that the Pakistan Boy Scouts Association was observing the current year as the "year of peace" and said that in this context, a special responsibility devolved upon them to revitalize the concept of

peace in the people, and work for rejuvenation of spirit of conciliation and understanding among the people.

He said that linguistic and regional prejudices were venomous for love and affection and hit the roots of national unity and stability. It was high time, he said, that these tendencies were curbed in the larger national interests.

MQM Calls for Action Against Illegal Allotments

46000008b Karachi DAWN in English 11 Sep 89 p 9

[Text] Karachi, Sept 10: Mr Azim Ahmad Tariq, Chairman of MQM [Muhajir Qaumi Movement] in separate telegrams to the President, Prime Minister, Governor of Sindh and Chief Minister has urged them to take "strict action against those who are responsible" for the sale of plots in Clifton area of the city at throwaway prices.

He also asked them to cancel "immediately" the allotments of the plots in Scheme-5 Clifton where irregularities have been committed by the authorities of the KDA [Karachi Development Authority].

He referred to the allotment of six plots in the said scheme where "irregularities" have been committed. He said due to the allotment of those plots through "cover applicants" KDA had sustained huge losses.

Mr Tariq said these were not the only cases where plots were allotted to the people at throwaway prices. "I believe that many more cases of such nature have not only taken place during the last few months but despite public protest this highly immoral practice is continuing".

Referring to Cause 6 of Sindh Disposal of Plots Ordinance, 1980, he said "plots of over 400 sq yds, should be auctioned".

Referring to the finances of the KDA, he said "funds are provided to the KDA by the Federal Government for the development and betterment of the area and it is therefore necessary that notice for any misuse of these funds by way of favor and malpractice should be taken by the appropriate authority."

JI Leader Says Government 'Looting' Treasury

46000008a Karachi DAWN in English 11 Sep 89 p 5

[Text] Hyderabad, Sept 10: The Naib Amir, Jamati-Islami, Pakistan, Maulana Jan Mohammad Abbasi, has accused the PPP [Pakistan People's Party] government of 'looting' the national exchequer and creating artificial shortage of sugar in the country to reintroduce rationing system for the benefit of PPP 'stalwarts'.

He was speaking at a training camp organized by the Jamat at Dehtha, ten kilometers from here on Sunday.

Commentary Supports Meeting of Council of Common Concerns

46560070c Karachi JASARAT in Urdu 28 Aug 89 p 3

[Editorial: "Why Avoid the Council of Common Concerns?"]

[Text] Following a telephone conversation, Sayyed Ifthikhar Gailani, the federal minister of state affairs, and Punjab's chief minister, Nawaz Sharif, have agreed to hold a meeting at the end of this month. This meeting will be held in Lahore, and the agenda and the date for the first state relations committee will be decided. Efforts will also be made to have Baluchistan's chief minister, Akbar Bagti, attend this meeting, because he had pointed out that the state relations committee does not have any constitutional support, and that this is just a committee formed by the Pakistan People's Party [PPP]. However, the Constitution mentions a council of common concerns of the states. A meeting of this council should be called, but the PPP government is against it. Akbar Bagti is against it, but it is hoped that chief minister Nawaz Sharif and federal minister Ifthikhar Gailani will be able to convince him to participate in the council meeting. This meeting will be successful only if the participants show understanding and moderation. The state relations committee, however, cannot replace the constitution-approved Council of Common Concerns, and the chief ministers of Punjab and Baluchistan are right in demanding its meeting. Why hesitate in calling a meeting of a council that was approved in the Constitution? Even Makhdum Khaliq, a prominent PPP leader, has demanded that a meeting of the state relations committee be called, and he has told Benazir that she should not express nervousness at the idea of calling a meeting of the Council of Common Concerns. The prime minister is worried because, according to the Constitution, if an issue is not decided in the Council of Common Concerns, the person supporting the issue can raise it in the joint session of the National Assembly and the Senate or the Parliament session. And the Parliament, as the supreme authority, can give the final verdict. The prime minister is worried that the issues will go to the Parliament after appearing in the Council of Common Concerns. Since she does not have the clear majority in the Parliament, she is bound to be defeated on those issues. However, it is not proper to suppress states constitutional rights and not call the meeting of this Council of Common Concerns just because of this fear. It would be better to take steps to alleviate the present tense and hostile atmosphere. After all, a country can be run only by mutual understanding and tolerance, and for how long can the meeting of the Council and Common Concerns and the Parliament session be postponed?

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